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
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RELIGION IN LIFE

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Preaching the Cross of Christ

JOHN PITTS

DURING the past half century there has arisen in Protestant circles what may be called a "cross-less" Christianity. It is a type of Christianity which does not seem to center consciously and willingly upon the death of Christ, and which refuses to sing, with any genuine feeling and conviction, such classic hymns as "In the Cross of Christ I Glory," "When I Survey the Wondrous Cross" and especially "There Is a Fountain Filled With Blood." In the preaching of the primitive Church there was one dominating name—CHRIST. That preaching linked to the dominating name one supreme epithet—it spoke of Christ *crucified*. We recall such mighty affirmations as those of Paul: "I determined to know nothing among you, save Jesus Christ and him crucified." "God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ." We remind ourselves of such pregnant sayings as those of Peter: "Forasmuch as ye know that ye were redeemed . . . with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot." "Who his own self bare our sins in his body right up to the tree, that we, being dead to sins, should live unto righteousness; by whose stripes ye were healed." Paul and Peter between them represent the major emphasis of the thinking and preaching of the Apostolic Church. Not that they always agreed; far from it. On one important occasion, and with reference to one crucial issue, Paul "withstood Peter to his face." But not on the question of "Christ crucified." There was no conflict of conviction on this supreme matter. And the two great apostles are typical of the whole of the primitive Church in regarding the Cross and its meaning as the very heart of the gospel. "Christ died for our sins, according to the Scriptures," was the cutting-edge of their message; and they could not conceive of any form of Christianity that did not center on the Cross of our Lord Jesus Christ.

But how different it is today, save in circles that are definitely fundamentalist in outlook. There is a type of "evangelism to the modern mind" which is quite sure that a careful and appealing presentation of the so-called "Synoptic Jesus" is powerful enough to bring men to God. It anchors its faith quite sincerely to the life and teaching and character

of Jesus as He is portrayed in Matthew, Mark and Luke; it finds its message of uplift in the "Christ of the Mount" and the "Flaming Mystic of the Galilean Hills" rather than a soteriological interpretation of that crude and cruel event whereby He passed from this earthly scene. Let us, says the New Evangelism, set forth the mighty power of Christ as revealed in the most memorable incidents of His career, and in His most memorable sayings—the healing of the paralyzed man, the words spoken to the "woman of the city" in the house of Simon the Pharisee, above all the story of the wayward son who found his way back to the father's home though he had never really been away from the father's heart—let scenes like these be presented warmly and sincerely, and they will never fail to bring sinful men and women face to face with the redeeming God. On this view, men can find God the Father independently of any and every theory of the atonement, and without reference even to the fact that Christ died on Calvary.

Of course, the most thoroughgoing manifestations of this tendency to regard the Cross as an irrelevance, even as an impertinence, are to be found outside specifically Christian circles. One of the most tender and beautiful of our modern English poets—the late William Watson—has devoted a sonnet to this very theme, in which he urges that today it would be more wise

"In His immortal greatness to forget
The mortal agony and the bloody sweat,"

and expresses his own deep conviction in the statement:

"To me His death is nought—His life is all."

Another modern writer, an American essayist, quotes with approval this challenging verse from an unknown poet:

"I fight alone, and win or sink,
I want no one to make me free;
I want no Jesus Christ to think
That he could ever die for me."

George Bernard Shaw has expressed the view with his usual forthrightness. "The central superstition of Christianity," he asserts, "is the salvation of the world by the gibbet." He does not like the superstition, and he will not accept the proffered redemption. He says quite emphatically that he does not glory in the Cross, that he regards the use of the Cross by the Church a deplorable and objectionable proceeding,

that had he been present in Jerusalem on the day of the crucifixion he would have done his utmost to prevent such a stupid judicial blunder, and that in his opinion "nothing has done more to hinder the spread of Christian doctrine than the substitution of a morbid interest in the sensational execution of Jesus for an intelligent comprehension of his views." We shall probably not find this view so baldly stated within the Church. Yet it is far from absent from contemporary preaching and theology. Many of us have taken the apostolic phrase "Christ crucified" and set the adjective at war with the noun. Christ, the supreme fact of Christian history and experience! Yes, we agree. As Christians we know that Christ is essential to our return to God, to our redemption from sin in this world, and to our hope of glory in the next. But "Christ *crucified*"! There's the rub. That is where we lose ourselves. We feel quite sure of the dominating name. We are far from sure about the supreme epithet.

Yet one thing seems quite certain, *viz.*, that in the Bible which is both the textbook of our faith and the charter of our commission, the death of Christ is represented as the very heart of the gospel. Both fact and meaning are there, both the plain print of history and interpretation in the light of experience. The New Testament writers did not make the distinction between fact and meaning to the extent of saying (as some modern preachers do): "We can preach the fact of Christ's death without bothering to work out a theory of it." They knew that such a distinction cannot be made. They were sure, in their own way, that a bare fact does not exist, that a meaningless fact is a sheer physical and psychological impossibility. They might not have been able to express this truth in the way we have just done. Certainly they could not have stated it in philosophical terms. They were not at all familiar with the "implicative system" or "inferential whole" of the modern logician, who assures us that even so simple a judgment as "This is a flower" is not so simple as it looks, but implies a whole system of meaningful relations. But they felt that it is impossible to separate the fact of Christ's death from the meaning of it; that is why they made their attempts to convey the meaning of the Cross of Jesus in the terms with which they were familiar. Whether or not they were right in these attempts to explain Christ's death in its relation to human need—whether or not there really was any relation between Calvary and man's spiritual necessities—is not the point here. The point is that in the New Testament the Cross is represented as being the very heart of the gospel, and that all the way through fact and mean-

ing are closely linked up as the essential message of God's redeeming love for the world.

The gospel records make much of the last week in the life of our Lord. The story of the events leading up to the crucifixion, and of the crucifixion itself, occupies at least two fifths of the evangelical material. In fact, the actual space given by the gospel writers to relating what happened to their Master during those six momentous days from the shout of the multitude: "Hosanna to the Son of David" to the cry of the crucified: "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit," is out of all proportion both to the rest of the narrative and to the time the events occupied. Of course, it is quite natural that the tragedy which ended the life of the Master should have produced an ineffaceable impression on the minds of those who loved and revered Him; and that fact may partly account for the large amount of space devoted to that tragedy in the Gospels. But is that the whole of the explanation? Is it the physical horror, rather than the spiritual value, of that death which led them to linger so long and painfully on the details of the passion? Or, further, if the spiritual value which they attached to the crucifixion was the thing which drove them to give the death of Christ such prominence, were they mistaken in attaching their soteriological theories to the plain print of history? Or, on the other hand, were they reflecting what they themselves had learnt of the mind of Christ?

There are some moderns who are quite certain that in devoting so much space to the story of the crucifixion the gospel writers were expressing merely their own opinions (or rather the opinions of the Apostle Paul, who somehow seems to have mentally dragooned the rest of the disciples into accepting his "strange" doctrines) and not the mind of Christ at all. They tell us that Jesus spoke very little about His own death, that the New Testament writers give it a prominence not warranted by Christ's own conception of His message to the world, and that even the large amount of space accorded in the evangelic records to the events of the Passion Week are a reflection of the "theologizing" tendencies of the Evangelists rather than an expression of Christ's own thought on the matter. But over against this it may be pointed out that if our Lord was reticent about His own death (and, we recall, He was reticent about other things as well), it was not without good reason. For one thing, as James Denney says, Christ came "not so much to preach the gospel as that there might be a gospel to preach." For another, the death of

Christ in its spiritual value and significance was one of those things the disciples were unable to bear until it had been accomplished and the Holy Spirit given to lead the disciples into the truth of Christ.

But, we may further ask, was our Lord quite so reticent as some of the critics would have us believe? Did He not endeavor to familiarize the minds of His followers with the thought of Calvary as soon as it was practicable? To ask these questions is to answer them, for if we are at all familiar with the gospel narrative we shall be reminded of the fact that (to quote Denney again) "that which, according to the Gospels themselves, characterized the last months of our Lord's life was a deliberate and thrice-repeated attempt to teach His disciples something about His own death." And more, on the night in which He was betrayed, in the borrowed upper room, with His chosen friends around Him, He instituted what we now call the "Lord's Supper." Making all allowances for Pauline influences in the reports of the institution of the Supper, we can nevertheless see here a reflection of the thought of Christ with reference to His own death. Whether or not the Cross was present to the consciousness of Jesus when He set out on His public ministry is not clear from the Gospels (though they who would say "Yes" here are not without some justification in the strange story of the temptation), but no one who believes the gospel narrative to possess a sound historical basis can gainsay the fact that when the Cross had presented itself to His mind it came fairly soon to occupy the central and determinative place in His thought. Both the Lord's Supper and the Lord's sayings are a revelation of the Lord's conviction concerning His own death; and if that be so, then such great affirmations of the primitive Church as "In whom we have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of our sins," and "He died, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God," must express a fundamental article of the Christian message.

Of course, in suggesting that the Cross is the heart of the gospel, we do not mean that the New Testament is concerned solely with the crucifixion, that there is nothing else in the New Testament save the death of Christ and its interpretation. Neither do we mean that the work of Christ is more important than the person of Christ. The work reveals the person; the person gives value to the work. One critic said of James Denney's great book on the Atonement that Denney was concerned with the *death* of Christ rather than with the death of *Christ*—a criticism that may be fairly brought against more than one treatment

of this theme and may partly explain the modern revolt against some of the older theories of the Atonement. We must recognize the comprehensiveness of New Testament teaching, and must avoid dissociating Christ's achievement upon Calvary from His character as expressed in His life and doctrine. "But"—to quote H. R. Mackintosh—"if we have read the Gospels, and noted the extraordinary proportion of space given to the Passion, if we have read the Epistles on the lookout for their main drift and interest, we are obliged to say that Apostolic Christianity without Atonement is as inept as the sentence without a verb. The verb is the *word* telling what is done; and the Cross of Christ is the great universal Word of God proclaiming what He does to reach and win the sinful." To Carlyle's despairing complaint against the Almighty that "He does nothing"—to Goethe's daring assertion: "If I were God, the sin of the world would break my heart"—we can reply by pointing to "Christ crucified." We can say that the sin of the world broke the heart of God in Christ upon Calvary. We can affirm that the Almighty Father did do something for man—something that man could not do for himself—when in the Lord of all Good Life He "endured the contradiction of sinners against himself."

Thus the Cross of Jesus both reveals God and evaluates man. It discloses, as does no other event in history, the lengths to which sacrificial love will go in order to redeem the sinful; and it shows, too, that man, although utterly unworthy of that love, is nevertheless worth it. We sometimes sing: "In Christ I feel the heart of God." Yes, the *heart* of God! But where? In Christ on the mount, when "he opened his mouth" and taught the disciple-multitude? In Christ when He had climbed the slopes of Hermon and in the presence of His three favorite disciples was transfigured with heavenly glory? In Christ in His controversies with the Pharisees and Sadducees? All revelations of the Divine character, no doubt! But they do not go far enough; they do not go as deep as the depths of human need demands. It is in Christ as He hangs from the "bitter tree" that we feel the great throbbing heart of the Almighty Father—throbbing with a love which loves to the uttermost and gives of its best because it gives of itself.

Yet we must not think of what God did for us in Christ upon the Cross as an isolated event in that time-series known as human history. Calvary was not just something that happened once and for all and was done with. It is much more than a fact, a moment, even a crisis, in his-

tory; it is the revelation of an eternal principle. "You cannot," says William Adams Brown, "crowd all of God into a moment of time, though a moment of time may be sufficient to give you an insight into what God is always doing. After that moment has come, you will see Him where you had not known He was at work and discover divine meanings in things that happen to you every day. The crucifixion of Jesus was such a moment. It was a revelation of the heart of God." That is why one New Testament writer can speak of Christ as "the Lamb slain before times eternal." And that is why all devout souls who believe in Him can call Him "Saviour."

"The hands upon the cruel tree,
Extended wide as mercy's span,
Have gathered to the Son of Man
The ages past, and yet to be.

One reaching backward to the prime
Enfolds the children of the morn;
The other, to a race unborn,
Extends the crowning gift of time."

But let us raise the fundamental question: What are the elements in the death of Christ which justify us in calling Him "Our Saviour"? What are the factors in the Cross that gave it value for God and give it saving efficacy for man? It is impossible to return a completely satisfying answer, as the history of Christian thought shows. For ten centuries the generally accepted theory of the atonement was the Ransom theory, which regarded the death of Christ as a ransom paid to the devil for the release from his captivity of the elect. This theory was given its quietus by Anselm in his epoch-making little book, *Cur Deus Homo*, whose Commercial theory (as it is called) regarded Christ's death as an infinite satisfaction made to God by Christ for the infinite wrong done to God by man's sin. At the Reformation, Anselm's Superfluous Merit theory (to give it its other name) was modified by the introduction of analogies derived from criminal law. The Penal Satisfaction theory of the Reformers maintained that the satisfaction rendered to God by Christ in His death consisted in the fact that Christ endured the punishment which otherwise must have fallen upon the "hell-deserving sinner." Calvin, for example, does not hesitate to say that Christ on the Cross endured the very torments of the damned, and interprets the "Descent into Hades" as a literal suffering of the pains of hell.

The next great attempt to explain the death of Christ was made

by the famous Dutch jurist, Grotius, in his Governmental theory. Grotius rejected altogether the ideas of legal substitution and mathematical equivalence; he held that Christ was not actually punished for the sins of men, but that He endured suffering which God could accept as a substitute for punishment. Through the death of Christ God remained just, while at the same time He became the justifier of the unjust. Finally, we have the various Moral Influence theories which stress the fact that the death of Christ was a revelation of the heart of God designed to bring sinful men back to their heavenly Father and to win their love for Himself. For example, Dr. McLeod Campbell held that an *adequate* repentance would be a sufficient satisfaction for sin; he maintained that Christ on Calvary offered to the Almighty on behalf of man this adequate repentance and so fulfilled the conditions of forgiveness. Again, Horace Bushnell taught that the death of Christ was an expression of the *vicarious nature of love*, which identifies itself with its object, even to the bearing of the object's sins, and so proves the strongest influence leading men to repentance and faith.

Probably Protestant theology today is divided between the Penal Satisfaction theory on the one hand and some form of the Moral Influence theory on the other. There is considerable vitality in the older view, a vitality which springs from the important element of truth which the theory enshrines; but it cannot be denied that the later theory is more in line with the modern psychological approach to the problem of human sin and salvation. Sin estranges men from God; and the death of Christ, by helping men to realize what is their true attitude to God, induces them to turn aside from the pride and selfishness which separates them from their heavenly Father. In the Cross of Jesus the moral qualities of faith and love are revealed at their highest, and it is these qualities which give our Lord's sacrifice its value for God and its saving efficacy for man; but this saving efficacy is possible only because in Christ we have the embodiment in human form of the redemptive love which has been in God from the beginning.

What can we say to these—at points—conflicting theories? Two things. One is that not one of them contains the whole truth, and every one of them conveys some truth, about the saving efficacy of the death of Christ. The other thing is that there is an important truth which is common to all these theories of the atonement. It is this: *Christ went freely to the Cross.* When we have noted the historical

circumstances which attended His end and have endeavored to evaluate them, we have not reached the heart of the matter unless we also mark the faith and love, the devotion and loyalty, which characterized every step of the way until He reached Golgotha's crown. It was the attitude of mind which Jesus exhibited, the moral quality of a perfect and whole-hearted obedience, that makes the Cross of Christ acceptable in the eyes of God. He went to His death willingly in order that men should live; and hence He fulfilled the divine ideal of sacrifice.

This important truth has been well expressed by Peter Taylor Forsyth in his thought-provoking volume, *The Cruciality of the Cross*. He discusses the old phrase, "the blood of Christ," and tries to set forth its essential truth in terms acceptable to the modern mind. He argues that it would not have mattered in the least if not a single drop of Christ's blood had been shed, that it would have made no real difference if Christ had come to His end by some other form of execution than that of crucifixion. There would have been no change of essential truth—only of the imagery by which the truth is set forth. But, he goes on to say, "it would have mattered a whole world if Jesus had met His end by disease or accident. Everything turns, not on His life having been taken from Him, but on its having been laid down. Everything, for His purpose, turns on the will to die." It was His faith in God, His love for man and His utter devotion to His cause, which led Him to go freely to His death. It is this free surrender of His life that gives the Cross value for God and saving efficacy for man; and it is the recognition of this truth that constitutes the common element underlying all the various theories of the Atonement.

Many pertinent questions arise at this point. For one thing, the insistence upon the fact that Christ went freely to the Cross suggests the inquiry, Did He commit suicide? The question sounds irreverent to us, but it has been asked—and answered with a decided affirmative—by some. Again, it may be asked, Was Jesus done to death because His pacifism would not allow Him to adopt a policy of self-defense? But to answer this question in the affirmative is to raise other problems not easily solved; for example, Why did He not seek safety in flight? Or was it that He could not escape? If that is so, then it follows that He died because He could not help it. Or if we suppose that He might have escaped but would not, does it follow that His disciples must also refuse to escape death by flight?

Again, it may be asked, Was the death of Christ merely that of a martyr? If we say "Yes" to this, does it not make His death less than that of a martyr? We have only to compare Socrates in his prison cell drinking the cup of poison without hesitation, greeting the unseen with a cheer, and a jest upon his lips, with Jesus in Gethsemane, His soul exceedingly sorrowful unto death, and praying that His cup might pass from Him—we have only to make this comparison to see that if Christ died a martyr's death and nothing more, then He was (and this is said quite reverently) a poor sort of martyr. Yet further we might ask, How does the death of Christ prove the love of God? How does the death of one person (Christ) prove the love of a second person (God)? Or does it mean that we cannot speak of two persons here, but rather must identify Christ and God so that what Christ does for us is really what God is doing for us in and through Him? And yet once more we may ask, How can the death of Christ prove God's love to us unless we were in some spiritual danger from which only such an event as the Cross could save us?

All these questions have a bearing upon the problem of the atonement from the point of view of its preachableness, but it would require a substantial volume to deal with them. Here we may consider two points in closing. The first is this: The conviction that Christ in some way died for, or on behalf of, men dignifies and enhances the value of human personality. We see that expressed as an ethical first principle in the New Testament. "Destroy not him with thy meats *for whom Christ died,*" exclaims the Apostle; and it is the fact that Christ died for men that lifts them up out of the miry clay, sets their feet upon a rock, establishes their goings, and puts a new song in their mouth. T. R. Glover has given several striking examples from church history of the recognition of this ethical first principle. In the fifth century there was a North African bishop who remonstrated with a governor for ill-treating the natives. He said: "You are treating men as if they were cheap, but man is a thing of price, for Christ died for him." There is the case of the scholar, Muretus, in the sixteenth century, who was journeying on foot through Italy. He became ill and was carried to a hospital in a strange town. As he was laid on the operating table he heard one of the doctors say to another, in Latin, "Try your experiment on this cheap life"; and to the surprise of the doctors he himself called out, also in Latin, "Do you call a life cheap for which Christ did not

disdain to die?" But probably the best expression of this is to be found in that masterpiece of early English literature, *The Vision of Piers Ploughman*, by William Langland. Langland has been referring to Calvary, and then says:

"Blood-brothers did we all become there
And gentlemen each one."

Thus the Cross not only binds us to God, it also binds us to one another. It is because Christ died that we have the assurance that man is "better than a sheep," that in his life he is not merely "a nobody on the road to nowhere."

The second point is this: A Jew and a Christian were once arguing about the virgin birth, and at last the Jew flung down this challenge: "If a woman were to tell you the story which Mary is supposed to have told, would you believe her?" "Yes," replied the Christian, "*if her Son were Jesus.*" He meant that so incredible a happening as the virgin birth became more easily believable when considered in relation to the uniqueness of the One who is alleged to have come into the world in that miraculous way. We may apply the same principle in speaking of the death of Christ. We must not separate the Cross from the crucified, we must not separate the death of Christ from the Christ who died. It is not merely the circumstances of His death that make it different from any other death; it is the fact that it was He who died. In this sense, it is not the Cross that saves men from their sins; it is the Christ of the Cross who is the Saviour of the world. We cannot understand that Cross, we cannot understand His own attitude toward it and His recognition of its necessity, unless we are prepared to believe that Christ was a unique Person who had come to fulfill a unique mission. As W. E. Orchard puts it: "The full explanation of Christ's acceptance of the Cross can only be found in the complete doctrine of His person as human and divine, and in His death as being the only means of redeeming the world." The early Church proclaimed the good news of Christ crucified. We live in a different age. Yet men's fundamental needs are just the same in the twentieth century as in the first, however much they may be overlaid and disguised by "our prodigal-son culture." And we can preach—yea, not merely can, but must preach—the same message: Christ *crucified*, Christ crucified.

The Political Dilemmas of a Christian

LYNN HAROLD HOUGH

THE problem of what ought to be and what is, perpetually confronts mankind. It becomes particularly difficult in the field of politics. The Christian is a relative being in a relative country which is a part of a relative world. He seems to be submerged in relativity. Yet he cherishes the conviction that he is a responsible representative of that which transcends the relative and partakes of the nature of the eternal. How shall he so conduct himself that he is saved from betraying the eternal in the midst of the confusions of time? How shall he so represent the eternal that through his offices it will obtain a genuine authority in the temporal life? The problem is made more difficult because many shrewd men who have no interest in permanent standards are quite ready to use the vocabulary of the eternal to advance their own questionable and sometimes evil purposes. And the difficulty is further increased when the Christian looks into his own heart and discovers that he cannot be as sure of his own motives as he would like to be. And deeper than everything else there is the problem of being quite sure of the nature of those eternal principles which have a right to be regnant in the life of time. When the Christian confronts his life as a citizen and desires to be clear as to the fashion in which he should discharge his political responsibilities, he finds that he is in a very complicated situation where it is all too easy to go wrong.

I

Let us begin with the nature of the principles which he must represent. We may gather them into a phrase by saying that the Christian is committed to the life of moral love. Or if we like another form of words better, we may say that he is bound to put all his weight always on the side of righteous good will. If he is a Christian in the classical tradition, he will not have any problem about the use of force for the maintaining of freedom. He will know that good will without military force in a crisis becomes politically impotent. He will know also that military power which is not dominated by righteous good will becomes tyrannical. So he will have a very great problem about the actual nature

of the *cause* for which he unsheathes the sword. But he will have no problem about his right as a Christian to unsheathe the sword in defending the very righteous good will without which life would lose its meaning as an experience of civilized men. To see in Christianity only one principle and that a love which is not shot through with moral meaning is to depart from the very genius of historic Christianity. The tragedy of the isolated virtue has betrayed Christianity again and again. Puritanism was likely to emphasize righteousness and forget love so it fell into one moral heresy. Pacifism has always been inclined to emphasize love and to forget the claim of righteousness. So it has fallen into the opposite heresy. The Christian in the central historic stream of Christian thought emphasizes righteous love and so he has no difficulty in believing in a clean sword. His problems arise when he comes to consider a clean cause worthy of the clean sword.

The reign of moral love is a high conception. The rule of righteous good will presents a noble creed. It gathers together all those desirable elements in the moral and political and social and industrial and international life of man for which we should strive constantly. We can discard it only at the peril of our very claim to good character. Difficult as it may be, dizzy as are the heights of thought and action to which it calls us, we can enlist under no less demanding banner. The Christian life is a life of moral love moving out to enter and to master every aspect of experience.

II

In a democracy the man who stands for a life of righteous good will must work with men in every stage of moral development and of every stage of moral disintegration. The most astonishing collection of men and women make up the company of those who exercise the franchise. They represent several distinct situations. There is the vast body of men of sincere good will who represent every stage in respect of that critical intelligence which determines the judgment. There is the large and significant body of men without moral scruples who would use the franchise for purposes which would exploit the public for the sake of particular groups or particular individuals. We may put the pith of the matter in two brief sentences. In a democracy bad men vote. In a democracy men of bad judgment vote.

We can cherish sound hope of educating the man of bad judgment so that his judgment will be improved. The man of bad purpose presents

the ultimate political as indeed the ultimate moral problem of the world. All these complications of human intelligence and human character become almost tragically significant at the time of a national election. The man who wins must have a majority of the votes. And the more he is a man of practical sagacity the more he is tempted to make speeches for the purpose of getting votes rather more than for the unhesitating expression of great principles. And he is tempted to political alliances which would never be suggested by his deeper purposes as a statesman. Mr. Franklin Roosevelt can scarcely be supposed to have enjoyed his political alliance with corrupt political organizations in certain great American cities. The alliances were made nonetheless. Mr. Dewey must have lost many thousands of votes through the very speeches which were supposed to win votes. When he blamed Mr. Roosevelt for failing to do more in regions where Mr. Dewey himself and men like him had made it difficult for the President to do anything at all, he assumed a naïve simplicity on the part of the American voter which happily that voter does not possess. He could never be forthright because he wanted to keep the support of the isolationists without losing the support of men who had a sense of American international responsibilities. Mr. Roosevelt on his side was confronted by the problem of getting the support of social reactionaries whose votes were necessary for his election.

The quiet Christian man who wanted to support righteous good will in the country and the world found the situation difficult enough. If he wanted to find fault with many of Mr. Roosevelt's domestic policies and actions, did he dare to say that they were as important as his international vision and understanding and leadership as the greatest of wars moved toward its climax? If he was impressed by Mr. Dewey's record as a prosecuting attorney cleaning up ugly plague spots in the greatest of American cities, could he avoid the question of whether a prosecuting attorney quite innocent in respect of great international problems and having as his most dramatic supporters a group of die-hard isolationists could emerge as a trustworthy world statesman? Mr. Roosevelt was sometimes trivial in his statements. Mr. Dewey was at times not too sturdy in resisting the temptation to misrepresent facts and to misstate situations. Both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Dewey were willing to let their hearers believe that the victory of a particular party would mean more than the victory of either party could possibly mean.

Clearly then the quiet Christian could not suppose that he was asked

to decide between Saint George and the Dragon. Neither candidate was good enough to be Saint George. Neither was bad enough to be a dragon. With an absolute principle the quiet Christian had to decide which candidate and which party would do most for that which is essential in Christian conduct.

III

There was always at last the personal problem. For the Christian himself was a relative person. His problem had to do with himself as well as with other people and with organized groups.

He had past political allegiance. Did his previous record in respect of either party tend now to blind his judgment? He had fears and hopes of his own. If he was a white man in the South, did his fear in respect of certain racial tensions unduly affect his judgment? If he was a Negro, did he tend to think first of what he believed to be the rights of his race and second of the good of the Republic and the good of the world? If he was a man who viewed the problem of Jewish persecution and the tragedies of anti-Semitism all about the world with the terrible indignation and deep sympathy for the Jews inevitable in a true Christian, was he likely to think of the problem of Palestine without any serious consideration of the rights of the Arabs and to welcome the commitment of his party to a policy in respect of Jewish settlement in Palestine which might mean the securing of votes rather than a solution based upon a consideration of all the elements of the problem? If he was a businessman and wanted a security the present administration had not given, was he tempted to so quick an anger that he blamed a particular authority for problems, some of which would have been equally difficult for any political party? Did his response to political speeches spring from his psychological nuances or from his clear Christian intelligence?

IV

Altogether the American democracy is a wonderful institution. The tumult and the shouting have died. Potential enemies have once more become good neighbors. The forces of good will are stronger than the forces of bad will. And they are closing in for loyal action in days to come. We will pursue the war to a victorious finish. We will attempt to implement a peace in good fashion. And all the other problems—one by one—must be faced. Neither as a politician nor as a Christian can a man solve even the smallest problem by ignoring it.

A Tonic for Christian Morals

GEORGE A. COE

THE term "Christian morals" is here employed to designate, not anything that Jesus was or taught, not the moral implications of the faith in its purity, but the characteristic attitudes and practices of the part of our population that calls itself Christian. If the familiar "visitor from Mars" should become inquisitive as to the moral forces in our society, he would note, among other things, the prevalence of preaching, instruction of the young, books, periodicals and assemblies, all called Christian, that claim to be the American part of the chief constructive moral force in the entire world. Accordingly, the unprejudiced visitor would ask, "What are the major moral issues of the time, where does Christianity stand with respect to them, and what are these Christians doing to make Christian morals prevail?"

His conclusion would be—well, what would it be? And what do we think about the same questions? What do we, as Christians, really want, and what are we doing to bring it to pass? We want peace, of course, but so do non-Christians. Are we, then, committed to a particular conception of what peace implies, or to any specific process for attaining it? Obviously not. We stand, likewise, for both justice and good will; but what is the Christian view of justice (as related—say—to the treatment of war criminals and of conquered peoples), and how must our economic and political structures, be changed if good will is to control them? The answers that these questions usually receive are so generalized, so lacking of the specifications that conduct must take into account if it is to be planned, that we who sing, "all one body, we," are split apart morally, and moving in the same various directions in which non-Christians move. The splitting up here mentioned is not parallel to our ecclesiastical divisions, for our denominations, as a rule, are made up of marchers in all directions.

One might indulge some curiosity as to how a religion that is morally vague, confused and broken into fragments can be the major moral force in civilization. I shall not deny that, in spite of these limitations, it might actually be what it claims to be. In any case, there is a more pressing question, namely: What are the effects upon conduct of this vagueness,

confusion and contradiction; what are the causes of it, and which of these causes might we control? This question leads at once to the fact that in broad areas there is lack of logical continuity between what is said and what is done. The contrast between our principles and our practices is a matter of common knowledge. Everybody knows that our ordinary and expected conduct does not constitute an exposition of the intentions that we think we have. A remark is often made and never denied that this or that defect in our society *could* be remedied by Christians—that there are enough of them, and that they have in their hands such instruments of power as education, printing presses, bank balances and great organizations. Another uncontradicted remark is that one cannot tell Christians from non-Christians by anything in their actions that is open to general observation. Even if there are differences in what is called private conduct (and I would not insinuate that there are no differences), nevertheless the kinds of political, economic and international conduct in which Christians, even outstanding ones, play a part, appears to flow in channels of its own, not in channels that exhibit Christian intentions. Does anyone doubt that if the conduct of Christians, the conduct of half of them, corresponded to their principles, the course of events would be profoundly altered? The cleft in us is so pervasive and so persistent that it is taken for granted almost as if it were included in good social breeding. It arouses some regrets, but little excitement, and no agony. Prayers of contrition do mention it, but such prayers have become “standard equipment” in public worship, as if this occasion for contrition were expected to be repeated indefinitely.

Endeavors to understand this divided self of ours have been made—three in particular. The first, often heard a half century ago, alleges that we are hypocrites. But hypocrisy is a deliberate attitude expressed in specific purposes, whereas our fault, obviously, is lack of specific purposes; we are not active enough, where our principles are in question, to deserve the charge of hypocrisy. Rather, there is a weak link between thought and action. To change the figure, the sentinel is drowsy.

A second attempted explanation invokes the theory of depravity. It holds or implies that hidden preferences, inherent in human nature, override our principles—that our principles are not really ours. This view, at best, would account for only half of the phenomenon that we have under consideration. For good principles, as observation shows, are as characteristic of us as our bad conduct. Indeed, idealistic views of man,

even glorification of human nature because our aspirations are inextinguishable, proceed from the very same set of facts as the theory of depravity. The truth is that our ideal aspirations and our unideal conduct interlock, each acquiring meaning from the other. The coincidence of law and crime is what yields the meaning of both. The reason that we are able to confess our selfishness is that conscience, the surrogate of society, is a part of our very selves.

There is a more cautious way of looking at the discrepancy between principle and practice. It notes that, starting from one and the same set of facts, both the idealistic views of man and the theory of depravity vault in one long leap to supposed fixed traits of human nature, ignoring the possible influence of habits induced by temporary historical conditions. When we discriminate from each other these two possible factors, the one original and permanent, the other acquired and changeable, we perceive that both are involved. Inasmuch as man participates in the evolutionary order of animate nature, and likewise is inescapably included in the process of change that we call history, his conduct reflects, as a matter of course, jostling points of view, a mixture of preferences for what is passing away with preferences for what is coming to be. Our ability to be thus self-contradictory *and to know it is*, in fact a chief mark of our moral nature. A consequence is that morality must weigh and reweigh not only the objects that give us satisfaction or its opposite, but also ourselves. Because we are human and more or less reflective, we demand, and we always shall do so, a selfhood that differs from the present one; we shall entertain principles that outrun some part of our conduct.

This is the matrix whence our moral self-contradictions proceed. But the matrix does not account for the whole career of any particular inconsistency. No scrutinizing of original nature will discover why, a few years ago, hoop skirts and bustles were expressions of "good taste" whereas now they are ridiculous examples of "bad taste"; nor why dueling, once honorable, has become dishonorable; nor why religious sensitiveness once burned heretics but now shudders at the thought of doing so. The truth is that, just as there are fashions in clothes and in methods of quarreling, so a given mode of self-judgment may become a custom or a fashion. The present way of excusing ourselves for the gap between principle and practice is a custom. Its characteristic procedure is as follows: Distinction is made between "the inner man" and "the outer man"; each individual is identified with his "inner man"; the functions of the "inner

man" are taken to be ideas, emotions and feelings of attraction and repulsion; if these are good, the man is judged to be good. We pursue this route only one step farther when we assume that, even if a man's conduct is bad, he is a good man provided that his intentions are good. This, I say, is a custom. Let us trace it to its origin.

We are dealing here with a back-lying philosophical and psychological assumption that we are essentially "spiritual" beings—in the language of yesterday, "souls" inhabiting bodies. Parallel with this is an assumption that God also is a "spiritual" being—that primarily He lives within His own thoughts and feelings, and only secondarily and in obscure ways takes part in the welter of world events. When these two assumptions are fused together they seem to give solidity to the notion that there are two worlds of experience—a world in which religion (guided by religious experts) is a proper concern, and a world in which secular affairs (guided by a different set of experts) also is a proper concern. Thus we acquire two standards and two sorts of leadership, and the resulting inconsistencies in our conduct seem to represent the nature of things rather more than they represent any blameworthy act of ours.

Are we, then, in fact, spiritual beings, with functions separable from the functions of our muscles? How, indeed, have we come to think so? This idea was not original to the religion of Israel, nor to the religion of the early Christians. In both of them it was a residual from the primitive mode of interpreting dreams and other states in which apparently men are seen where their bodies are not. Between belief in ghosts and the assumption that we are "spiritual" beings, only incidentally attached to bodies, there is historical and psychological continuity. This is an arresting truth. Though it does not prove that the common assumption is incorrect, it challenges us who do not believe in ghosts to consider the factual evidence with respect to the nature of man.

Psychologists, with practical unanimity, now look upon a human being as an organic whole—a mind-body unit, not a mind-and-body composite. The general considerations that have led to this view cannot be reproduced here; there is space for nothing more than some illustrations of mind-body unity in religion itself. That primitive and near-primitive religion was all one with endeavors at tribal self-maintenance by fishing, hunting, agriculture, government, and war is well known by all students of the history of culture. When distinctively religious institutions arose, the meaning of religion could not be expressed without reference to the psych-

ical maintenance of priests (their claim to a part of the sacrificial animal was co-ordinate with the claim of the divinity who received the smoke), likewise to the maintenance of some sort of coercive social order. With the growth of social differentiations and the rise of "social issues," religion became more and more, though less and less consciously, a part of the process of class self-maintenance. Religion as maintenance of a priesthood reaches a climax in the Roman Catholic insistence that true religion is impossible without the Pope and the Church. Religion as class maintenance reached a climax in Czarist Russia. A refugee from the revolution said to me with emotion, "The Czar is part of our religion." Even when there is deliberate endeavor to attain to a spirituality that is above all bodily functions, all priesthoods and all social orders, as in Indian mysticism and in some sorts of Christian mysticism, still the mind-body unity can be detected. Both the yogi and the Christian contemplative practice muscular control—a state of muscle is part and parcel of what they desire should be purely spiritual. Moreover, there is overwhelming evidence that the most outstanding Christian mystics have been subject to physiological conditions of excess or defect that are reflected in or compensated for by mystical states.

Thus, not only general psychological considerations, but also the actualities of religion itself lead to the conclusion that every adequate moral judgment upon myself must include a reference to my body. Possibly some persons will regard this as a depressing conclusion; but, on the contrary, it is a moral tonic. How great a tonic cannot be said within the space of this article. I must limit myself to a remark or two about the relation of voluntary muscles to voluntary religion, leaving out of present consideration glandular and other nonvoluntary processes that have much to do with the qualities of a person. If we are to practice religion voluntarily without self-delusion, we must refuse to regard any intention as good that does not contain a reference to some specific desirable use of voluntary muscles. The reference must be specific because there is no such thing as muscle-in-general, and because muscular action always is a matter of some particular time, place and direction. It is worthy of remark that the Epistle of James hits the nail precisely on the head when it spoofs the kind of regard for the hungry that is not a muscular as well as an "inner and spiritual" regard.

How fresh and stimulating the whole religious landscape will become when everywhere in it we perceive a muscular pro and con as well as a

pro and con of ideas and feelings! Ecclesiastical assemblies, conferences and committees, when they declare their convictions with respect to social issues, would indicate the physical acts that are approved or condemned, and this would make necessary such formulae as point unmistakably to the owners of the muscles concerned. There are precedents for precisely this kind of procedure, as when Mr. Gary, then the head of the United States Steel Corporation, was personally confronted with his own responsibility for the twelve-hour day of his workingmen. Worship, too, would be vitalized by this recognition of the moral significance of muscle. At present, any attendant at church services who gives his assent to what is said in the prayers, the Scripture readings and the sermon, especially if the assent is emotionally warm, naturally enough regards himself with satisfaction—satisfaction that may or may not involve self-deception. The present movement for the enrichment of worship increases the danger of self-deception, for it attaches increased emotion to verbal formulae and to symbols taken apart from the specific moral issues of the present. This is not the road toward reality in worship. We are supposed, when we worship, to be engaged in the struggle of good against evil; but if our devotions contain no consciousness of the muscular phase of the struggle, no thought of God as possibly incarnated in our own muscles, our worship becomes a means of perpetuating the gap between principles and practice. These words do not imply that worship is becoming too esthetic or too emotional, nor that we should be contented with prosy piety. Quite the contrary! The esthetic glow, and the elevated sense of the meaningfulness of life will be intensified when they come out of the relative vacuum which now they vainly strive to fill. Nothing can be more thrilling; nothing can make duty more beautiful; nothing can witness more powerfully to the presence of God, than muscle voluntarily guided toward the greatest good.

Psychotherapy and the Christian Ministry

DAVID E. ROBERTS

IN THIS essay I am not going to discuss theoretically the relations between psychology and religion, except to say that we cannot cut the Gordian knot by declaring that there is a clear division of labor between them. I agree that a Christian minister has one function and a psychoanalyst has another; but each of them tries to deal with man as a whole, and each is concerned, in his own way, with problems of motivation, ethical orientation and ultimate beliefs. Many writers, occupying widely diverse standpoints, hold that psychology should pay no attention to metaphysical questions. I think they are mistaken, at least so far as psychoanalysis is concerned. Every therapist has an operative philosophy of human nature, whether he has formulated it theoretically or not. That outlook has metaphysical and theological implications which should be acknowledged and examined.

As a clinical procedure, however, therapy stands nearer to religion than to philosophy or theology. It works primarily through personal relations instead of through theoretical ideas. Just as the reading of a textbook in theology is not likely to make a man a Christian, so the reading of a textbook in psychoanalysis is not likely to cure a neurosis. Therefore theoretical considerations are often left aside in the course of an analysis, because it is aimed primarily at uncovering feelings. Indeed, one of the major obstacles therapists encounter in dealing with academically trained patients is that the latter translate everything into conceptual categories instead of being able to have and to recognize their feelings "as they come." And it is a significant fact that as long as a patient maintains a theoretical attitude toward his problems, he makes little progress in solving them.

I

First let me indicate some of the limiting conditions which surround the practice of psychotherapy. It is not a panacea. It is not a substitute for friendship, work, play, art, philosophy, worship or any other funda-

mental human interest, although it may re-educate a man in the way he pursues such interests. Moreover, there are certain minimal requirements which must ordinarily be fulfilled in order for it to help much at all. Obviously there must be enough voluntary co-operation on the part of the patient to keep him coming back for more. Most people do not go to a therapist unless they are in serious need, and are therefore predisposed to co-operate. And most of them would not stick with it, after they find out how agonizing it can be, unless circumstances goaded them on. And some people, when they get a glimpse of the full seriousness of their problems, run away from going deeper, either by simply discontinuing, or by developing an insurmountable hatred for the analyst, or by getting sick so that they cannot keep their appointments, or by squandering their money on other things so that they cannot pay, etc.

Another limiting condition is to be found in external circumstances. Often they are so difficult that analysis can do no more than help meet very terrible problems; it can't make the problems anything less than terrible. Here I am thinking of such handicaps as incurably low mentality, incurable physical infirmity, and many of the fateful tragedies which attend war, race prejudice and poverty. It is often surprising, however, how much difference analysis can make in changing one's internal attitude toward circumstances which cannot be altered; and it also frequently enables a person to take initiative in changing circumstances which he hitherto regarded as unalterable.

One final qualification needs to be added. People seldom get out of therapy what they expected when they began; hence, their criteria as to what constitutes a successful analysis change. They begin expecting to have all of the inconvenient consequences of their neuroses removed, without having to relinquish the neuroses themselves; and they end with the humbling discovery that their most important gain has been in power to take responsibility for their own difficulties instead of blaming them on other people or upon fate. And so the major difference between a neurotic and an integrated person is that the former cannot make progress in solving his problems through an internal change of character-structure, while the latter can. The difference is not that one has problems while the other doesn't. The difference is, to put it colloquially, that one is stuck in a rut, while the other is able to drive his car over a road which probably is still rather bumpy.

II

Now let us take a glance at the sort of thing that usually happens in an analysis. The patient comes with a single problem or a whole collection of problems. He has his own ideas about the causes of his difficulties, and he expects the analyst to take these ideas at their face value. He also has his own specifications as to what will constitute a successful solution of the problem. He tells the whole story and then says, in effect: "Now I've done my part. You go to work and get the thing cleaned up." The patient is usually somewhat baffled when the analyst suggests that they simply continue to talk around the problem. He fails to see what good that is going to do, and he begins to wonder what he is paying all this money out for, anyway. Then, gradually, if an atmosphere of mutual confidence and candor is established, feelings and attitudes begin to crop up which put his problem in a new light. He comes to realize that the specific difficulty which he wants to remove is merely one surface manifestation of deep-seated personal traits, and that he cannot remedy what is troubling him without a transformation of himself—his motives, his feelings and his picture of himself.

What does the patient find when he begins to get beneath his immediate problems to some glimpse of the soil in which they have their roots? Obviously, what anyone finds is different in each individual case. However, what most people find is that they are serving two masters, and serving them more or less automatically. In a typical instance, we might call one master "the Pharisee" and the other master "the Brute." The Pharisee is primarily interested in maintaining a good opinion of himself; he must always be in the right; he must always be striving toward perfection. Hence, whenever anything discreditable happens in the life of the self, the Pharisee disclaims responsibility. The Brute, on the other hand, is primarily made up of those drives and impulses which rebelliously break through to the surface in moments when we have "lost control"—in rage, defiance, aggressiveness, lust, etc. Admittedly this is a condensed and impressionistic way of trying to suggest a typical sort of conflict; its purpose is merely to illustrate why the neurotic person usually feels as though he is caught in the middle of a psychological tug of war between opposing forces, neither of which is entirely subject to his own will. Thus he constantly finds that his own actions and his relations with other people do not turn out the way he wants them to.

Frequently a crisis is reached at this juncture. The patient feels

hopeless because a wider awareness of his pharisaical and his brutal strategies doesn't seem to put an end to them. In fact, it is very discouraging when one really identifies himself with such traits to realize that they somehow spring from within himself instead of being due entirely to circumstances or to society. As I have just indicated, the neurotic usually feels that his difficulties have "happened to him," or were "done to him" by other people. And in view of the fact that his character structure was basically formed in childhood before he could take responsibility for it, he is partly right. Sometimes it is not until one has gone back, and relived in feeling the formative events of earlier years, bringing the reactions of the confused and defenseless child into the context of the adult emotions and understanding of the present, that a cure can be effected. But a crisis is reached when one begins to have insight into these forces which are beyond his voluntary control, because it takes a great deal of faith to go deeper into awareness of them instead of drawing back. To go forward seems like increasing one's acquaintance with how complete and how overpowering his bondage is. And yet the therapeutic evidence is clear: the only way to gain mastery over the Pharisee and the Brute is to widen awareness of them as authentic aspects of oneself, and, in the end, to get them to make friends with each other.

Let me stress the fact that the Brute is made up primarily of those impulses or traits which a man repudiates *without becoming aware of them*. And the Pharisee is constructed to act as a sort of policeman in keeping them under. What is *bad* about such an arrangement is that a great deal of vitality and capacity for constructive work are locked up inside the Brute, and the Pharisee is constantly keeping them locked up under the pretext of being a guardian of virtue. Through free association, the interpretation of dreams and the other resources of therapy it is sometimes possible to civilize the Brute and to humanize the Pharisee.

III

This breaking down of the partition between conflicting factors in the life of the self, by bringing both into consciousness so that each can modify the other, is the fundamental aim of therapy. In ordinary life we are all aware, of course, of a contrast between the public personalities which we have built up and the private, inmost secrets of our hearts. And sometimes the contradiction between the two is startling enough, even in so-called healthy people. But what I am talking about, lies at a

deeper level because it has to do with pretenses and conflicts which we do *not* recognize. Let me illustrate by means of another example which I shall call the case of the Dogmatist vs. the Skeptic. Here is a man who holds to his convictions, not merely with sincerity, but with a sort of desperate rigidity. When he comes across an argument or a fact which would require revision of his convictions, and, by implication, an admission that the basis of his life has been partially unsound, this individual goes functionally blind; or he gets angry, or supercilious, or in some other way retires within the citadel of his fixed position. Perhaps he is clever enough to conceal his dogmatism from others and from himself, combining great liberality of manner with inner inflexibility. The main point is that the Dogmatist in him is correlative with an unconscious skepticism which is in conflict with his sincere conscious convictions. He remains unaware of this conflict, which is another way of saying that he is unable to let it come out into the open.

Just as in the case of the Pharisee vs. the Brute, there is a tendency here to place all the virtue on one side and all the vice on the other. The Dogmatist is regarded as safeguarding the views of the "higher" self, while the Skeptic, when his doubts do manage to reach the surface, is repudiated as the "lower" self. What analysis discloses is that each of these opponents is a distortion; each is a parasite, feeding upon the other. And the individual has a tremendously powerful motive for not letting the conflict come out into the open, because it would betray the fact that he has no wholehearted views of his own.

IV

Now, most ordinarily healthy people can carry around mild forms of conflict all their lives without serious trouble. They remain largely unaware of them; hence the contradictions do not interfere unduly with their happiness or their work. But when the conscious picture of the self is seriously estranged from reality, a vicious circle sets in. Because this picture is false, it has to be maintained by increasingly desperate measures. For example, a person who has come to base his life on the formula that his failures are due to the ill-will of other people will be compelled to resort to various expedients in maintaining the formula. He will be especially nasty to persons who make overtures of kindness; and if they persist in their friendliness, he will have to find some way of impugning their motives. You might say, "Why would anybody want to maintain

such a stupid formula?" The answer probably is that in order to give it up he would have to be able to recognize how much his own antagonism accounts for his difficulties; and to be put in the wrong in this way is something he will fight against to the last ditch. Moreover, he is probably afraid to feel affection toward others, precisely because he needs it so much. He has long since given up hope on this score and has steeled himself defiantly to get along without it. Once a neurotic strategy like this gets established, it tends to mire the individual ever more deeply behind his own defenses. Because his formula is false, he is increasingly forestalled from carrying on the give-and-take of life; everything that happens must be made to fit the formula, and a free interchange with existence would produce some things which would not fit. Usually, therefore, neurotics do not seek help until, despite themselves, their formulae break down. They can no longer run away, and yet they cannot go forward. This is a "breakdown" in the familiar sense; and it may range from simple bafflement to utter desperation.

V

How does therapy enable a person to get these wasteful conflicts out into the open? Many resources are employed, but I shall confine attention to one of the most important. *The inhibitions and fears which prevent unconscious forces from being recognized are relaxed in therapy because it creates an atmosphere of provisional moral neutrality.* If the analyst is competent, he is sufficiently well balanced so that he does not exploit the patient in connection with his own neurotic needs. In his presence it is possible to admit faults and failures without the fear that he will use this admission to satisfy his own need to feel superior. One can afford to be dependent upon him in certain respects without fearing that he will dominate or enslave. And, on the other hand, the analyst knows how to deal with various forms of spiritual blackmail, resentment, appeals for pity, pseudo repentance, etc. He has learned through general experience, and through intimate acquaintance with the strategies of the particular patient involved, to discriminate between conscious and unconscious motives. (For example, many patients try to make the analyst into a moral judge; they want him to scold them so that they can feel that they have paid the price in humiliation for their sins.) He must be alert to the hidden meanings which constantly lie behind the patient's explanation of his own reactions; and it takes an emotionally mature person to know how to do

all this sympathetically without feeding self-pity in the patient, and yet to do it realistically without playing the role of policeman.

One of the reasons why the average minister today cannot be of as much help as we might wish in counseling is not merely that he lacks the professional training, but that he is incapable of entering into the kind of human relationship I have just described. Let us assume that the minister is well balanced; he can absorb resentment; he is able to listen instead of doing most of the talking; he is not easily shocked; he is neither domineering nor sentimental. I submit that these are colossal assumptions. Even so, what is his usual approach to people who come to him with difficulties?

Do not most of us assume that we have a set of answers concerning how a man should live, and do we not feel that our chief task is to get him to accept those answers? We give advice; we try to get the individual to make a fresh resolution; we attempt to confront him with a standard which will convict him of sin, stir him to repentance and arouse the desire for reformation. Now this is just the reverse of the most effective counseling technique. In counseling one does not tell the patient what to do; instead, the counselor attempts to help the patient find out for himself what he really wants to do. The reason for this is to be found in the nature of conflict itself. As I have already indicated, most conflicts involve two factors: first, an approved perfectionist picture of the self; second, repudiated impulses which are incompatible with it. The approved picture varies for every individual; and the repressed factors are equally diverse. But no matter what special forms conflicts may take, they leave the person in a condition of wasteful tension. He cannot be wholehearted in his pursuit of ideals because one part of himself is sabotaging his efforts. And he cannot be wholehearted in his emotional life because of the censorship which his ideals impose.

Most people who come to a minister accept ideal standards in a way which is partly bogus—bogus not in a sense which involves conscious hypocrisy, but in the sense that there are strong, unrecognized forces within the self which are not really committed to those ideals at all. In such cases, the guilt felt at failing to fulfill these ideals is partly bogus in the same sense. One of the reasons why conflict arises is that the ideal standards which the individual has accepted as obligatory frequently contain demands which may not take account of his particular capacities and limitations at all. Hence, he has to repudiate a genuine part of him-

self in accepting them; and the repudiated part, though it may be driven underground, continues to sabotage his perfectionist efforts.

Now advice, exhortation and condemnation will simply intensify the conflict. They will reinforce the "moral efforts" which have been directed all along toward trying to impose ideal standards upon the partially resisting self. Sometimes this sort of procedure seems to pay dividends. The individual is enabled to tighten his grip and to force the recalcitrant factors into the pattern which this legalism demands. But that is pseudo integration. What the individual really needs is to become less estranged from his feelings instead of driving them deeper underground. And the main trouble is that in so many cases the same conflict breaks out later with new intensity, because the more effort one has to exert in forcing his behavior into certain channels, the more the rebelliousness of the repressed parts of himself will be intensified.

VI

Counseling works by a method which is the reverse of exerting moralistic effort. It assumes that an ideal which really has the backing of a man's feelings is much more likely to be effectively served than one which he unconsciously resists. To be sure, there is no way of getting perfect coincidence between the demands of society and the spontaneous impulses of an individual. But there is all the difference in the world between a compulsive and a responsible attitude toward social demands. The compulsive individual may appear to be much more virtuous; but he is automatic in both his so-called good deeds and his so-called bad ones; his goodness consists in following rules and his badness consists in breaking them. He cannot help his conscientious compliance any more than he can help his occasional outbursts of waywardness. And it is sobering to realize how much of life today, including much that goes under the name of Christian morality, is reducible to this automatic performance of functions, this habitual playing of expected roles.

If we take seriously Jesus' stress upon motive, in contrast to the externals of behavior, we must consider how easy it is to confuse the two in counseling with people. Often we think we have done the job if we can get an individual to change his external conduct, by a fresh effort of will, so that he stops doing something antisocial. That may be an accomplishment of some worth in itself. But let us not confuse it with a real change of heart. And let us ask ourselves how much good it does

all this sympathetically without feeding self-pity in the patient, and yet to do it realistically without playing the role of policeman.

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to impose our standards on another person. We may approve of the result; but let us not confuse it with helping the individual to reach standards which he has genuinely made his own.

It is very flattering to us to be asked to play the role of God, to dispose of other people's lives for them, to tell them what is right and what is wrong. Many people are afraid of responsibility; they would rather have someone make their decisions for them. But if we believe in a Protestant, as against a Catholic, method of moral nurture, will we not recognize the very limited value of trying to scold or coax people into following certain precepts simply because the minister or the church sanctions them?

VII

Hence, I am inclined to think that the gap between pastoral methods and therapeutic counseling can be partially bridged if we remember that Christianity is antilegalistic, and that the most profound transformations of human character come through something other than moral effort. The saving, releasing energies come flooding in from beyond the confines of the narrowly organized ego. Christianity and therapy are close together when they recognize that the ego-centric, isolated individual, who is caught in the bondage of self-defeating moral conflict, can be saved only through faith and love, not through rules and dogmas. They are also close together in recognizing that genuine repentance is impossible except when the needy person finds some kind of acceptance *as he is*.

But someone may protest that therapy, as I have described it, falls into the romantic hope that by releasing the impulses which are held in check by moral coercion, we will produce a healthier, happier race—whereas actually we see such impulses breaking to the surface in very destructive forms all around us. A partial answer to that charge would run as follows: In the therapeutic situation it is possible for destructive feelings and attitudes to come out into the open, to have their day in court and to throw their weight about. Because they have a release in the consulting room, they are much less likely to take the form of violent overt behavior outside the consulting room. This generalization is not always true, however. The loosening up of a person's repressions may result in periods when the pent-up energies explode all over the place; and sometimes disaster results, though it is fair to ask what would have happened if the individual had not gone to an analyst at all. In suc-

cessful cases, the individual reaches a new kind of stability after the repressed forces have blown themselves out. We need to be cautious, therefore, in passing quick judgments on the success or failure of an analysis. I know people who in the middle of the process became very rebellious, self-assertive or nihilistic; and their friends were inclined to think that they had been ruined by going to an analyst. But some of these same people, in the long run, have become much better able to make their own decisions, get a new job and stand up to a domineering parent or mate, where formerly they were hopelessly tied up. Sometimes it is worth putting up with unpleasantness while a friend is in the process of changing from being a mouse into being a man. Admittedly, however, the releasing of repressed energies is accompanied by risk, and not even the analyst can know in advance exactly what will happen once a hitherto rigid person begins to break out of his shell.

VIII

Another reason why therapy is often criticized by ministers is that it does not grind in a sense of guilt. It certainly is not blind to the fact that men feel guilty; but it seeks to remove the feeling by removing the cause. Probably it is never entirely successful. Many theologians raise serious questions, however, about even attempting to bring about such a result because it opens the way to moral complacency. This raises an extremely complicated issue, and I shall not pretend to be able to settle it. Yet this much can be said. What we call moral complacency is an attempt to *anaesthetize* guilt feelings; it is a sort of half-willful inability to recognize shortcomings. Therefore it should be distinguished from that experience of ethical release and empowerment which attends the genuine resolution of conflicts. Of course, even the so-called integrated person is not perfect; and it is a sign of health in him that he does not pretend to be. Unlike the complacent person, he can recognize his shortcomings frankly and squarely; unlike the morbid person, he is not paralyzed by them.

Moreover, therapy and theology should be at one in teaching us that a man who is suffering from an intense sense of guilt may be in a condition of moral confusion instead of moral clarity. They should be at one in teaching us that a perfectionist attempt to live up to impossible standards, with the self-rejection which attends our inevitable failure to do so, intensifies a harmful situation. Finally, they both should warn

us, as ministers, that it is legalistic to deepen feelings of guilt and self-hatred in a person unless we are at the same time able to help him come through, in his own way, to a release from that sort of bondage.

IX

Yet some may protest against this alleged affinity between therapy and Christianity on the ground that the latter works through a God-centered, Christ-mediated saving power, while the former does not. My brief comments on that protest will conclude this essay. So far as belief in God goes, many discerning analysts take the attitude that if a person is neurotic, he will use his dependence upon God in neurotic ways; if he is sound, that soundness will be reflected in his religious beliefs. They do not take the Freudian position that belief in God is *ipso facto* illusory. And in their own practice they encourage their patients to believe that the creative forces within themselves have a source which is beyond themselves.

This is "thin stuff" from a theological standpoint, and therapy certainly does not insist upon a scheme of salvation which is directly connected with the Person and Work of Christ. What is more, it fosters a kind of human autonomy which is incompatible with subjugation to authoritarianism generally, whether religious or secular. Finally, its outlook is centered upon the needs and conditions of finite, creaturely, earthly men instead of upon anything supernatural or suprahistorical.

But at the core of therapeutic experience stands the solid fact that real transformation from isolated ego-centricity to relations of love and respect with other persons is achieved only through the acceptance of suffering. It is achieved only as the blockages of pride and illusion are shattered, and the self is laid open to redeeming forces which come from beyond its own narrow will. It is achieved only when one ceases to play the role of a judging deity in dealing with himself and others, so as to enter compassionately into an understanding and acceptance of the human situation. It is achieved only through a kind of inner sincerity which unites a man with his fellows instead of setting up barriers of superiority, condemnation and deceit.

Therefore at the risk of displeasing both psychoanalysts and theologians, I shall conclude with the words of Gamaliel: "If this counsel and this work be of men, it will come to nought: But if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it; lest haply ye be found even to fight against God."

The Setting for the Sermon¹

PETER MARSHALL

AS PROTESTANT ministers we must at the outset make up our minds that the sermon is an essential part of the worship of God. Our preaching must be for us an act of worship, and for the congregation, that which makes God real, and clearly teaches them the application of the gospel in their own lives. Any message from the pulpit which fails in one or another of these functions is not truly a sermon as the New Testament regards it.

When the reformers in their zeal took a courageous broom to sweep away all that was obnoxious to them in the Roman Catholic service, they put the sermon at the point in the service where the Host had been elevated by the priest. "The central place which had been taken by the mass was claimed for the reading and preaching of the Word in a context of prayer." Thus our sermon was given a place of great responsibility and spiritual significance.

It might well frighten us, as it frightened the apostle Paul, who wrote to his friends at Corinth: "Thus when I came to you, I did not come with any elaborate words or wisdom. It was in weakness and fear and with great trembling." So ought we to enter the pulpit, but we must understand that the sermon must have a setting and the setting is important, not only for itself and its content of worship, but also as a prelude and preparation for the spoken Word. A worship service, however beautiful and meaningful, without the sermon, is not a Protestant church service, and the sermon, without an appropriate setting and introduction cannot possibly fulfill its function in the hearts and minds of men and women today.

Notice that in most Protestant churches the pulpit is central, and even where the chancel is divided, the pulpit still occupies a place of prominence. Yet far too many Protestants still refer to the interior of the church as the "auditorium." Surely it is more than that. It is the place where people come to hear—to hear the preaching of the Word of God.

¹One of a series of lectures delivered at Gettysburg Seminary under the Zimmerman Foundation in May, 1944.

I cannot object to the view that the sermon is perhaps the most important element in the service, taking as it does, the major portion of the time allotted to the service. But I deplore its being regarded as so important that all which precedes it should be called "the preliminaries." There is something radically wrong with a worship service that is referred to by those who participate in it as "preliminaries." As they mean it, the singing of the hymns, the prayers, the music and the liturgy of the service are not, and never could be "preliminaries." There is a sense in which they should be preliminary; that is, in the sense that the whole service has been planned as a progression toward an emotional and spiritual climax in which the sermon is the hammer blow that drives the nail completely home.

Some people have only one criterion for evaluating the public worship of God, and that is the quality of the sermon. The sermon is not to be regarded as the all-important part of the service; neither is it to be minimized by the modesty of the preacher himself, or by the excellence of the music, or by the beauty of the ritual. Doctor Denny, a great Scottish theologian of the last generation, has stated what is, after all, the whole purpose of preaching, when he said:

"If the sermon in church is what it ought to be, if it is not an exhibition of the preacher but of Jesus, there should be nothing in it even conceivably in contrast with worship, but the very reverse. What can be more truly described as worship than hearing the Word of God as it ought to be heard, hearing it with penitence, with contrition, with faith and self-consecration, with vows of new obedience? If this is not worship in spirit and in truth, what is?"

The sermon must have an appropriate setting. One does not preach a sermon during the seventh-inning stretch at a ball game. It would be difficult to make the grandstand a pulpit in the last of the seventh, with the bases loaded, and the home team two runs behind. Nor would the preacher have much success on the floor of the stock market during a lull in the morning's trading. The stage of a Broadway theater is not the best setting for a sermon between acts. There have been historical exceptions perhaps, when great preachers, with a fire in their bones stood up in the midst of everyday activity, to make people aware of the higher sanction. Paul's sermon on Mars Hill certainly lacked the overtures of praise and the introduction of worship. His voice came suddenly into the disputing of the philosophers, and he had to speak his word when challenged. There are times, no doubt, when to every preacher there comes a compulsion to

speak, and speak he must, regardless of the setting. Ordinarily, however, you and I are to preach in Protestant churches on Sundays and in a particular setting. Now this setting is important. It deserves more attention than it receives from the average minister. He cannot evade his responsibility by implying that the setting is not his province, but belongs to the organist, the director of music, or to someone else. It is his responsibility, his concern, since it is the setting in which his message will either lodge in the hearts and minds of his hearers, or be lost in a spiritual or ecclesiastical static in which nothing is very clear to the expectant worshiper in the pew.

We have constant allies, silent aids and witnesses speaking for us, and making it easier to direct the thoughts of the congregation Godward. We have the church building itself. It has associations. Clinging to its walls are all sorts of hallowed memories. The voices of loved ones, loved long since, and lost awhile, seem to whisper to lonely hearts. There are stained-glass windows, perhaps each with its own message, interpreted by different persons in different ways. There is an organ, with its mighty voice speaking as only organs can speak to the soul. There are symbols, the cross itself, and who can look at the cross, and not see something, who can look at the cross and not hear the voice of Christ? All these and many more, are our constant silent partners in the creation of an atmosphere in which we would present God.

It might be proper to ask at this point, just what we mean by "atmosphere." This is one of the things that is difficult to define. There is no formula for it but when you have achieved it you'll know. It is like the old question, asked by every adolescent youth at some time or other, "How will I know when I fall in love?" I used to ask it; didn't you? You know the answer, the only answer that can be given. This is the answer I always received: "Don't worry, brother, you'll know." Exactly, precisely, you'll know. Well, when the atmosphere of your service is right you'll know. The politicians usually have an audience that is electric, like prairie grass waiting for the spark that starts a forest fire. Many of the hearers, at the political rally, are as keen, for or against, as the speakers themselves, and the audience is as thrilled as those who address them. So with the actor on the stage. Theatergoers enter with a sharp and keen expectancy. They come prepared to listen and to help the actors in the make believe into which they willingly enter for two or three hours.

For the preacher the problem is somewhat different. The same eager,

sharp expectancy of the theater is all too rare in church. The strong partisan interest that surges through the audience at a political rally is absent for the most part. The preacher, however, has other resources. He has the promise of the Risen Christ: "Whosoever two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them"; and in the words of the Great Commission: "Go ye into all the world, and lo! I am with you always, even to the end of the world." Christ has promised to be present through the Holy Spirit. It is quite true, and we should never try to evade it, that our people may meet God anywhere, but let us persuade them that they meet Him in a unique sense among the assembly of Christians. The Lord is in His Church! Gloriously there—graciously there! We can use the whole service for atmosphere, for creating a receptive and expectant spirit among the people so that when we come to our preaching, our sermon may be the natural climax of worship. The atmosphere is that feeling of spiritual presences, that glow of the heart, that confirmation to the soul of the reality of what it worships, that sense of God's nearness, that charges the very air, and makes us aware, however we vary in our spiritual sensitivities, that "truly the Lord is in this place." When our people can leave the church with misty eyes, quiet with the hush of true worship in their hearts, or when their eyes shine and are eloquent while their tongues are mute, when they simply clasp your hand and walk away without speaking, then, gentlemen, you have had atmosphere.

Insofar as we ourselves can help create this atmosphere, we should pray for it and plan for it with every assurance that we can obtain it. For the promises of God will be valid next Sunday as they were last Sunday. Early in the week, and the earlier the better, there ought to be a conference between the minister, the organist and the choir director or director of music, whatever he or she may be called. There is no reason why the ministry and the musicians should remain in a state of armed neutrality with regard to each other's work. There must be a sense of teamwork, a partnership; for each contributes to the effect the others seek to create. There is no excuse, nor is there any need for jealousy. Whatever the music adds to the service, and it can add tremendously, is a help to the preacher. Every part of the service should be prayerfully and carefully arranged so as to co-ordinate the entire service. Organ preludes and postludes, interludes and voluntaries should be consistent with the effect desired. The hymns should be carefully selected with an eye to the text

as well as the music. Let no preacher be reluctant to trust his director of music as to the appropriateness of the hymn tune, or the type of hymn under consideration. The director of music will, in most cases, know better than the preacher, and each ought to recognize the qualifications of the other in his particular field.

The anthems should likewise be selected with the same objective in mind, so that every part of the service contributes its own part to the total effect of the service. With regard to the hymns, there is here a great opportunity for training in worship. You will remember that one of Martin Luther's theses was his demand that the congregation be given the right and the privilege of joining in the praise of God. "Let all the people praise Him" was an injunction that had been almost completely ignored until Martin Luther's time, and sadly enough, has been ignored ever since in many Protestant churches.

In the last three or four decades, it had become established custom to hire a professional quartet to sing God's praises. It is a source of amazement to me, coming as I do from a covenanting background, to see how few there are in many congregations, that take part in the singing of the hymns. I cannot believe that these silent worshipers are unable to sing. I know better. I have seen some of them who are mute and unresponsive to the great hymns of the church, sing lustily enough at a men's supper or a luncheon club, some of the popular songs. Why then this silence on their part in the church service? Some people, who make no attempt to join in the singing, would say that they simply "cannot carry a tune." I view this excuse with strong suspicion, but, even if true, they should still be willing to open the hymnbook and read the words that others sing. Again, others are timid, afraid of the sound of their own voices, and anxious to avoid being conspicuous when people around them are not singing. While there will always be some who for physical reasons are unable to participate in the praise of God, there are many more who simply can't be bothered, because it takes effort to sing and they are not sufficiently interested.

In church, if people are not familiar with the tune, they will, for the most part, make no attempt to learn it, but will remain silent and aggrieved that the preacher doesn't let them sing the familiar tunes. The average congregation in America, I have read somewhere, knows only about fifty of the hymns in the hymnal. Over and over again the same hymns are used, regardless of the date, the occasion, the sermon or the

mood of the preacher or his people. How many hymns does the average hymnal contain? The Presbyterian hymnal contains over five hundred hymns, but if the people are to use only fifty, then my Scottish idea of economy is outraged. Given a choir that loves to sing, there is no reason why any congregation cannot be taught new hymns until its repertoire is expanded and its enjoyment of singing becomes an experience in real worship. By using the midweek service as a teaching service, as I believe it should be, the hymns to be used on Sunday can be practiced. Thus you are assured of a nucleus of the congregation that will be familiar with them. There are some great hymns, the classics of the Christian faith that every congregation ought to know and to use. If I dared to list them, I should certainly include Martin Luther's great hymn, "*Ein Feste Burg Ist Unser Gott*," "When I Survey the Wondrous Cross" to the tune Hamburg; "Jesus, Lover of My Soul" to the tunes Refuge and Hollingside; "Ancient of Days," "Rock of Ages," "How Firm a Foundation," "Lead, Kindly Light," "Where Cross the Crowded Ways of Life," and that lovely evening hymn, "The Day Thou Gavest Lord Is Ended." One could not omit the "Church's One Foundation" to the tune Aurelia, nor the marching song of the church, "Onward, Christian Soldiers." What better communion hymn could we have than "O Sacred Head Now Wounded" to Bach's Passion Chorale? These are but a few of the great hymns that must be the joy and inspiration of every group of worshipping Christians. But there are newer hymns that, in my judgment, will be just as great when viewed in the perspective of time. There is Harry Emerson Fosdick's great hymn, "God of Grace and God of Glory," to the Welsh tune Cwm Rhondda. The old Irish tune Slane is used as the setting for a hymn which is sung in unison, "Be Thou My Vision." The music of Sibelius conveys a message of trust and confidence in the hymn, "Be Still, My Soul," to the tune Finlandia. These are hymns that I would include in the repertoire of any Protestant congregation. Yet I have been amazed to find, again and again, that I could not use them in some church where I was guest preacher, because the people didn't know them, or worse still, the choir didn't know them.

Since I have been reckless enough to list some hymns that ought to be sung, may I further commit myself by suggesting some that ought to be avoided? Many of our congregational hymns are not good, as music, poetry or theology. The preacher ought to be able to discriminate between what is good music and bad, but if he cannot, let him trust his

organist or director of music. If the people can tap their feet to a hymn tune, it is, more than likely, one to be avoided; and if it be possible to waltz to the melody, it were better to let the dance bands have it. There are hymns that express a diseased theology, quite inconsistent with what we believe today. One such example is the hymn, fortunately not appearing in our better hymnals, "I was sinking deep in sin, far from the peaceful shore; very deeply stained within, sinking to rise no more." That were bad enough for anyone to sing, but to ask little children in Sunday school to sing it, is without excuse.

There are some other hymns whose words surely cannot be sung by thoughtful Christians without some mental reservations. There is a verse in one of our hymns of consecration, for example, which issues a challenge to God in these words: "Take my silver and my gold, not a mite would I withhold." Now that is simply going too far, gentlemen, for your deacons and trustees are not going to mean that, and as they sing that particular hymn I think you will notice that they will keep one hand in their pockets, firmly grasping their roll of bills, and even their loose change.

I was brought up on the psalms and paraphrases, and have a prejudice in favor of the Scottish psalter, I must admit. But you should have inherited something of the same tradition in the collection of Bach chorales, so that we should know better, you and I, than to permit our people to sing the cheap tunes, the unnatural in theology and the so-called hymns that are not sung from the heart or the consecrated mind. We *can* have great music in our churches and have great congregational singing. There is no greater inspiration for the preacher nor any surer maker of the atmosphere for preaching. It requires effort to sing, and the diaphragm must be used as well as the lungs. With discipline and determination we can have the kind of music that stirs the soul, without tickling the toes or shattering the eardrums.

Being still on the subject of music and its part in the creation of atmosphere, let me say something about the choir. I shall acknowledge at the outset my own bias and conviction. I am completely and irrevocably committed to the chorus choir in preference to the paid quartet. It is a false economy to try to save money in the budget item for music, for there is no better investment than the engaging of a competent choir director. We have found also, that there is no more active or successful means of evangelism than our choirs. Young people brought into the

choirs to sing, recruited literally from the streets of Washington, have been introduced to Christ. Some of them had had no religious education whatsoever. We found in Washington, young people with no more religious background than one would expect to find in the heart of Africa, or in the interior of Tibet. There is no excuse for any choir or quartet singing words that are unintelligible to the congregation. If you cannot make out the words, then the anthem were better omitted from the service. It is a message, and was selected as such, not as a music exercise. It is helpful to have something in the service to suit every type of worshiper. They are not all of the same disposition, with the same tastes, or the same degree of musical appreciation. Therefore, we have some of the old hymns and some of the new ones. From the gospel hymns we select one that has the message of the service, and it is used either as an offertory hymn or as preparation for the pastoral prayer. Here is an important service the choir can render. As they sing some well-known and beloved hymn of prayer or aspiration, the preacher can call the people to prayer and the music and message of the prayer hymn is the most effective creator of atmosphere that I have yet found. It is easier to lead the congregation in prayer when the need of prayer has been stimulated by the soft, worshipful singing of a hymn of aspiration.

The anthems, likewise, can provide the old and familiar as well as the new. Dudley Buck belongs to the Gay Nineties of church music. Let him stay there. Christiansen and Burleigh, Noble Cain and Roberton, Dickinson and Tertius Noble, Emurian and Sibelius with the masters, Bach and Handel, Mozart and Rossini, Mendelssohn and Stainer provide enough variety and inspiration to keep any choir busy.

The public prayers are perhaps the most difficult part of the service to keep free from a formal frigidity on the one hand and an informal, chatty sentimentality on the other. The public prayers must be dignified, for we are not chatting with God and we must avoid sticky adjectives. There is no place in the pulpit for cheap familiarity in language. You cannot talk to God in the light and casual terms in which you address your next-door neighbor. God is not to be spoken to as if He were the genial president of your luncheon club. Rescue yourself from the slack and sloppy affection that ruins true reverence. Avoid speaking about Jesus as "Dear Jesus," "Lovely Lord," "Sweet Saviour," terms which are utterly alien to the robust thought of the New Testament. No one wants starched dignity, but we do want reverence.

Invocations should invoke, not argue or orate. Let the invocation do what it purports to do. In the pastoral prayer, the minister has the difficult task of leading his people in prayer. He has the high privilege of expressing in words of his own, their deepest thoughts and their highest desires. How can he effectively do that, unless he knows somehow what is in their hearts? How can he possibly know that unless he is personally acquainted with their needs? He may discover much in his pastoral visiting, in his calls, in his hospitals and in the homes. He will learn something of the problems facing his people if he listens carefully when they talk with him. His conferences in his study are guides to the tumult raging in some hearts and the shivering doubts that crouch in others. Chiefly, however, I feel the minister will find his surest guides in his own heart. We know that we "know not what to pray for as we ought," but this we do know, if we pray for what we, as men, need for ourselves, what we, as parents, feel constrained to pray for, we may be sure that we shall be pouring into the molds of speech some of the unuttered, in-articulate yearnings of most of the hearts bowed in prayer with us.

One of the most difficult aspects of public prayer is the avoidance of repetitions. It is not easy, when one is leading the congregation twice each Sunday, week after week, to avoid using the same phrases and sequences of words, but avoided it must be, at all costs, else the people, having learned our phrases from constant repetition will be saying them ahead of us. There is a rightful place in our public prayers for poetic phrases and imagery, for even in our prayers the imagination should have a part.

I have a feeling that no part of the average Protestant service needs more attention and receives less than the reading of the Scriptures. Let the minister remember that he is reading the Word of God, not the curb market quotations from yesterday's newspaper. Let him practice reading the chosen selection, until he is sure that he can reveal its meaning by his inflexion. If the meaning is not clear to him, he will never be able to make it clear to his congregation. Here again, and primarily, the minister must feel what he reads, not stumble through it as if he were seeing it for the first time, and had not the slightest idea as to what it might mean. This is one part of the service where God is speaking to the people through His Word, and the voice of the minister. Nothing should be allowed to interrupt or to detract from this part of the service. Quiet and reverent attention is more becoming at this point of the

service than at any other, for here God is speaking to us. It behooves us to be more careful here than during the prayer, even where we are talking to God. There is more criticism of our services and our ministers at this point than any other. Gentlemen, there is absolutely no excuse for slipshod, unintelligent reading of the Holy Scriptures. No greater mistake could be made than to assume that it is easy to read from the Bible. It is one of the most difficult parts of the service, and one which the sensible preacher will approach with preparation and dedication. The Word of God must be so read that every person present will have heard it, clearly and distinctly, and will have understood the meaning of the passage from our reading of it. Thus we can interpret by the inflexion and emphasis with which we read. For your guidance in the reading of the Scripture, make sure that you have grasped the meaning of the passage, and then read it with that meaning in mind.

I believe that the service should proceed to its climax in the sermon, so that the benediction is pronounced on a high plane of spiritual experience and mood. You will notice that I assume there will be no closing hymn. I feel quite definitely that to use a hymn at the close of the sermon is to interrupt and to shatter whatever atmosphere has been created. It is to inject a new note entirely and to dissipate whatever appeal the service, up until then, might have had. We find it infinitely to be preferred to send the people out under the spell of a great unified service. To hear the people say, "I enjoyed the whole service" is worth all the effort and careful planning it takes. If we can have our worshipers think of the service as a whole, we have succeeded in teaching them what worship is. If your atmosphere has been properly built up, you will feel as you stand up to preach, that psychologically and emotionally, the people are ready for your message. In fact, it is possible for the experience of worship to be so real and meaningful that the sermon itself may even seem to be anti-climax. This will not happen very often, but when it does, praise the Lord, for you will then have had the perfect setting for the sermon.

The Relevance of Christian Ethics

RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER

THE problem of Christian ethics is primarily the discovery of the will of God and doing it. Unfortunately, it is not so simple as it seems. No one is sure what God's will is, and because God's will is not limited to human systems it is even more difficult to predict what the will of God may be tomorrow. Even if one is convinced of God's will for him, it is still difficult (some would say impossible) to carry out that will because of the element of sin present in every man.

The dual problem of Christian ethics, of finding God's will and doing it, is full of complexity. It involves the study of Christian anthropology and sociology against the background of the Christian doctrine of God. It involves the study of the sources, authority and nature of Christian ethics. It means the study of the relation of God's will to the prudential, human situation.

SOURCES

Christian ethics is grounded in the New Testament. The ethics of Jesus is distinctly religious, finding its author in God, and yet it has profound social effects. The relation between man and God is essentially moral, and the change demanded by repentance means a change in man's moral character. The main test of a man is the inner test, of whether his attitude toward man and God is right. Jesus' ethics is inward in its insistence that a man is no better than his thoughts. The basic attitude of a man is essential, assuming of course an organic relation between attitude and action. If a man's attitude is right, to that extent will he seek to do God's will as he understands it.

The emphasis of Jesus is not profoundly altered in the rest of the New Testament. Paul puts more stress on man's sinfulness and the need of grace, but the same moral relationship between man and God is at the heart of it all. God's will is essentially ethical; and while no specific ideal can summarize God's will for us in a particular situation, there are certain norms which are general guides for all situations. There are no concrete instructions for each problem.

The insights of Christians since New Testament times have added to the sum of particular advice for human problems; but they have given

no new guidance for the discovery of the will of God. New situations have evoked answers which cannot be paralleled in scriptural experiences, and thus many details have been added to the ideals of Christian living; but the general principles have remained the same. The revelation of God found in Jesus Christ, with its teaching that in the attitude of complete commitment and willingness to search out the hidden values of each situation according to the basic attitudes of the teachings of Jesus, is the primary source of all Christian ethics.

AUTHORITY

Because Christians have not been able to make this commitment and search unaided, in their ethical dilemmas they have relied upon three authorities: the Church, the Bible and the conscience.

1. Some churches have handed down ethical rulings, but in almost every case such rulings have been outworn and outgrown in a short time. The restrictions of the Puritan Sabbath ran counter to Jesus' teaching that the Sabbath was made for man. The ceremonial laws of the Roman Church, and especially the petty rulings concerning penance, helped cause the Protestant Reformation. Protestants and Romanists differ concerning the ethical values of democracy. Christian groups differ concerning the ethics of patriotism, saluting the flag, and various economic and social problems.

However, there is authority in the churches. The ecumenical conferences of old carried an authority of their own which lasted as long as the solutions proffered were significant to the situations in which men found themselves. Modern ecumenical conferences have the authority of the keenest minds of non-Roman Christendom, and the Oxford Conference, with its combination of sound theology and ethical insight, offers guidance for the world today. Between the conflicting statements of various churches and councils, the individual is forced to choose, and in choosing he must rely on an authority other than the churches themselves. He is thus forced back to the authority of either the Bible or his conscience.

2. The Bible as an authority has always presented a problem. It has always been the authority of the Bible-as-interpreted-by-groups-of-individuals. In itself, the Bible is as confusing as any sixty-six (or eighty) books by authors holding different points of view. Excerpts from the Bible can be selected to encourage any kind of behavior.

At first unconsciously, and then consciously, the Bible has been ac-

cepted by many of us in terms of Paul's "mind of Christ." The rest of the Bible has been interpreted in terms of the spirit and teachings of Jesus, and even the remainder of the New Testament has been understood as deriving its authority from the teachings of Jesus as found in the Synoptic Gospels. The advances of New Testament scholarship have tended to clarify the concept of "the mind of Christ."

The doctrine of "the mind of Christ" has the objectivity of the teachings of the historic Jesus; but it also includes the subjective elements of the individual's choice. We cannot escape the need to interpret Jesus in the light of our own experience. God is always conceived in terms of the highest insights of man, while we recognize that God is always more than and different from man's highest ideals. Jesus' teachings-through-my-eyes hardly provide a dependable authority for behavior, and yet it is our only means for interpreting the Bible for these times.

3. Thus, we are forced back from the Church and the Bible to the individual conscience. But the conscience by itself is no more than the ability to choose between right and wrong. It can be conditioned always to choose the wrong. Environment, heredity, education and other elements of experience enter into every value-judgment. Conscience by itself does not guarantee ethical action, even if it chooses the right path. The content of the selections of conscience come from another source.

Conscience, which is far from infallible, must rely on the insights of others, especially in the Church and Bible, which are not infallible either. Thus the devoted, sincere and seeking Christian finds himself caught in a vicious circle of relativity. If he lacks the courage to attempt to stand on his own feet before God, he falls back on Church and Bible, and thus is guilty of absolutizing views which can be shown to be relative. This is simply idolatry, however noble it may be, for it substitutes something less than deity for God Himself. But if he insists on remaining an individualist, he loses the resources of the group and tradition, and is in danger of absolutizing his own ideas, which are even more relative than those of the groups he has rejected.

Then there is the danger of admitting the relativity that is present. Supposing that he has the insight to avoid absolutizing either the authorities of Church or Bible, and remains humble enough not to absolutize his own value-judgments. This leaves him without an ethical center of gravity at all, and he can be swayed by the opinions, pressures and propaganda of his environment, by his own wishes and hunches, and by his

hidden will for power. This is where many people find themselves if they are intelligent enough to reject the authorities of Church and Bible.

THE NATURE OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

The trouble with all of these positions is that they have failed to present the true nature of Christian ethics or of the will of God as it applies to men. Reinhold Niebuhr's reminder that the Christian ethic is an impossible possibility, which is absolute and thus beyond the scope of prudential ethics, gives us an absolute which lies in the transcendental nature of God. Church, Bible and conscience when properly blended can be a relative guide for prudential ethics, if we see that the absolute lies in God's will. Whenever God's will is translated into human terms, it ceases to be absolute and becomes permeated with the relativities of human experience.

The will of God is higher than all human wills, and his thoughts are different from all human thoughts, because God is the one, true, infinite, transcendent Being in whom reside the potentialities for all finite goods and values which come into the world. But only the potentialities are infinite and transcendent. The moment they enter history they become finite, partial and immanent—as God's work of growth of value in the world.

The point of reference for all human living is this absolute will of God, which cannot be known in any satisfactory way through Church or Bible or conscience. We find a hint of its presence in all of these organisms, and in the teachings of Jesus we find the great command which is also the height of religious irony: "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect" (Matthew 5:48). This is true, but it must be kept at the proper state of tension by the other admission: "There is none good but one, that is, God" (Matthew 19:17).

If the will of God is absolute and transcendent, and if we must live among the relativities of the finite world, we must see that this leads to hope and assurance. On the one hand, we cannot talk simply about the relevance of an impossible ideal; and, on the other hand, we dare not claim that our prudential ethics can be called the will of God for us and thus eliminate the tension. The main problem of Christian ethics is to find the solution to this dilemma in terms of hope. The will of God in all its absoluteness must be related to the ethical problems of our individual and group living.

THE RELATION OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS TO LIFE

Christians historically have found four possible solutions to the problem of the relation of God's will to social living. John C. Bennett has commented on them in his *Christian Realism*, but I believe that an important distinction between Bennett's solution and that of Reinhold Niebuhr has been omitted from the discussion there. As will appear, the solutions commented on below owe much to Bennett, but there is an additional variation:

1. The first solution, offered by many leaders in Christian ethics, is that the answer is found simply by doing the best one can in each situation. This means building up a system of ideals, perhaps in terms of altruism or humanitarianism or utilitarianism, and then equating that system with the will of God. Translated into social realms, there have been Utopian dreams such as Christian socialism, the social gospel in many forms, and paternalistic capitalism. Provided these dreams are kept purified, we may be assured that we are on the way to the kingdom of God on earth.

This leads to the identifying of prudential ends with the absolute will of God. It ignores the dilemma between the relative and the absolute. If the ends so achieved continue to be absolutized, effort ceases and pride enters the picture. It is this type of thinking which identifies God with democracy, church, or some other human institution. It confuses the absolute will of God with some social or political or military strategy, such as prohibition, pacifism or any other suggested platform of Christian behavior.

In spite of its error, this type of thinking has been prevalent among all groups of Christians. It is the error of the Roman Church in identifying itself with the kingdom of God on earth. It is the error of that group of Protestants who have identified the will of God with capitalism and industrialism. It is the error of smaller groups who have identified the kingdom with various utopian schemes. It is the error of those liberals who insist that if we play the game we can "build" the kingdom on earth.

In all of these cases, the result has been to banish the tension which exists between the kingdom and finite men. No matter how verbose representatives of these positions may be on the subject of sin, they fail to see that their sin lies in making the will of God identical with relative ethical ideals. Even when these ideals are good, and many of them may be worth dying for, they are only partial and relative.

To these criticisms, adherents of this view answer that we must have a prudential ethics—and, of course, that is true. This prudential ethics must be grounded in the Christian tradition and in the will of God—and that also is true. The absolute must be made relevant to the human situation—and that is true. What they fail to recognize is that this cannot be done by the substituting of any prudential ethics (no matter how well disguised or piously phrased) for the absolute commitment to God Himself.

2. There are those who admit that the ethics of Jesus is an absolute ethics, and then proceed to show how completely irrelevant his sayings are to the present situation. No one could follow Jesus literally and live. Even He could not stand against the world. His teachings, therefore, are applicable only to the coming kingdom. The kingdom, so holders of this view claim, is to come by a divine act; and when the kingdom comes, the absolute demands of Jesus can be met.

A variation on this theme which is equally disastrous is the claim that Jesus taught an interim ethics. This means that all of Jesus' teachings applied to the brief period before the coming of the kingdom. Paul also taught an interim ethics, and many of his sayings make sense only in that perspective.

Now there can be no doubt that both Jesus and Paul thought the end of the world was coming, and some of their sayings can best be understood in this light—as, for example, Paul's advice about refraining from marriage if possible. But it would not apply to Jesus' reported teaching about divorce. It would not apply to many things that Jesus said about the fulfillment of the law and the prophets.

Scholars have listed the many arguments against this theory of Christian ethics; but the important thing is that this theory, in any of its variations—including the Lutheran doctrine of the double standard, fails to make Christian ethics relevant to our historical situation. We are faced with ethical decisions now, and if Christian ethics applies only to an eschatological kingdom, or to the brief time before the kingdom (which has not come), then we had better find an ethics which will help us in this world.

This is the kind of solution reached by Schweitzer, and it means retreating to the first position of prudential ethics, with all its attendant weaknesses.

3. No one has been more eloquent than Reinhold Niebuhr in show-

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ing how impossible the absolute ideal of love is. He builds up the sense of tension which is essential to Christian living (a tension which is destroyed by the extreme forms of both prudential and eschatological views). He makes the sense of tension real, vital and unescapable.

The relevance of an impossible ideal, however, is never made quite clear. It is relevant only to prove the impossibility of getting away from failure in any ethical endeavor. The tension is onesided because in the end it paralyzes moral effort at the source. The ideal that is held out is so high that one loses sight of it in his prudential living. When one does good, he knows it is still evil. Instead of being an approximation of the will of God and therefore worthy, it is a failure to reach the impossible and therefore not so clearly worthy.

In the second place, by making the "law of love" the substance of the impossible possibility, Niebuhr falls into the same moral idealism as the prudential thinkers. While he has not fallen into the trap of identifying prudential ends with the will of God, he has assumed that the will of God can be known in terms of love. Thus, the will of God, which is transcendent and absolute, is brought to terms with a man's ethical ideals and identified with man's highest insight. He makes his ideal of love include justice as a secondary category; but if the term, love, is to have meaning, it cannot include all the moral categories by which men live. Therefore, love does not stand simply in a state of tension beyond man's strivings; it stands also in contradiction to some of their endeavors which might also be the will of God.

The will of God must transcend all moral categories, including love, for it to be absolute and relevant at the same time. Any ideal must be thrown over when the will of God demands it, even the ideal of love. We do not claim that God is love and nothing else. We do believe that God includes love and all other ultimate values in his nature, for He is the source of all values. Thus we must seek for a solution other than Niebuhr's to avoid either a paralyzing tension or a God limited to love. What we need is a dynamic tension and a God who is love-and-more.

4. The fourth view, and the thesis of this essay, is that we can have "approximation" in Christian ethics. The truth which is involved in all of these theories must be accounted for. The will of God is absolute, and in its transcendent nature is not achievable by creatures. But that is only part of the story. God's will is also expressed in time, for He

is Lord of history. The Holy Spirit, whatever else He may be, is God immanent, at work in the world and in us. This does not lessen the absoluteness of his will, which is beyond any ideals we can conceive, but it does make his will relevant to history.

Men, living in the finite perspective of history, can align themselves with the processes which God has set in action, and in so doing they can *approximate* God's will for them. They do not achieve God's absolute will, but they are sensitive to the *possibilities of value* in each concrete situation, and thus they can act as channels through which God's will operates.

Men who are committed absolutely to God's will are those who seek to discover through every tool at their command the potentialities which are really there, and to decide how best they can open themselves to God's work and God's power through them. These decisions are of many kinds. Sometimes, there is a conflict between two courses of action both of which seem to the rational man to be good. Perhaps it really makes no difference to God which way we turn. However, if we are really sensitive to God's will, we will see, in some cases, that only one of two seemingly good courses of action can fulfill God's purposes. Frequently the contrast is abundantly clear, and there is no doubt that one choice is better. There still remains the tension, for there is the realization that even our best is still the best in human terms and not in God's terms. Finally, there are those terrifying experiences where the choice is between evils. No alternative is right, and yet there are no other possibilities. This is "the hardest problem for Christian ethics" (which is the title of John Bennett's essay in *Christianity and the Contemporary Scene*, Miller and Shires, editors). It is particularly true in cases of social action. Simply by being in an immoral society, the possibilities for us are relatively evil. This is obvious in the case of war, where the pacifist must fail to defend his country and to stop the aggressor, while the non-pacifist must take part in war which is evil in itself.

Furthermore, in making any of these choices, there is the danger of pride. Even where the choice is good, there is a tension between the highest concept of good and God's will. This tension can be relieved sufficiently to allow for consecrated action by the realization that the conceiving of the highest possible course of action open to us is an *approximation* of God's will for us. It is not God's absolute will, but it points in that direction. It is more than compromise, for the motive

is dynamic and positive. And there is always a danger that unless we always face up to the absolute (which is unknown in its absoluteness), we are likely to make the prudential our ultimate guide without seeing beyond.

This last position avoids the dangers of a prudential ethics by seeing that even the highest prudential and relative ethics is never more than an approximation of God's will, and it also releases the stalemate of the impossible possibility. It does not suffer from the limitations of moral idealism, and its reliance on the ethics of Jesus depends on its self-validation in the present, despite the world-view of eschatology dominating the New Testament.

The question then arises whether anyone can achieve God's absolute will. In individual action, there seems reason to believe that in some cases there is an act so final and complete as to be perfect obedience to God's absolute will. It may be some act of heroism, whether it be martyrdom or a mother's sacrifice for her child. It can come in a split-second decision which may alter one's life completely. Unless such a perfect act ends in death, the next act may make one a sinner again. In the way in which Jesus was sinless, men may *hope* to become sinless, but it is more likely that the best of us will only know sinless moments. In relation to society, however, there is no escape from the dilemma of having to choose between evils.

The Christian ethics is always directed to the will of God, for it is a religious ethics. Christian behavior is achieved among men by God's grace, by the self-giving of God's wisdom and power. Man's own seeking of his highest ideal leads to moralism, but not to a religious ethics. The Christian ethics finds its dynamic power through the absolute commitment of the self to the will of God. It is a religious relationship which results in ethical action. The coming of the kingdom is God's act and not man's. Man fulfills the conditions, but it is the religious dimension which is prior to the ethical.

While the will of God is absolute in its transcendence and every human act stands under God's judgment, this tension is lessened by the fact that men who are committed to the will of God can approximate that will in their human choices and actions, in complete freedom and yet by the grace of God. Thus a prudential ethics stands under the judgment of God and is related to the will of God at the same time, without being identical with the will of God.

CHURCH AND INDIVIDUAL IN ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

The authority of the Church lies in its traditions which are born of experience and in its cumulative expression of the opinions of particularly devoted Christians among the leaders of the Church.

The Church's domain is the whole world of human experience. Its main job is not ethical or social legislation, but in its place as the central institution of the Christian religion one of its chief concerns is the formulating of ethical ideals which are approximations of the will of God for specific situations. In stating these ideals, the Church hopes to *inspire* social legislation, to *influence* leaders among statesmen, to *encourage* citizens to support good leaders and laws, and to *stimulate* actions which will bring about conditions which are closer to God's will in the world.

It is proper for the Church to make statements concerning child labor, planned parenthood, liquor conditions, race problems, industrial relations, war and peace; but its main task is not to dictate legislation. It uses its persuasiveness, working through its Christian members, to bring about the elimination of social and ethical evils and to make possible the increase of that which is good. The Church by itself may never stop war, but it can and does inspire men to work for peace and an international co-operation. While a greater League of Nations may be necessary to set up the machinery of peace, the World Council of Churches will do more to inspire it.

While the Church has no business legislating about major or minor matters, and should make only the most general provisions for its members, it should still be deeply concerned with the personal and social ethics of its environment. Such statements as the official pronouncements of denominational leaders, the occasional findings of the Federal Council of Churches, and the report of such ecumenical conferences as Oxford on matters of personal and social ethics, carry with them a profound and guiding authority. It is conceivable that group opinions of leaders may be wrong (and occasionally they have been shown to be wrong, even reversing previous decisions), but they have a greater authority than the conscience of the individual.

If the Church should enter directly into politics, it would cease to be a persuasive and inspiring force. This would turn it into a political power. When it failed or was proved wrong (as has been the case at times), it would lose prestige and thus lessen its future persuasive and inspiring force. When it succeeded, it would become a slave of the power it had

used, and thus would serve other ends than the will of God, as is abundantly shown in the political activities of the Roman Church. (The record of the Vatican in Spain, the battle over birth control in Massachusetts, the use of the boycott as a political, social or economic weapon, are good examples of sub-Christian power politics). Furthermore, only an authoritarian Church can afford the luxury of unanimity on any social or ethical problem.

Individual Christians (even the clergy), simply because their authority is less, have the right to be more direct and demanding than the Church in seeking social change. The Church could support prohibition in principle, but individual Christians, *as Christians*, could demand a certain type of legislation to control the obvious evils of freely sold liquors. The Church can make statements concerning the justice of a particular war, and still allow freedom among individuals to choose between participation and conscientious objection. On many issues, Christians and even churches may differ, as in the case of child labor, and each group will feel bound to support opposite sides. This does not mean that God's will is divided, but that men, as usual, have an inadequate or partial grasp of his will.

The problem of Christian ethics is the discovery of God's will and doing it. The discovery is difficult in itself. We need to call forth all our resources—of reason, observation, imagination and will—in order to have even an approximation in our mind, and then we need to call forth all our energy, sense of direction and faith in order to achieve even the approximation which we have sensed. It is no wonder that ethical idealism fails; it is not surprising that so many Christians fail; for without the strength that comes only from the grace of God no man can achieve the will of God for him, and then he will fall into sin again and again. The sin of pride will come from achievement and spoil what God's grace has made possible; or he will fail in his intention and sin from the beginning. In either case, God's forgiveness must accompany God's grace if we are to have any sanity at all in the world. The Christian is a citizen of two worlds, and the tensions between those worlds are never completely demolished. But both worlds are bearable because God is equally present in both, and man is always a son of God as well as a sinner—in the sight of both worlds and of God.

A Personalistic View of Human Nature

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

ANYONE who writes today on human nature in a religious context usually feels himself obligated to compose a dirge. Utter despair is the thing; the more utter, the better. Every ray of hope must be suppressed. Sin, whether original or (more realistically) unoriginal, is the essence of man; and if man happens to take a fancy to himself because he discovers to his amazement a spark of decency within, that too is sin—pride, the deadliest sin of all. Furthermore, such a writer—I had almost said crapehanger—is expected to examine at length the views of all previous pessimists and irrationalists, praise them sadly, agree with them mournfully, and proceed to the disorder of the day. The present writer is under no such restrictive compulsions. Hence, his task is the more complex one of trying to set forth the first principles of human nature with no preconceptions but his own, and with no commitment but a desire to find the truth.

His own preconceptions, as they now stand, may be described as personalistic. Personalism is a radically empirical form of idealism which uses coherence as criterion of truth, yet avoids absolutism; and includes all practical consequences, yet transcends pragmatism. A personalist believes that all existence is experience and that all experience is personal. That is to say, everything that exists is a self or an aspect of a self, or a society of selves. A self is conscious, active and purposive; it is able to remember, to anticipate and to identify itself. Selves vary in complexity from the supposed transitory and evanescent selves of certain subconscious processes, or of the lowest and simplest forms of life, such as the paramecium, all the way up through human and possible superhuman selves to the Supreme Person, in whom nature and values have their basis.

With all the varieties of experience and of personality which this universe exemplifies, in a sense everything is homogeneous, for all existence, subjective and objective, existential and subsistential, is (on this view) actual or possible experience of persons. Occam's razor shaves off every unexperienced or unexperienceable entity, whether held by the metaphysician or by the man on the street, who is the most metaphysical of beings. Atoms, airplanes and alpenstocks, as well as beauty, tragedy and truth, are all forms which the energizing experience of the Cosmic Person

(or, for the panpsychist, of the society of psychoids) assumes in its various aspects. To suppose something nonexperiential as the object, or ground, or cause, or explanation, of experience is to populate an already sufficiently populous universe with unnecessary beings. To suppose a society of persons is to offer an empirical basis for the unity of science and religion, fact and value, mechanism and teleology, permanence and change.

But it is not the aim of this paper to argue for metaphysical personalism. The position has just been barely stated in order that it may serve as a background for the personalistic view of human nature. The aim of the paper is, then, to define what human nature means in a vast universe of extrahuman, subhuman and superhuman experience.

I

A well-known American naturalist was asked to define the term "Nature," and he replied that it could not be defined. If he meant humbly to declare man's inability to explain all that Nature means, or to probe it to the bottom, he was talking sense. If, however, he thought such humility was a good reason for abandoning any definition of Nature, the sense is less evident. It is true both of Nature and of every term we use that nothing whatever can be fully understood or adequately explained by man's mind. If, however, our humility is not to become senility, we must make some effort to indicate the direction in which we are groping, while remembering that every definition is but an hypothesis, tentatively held, open to correction, possible rejection, or else further confirmation. If definition is impossible, all language and all communication are impossible and Nature means no more than *abracadabra*.

We need definition, but it is no simple task to meet the need. Runes's *Dictionary of Philosophy* didn't try; there is no entry *nature*, although we have on our hands both Nature and nature as obvious candidates for definition. Nature with a large *N* is some sort of objective order of reality (Mr. Squeers had large *N* in mind; "she's a rum 'un, is Natur"). With a small *n* it is the essential or intrinsic being of anything ("Let dogs delight to bark and bite, for 'tis their nature to"). In order to gain time for thought, it is always a good idea to look into the etymology of a word. *Natura* derives from the Latin *nascor* (*nasci*, *natus*), to be born, or to beget; which in turn comes from the root GEN, to beget, appearing in "genesis," "pregnant," "genus," "genius," and "native," as well as in German *Keim*, *Kind*, *König*, and English "kid," "kin," and "child,"

not to mention the Greek γίγνομαι and (perhaps) γυνή. Nature, one begins to see, is nascence and renaissance. It is birth and rebirth, life and growth. The Greek φύσις tells much the same story. "First the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear." That is Nature. Our etymological forebears had a better insight into evolution.

We may now return to the attempt to define Nature. There are at least five general historical meanings of the term (with subvariants), a circumstance that confirms John Dewey's statement in Baldwin that "few terms used in philosophy have a wider or looser use, or involve greater ambiguity." (1) Nature (φύσις) for the Greeks was the whole world, viewed as an ordered process; law rather than development was basic. (2) For traditional theology, especially for scholasticism, Nature is the created order as distinguished from God. (3) For the more pantheistic thinkers, Nature is all-that-there-is; as in Spinoza's *deus sive natura*. Nature as begetting, so to speak, is *natura naturans*; Nature as begotten, *natura naturata*. Many modern naturalists share this view vaguely, and think of Nature as synonymous with reality. (4) For Kant, Nature is the phenomenal order—the order of categorized appearances, the sense manifold organized into a world of possible experience. Neither things in themselves nor moral experiences are, on this view, any part of Nature. (5) Nature is also loosely used as the designation of what the sciences are investigating. This is vaguer than Kant's usage.

To me it seems most useful to follow Kant's clue and to define Nature as the order revealed through the senses. So defined, Nature for a personalist is one realm of God's experience—a realm discovered by scientific, epistemological, and metaphysical interpretation of sense data; this includes the human body, but excludes the personality.

We have not advanced very far toward our goal of human nature, and we must next define nature with a small *n*, in order to grasp our problem. Insofar as man is or has a visible body, he is part of Nature. But what do we mean when we ask about his nature? In the small *n* sense, nature (to quote Dewey again) is "whatever is born with the thing." Thus the nature of anything is what it is innately. But it is extremely difficult to study any being at birth and determine exactly what is born with it. There is a time when it looks as though the human embryo would become a fish rather than a boy or girl baby. Inspection of an acorn reveals none of its oak-nature. A more usable definition is needed. Suppose we suggest, then, that the nature of anything is its potentialities

—what it can develop into, what it can do. Human nature is what man can do within its limits. It is no scholastic entity.

II

Since a personalistic view of human nature is promised in the subject of this essay, a fuller definition of personality is needed than was hinted at in our introductory remarks. The meaning of "personalistic" and of "human nature" is contingent on the meaning of personality. What is personality? Charm, wit and grace? Making friends and influencing people? The psycho-physical organism (made one by the blessed hyphen which, as has been so naïvely said, goes around, but not through, the mind-matter problem)? The congeries of processes known as the subconscious? Or is personality simply what we experience it to be? As a personalistic empiricist, I elect the last-named possibility.

I am fully aware how extraordinary it is to take experience literally and seriously. It is contrary to psychological usage; the psychologist usually includes both experience and the body in his concept of personality as a psychophysical organism—or as body minus experience, if he is a behaviorist; and he usually adds to experience a realm of subexperience or unexperience which he calls sub or unconscious. I have no quarrel with the study of these complexes. Their investigation, experimentally conducted, has led to important knowledge. What I do object to is the identification of experience with its causes or its organic associates. If I consult experience, I find in it conscious processes of all possible kinds and degrees; sensory, attributive, relational elements (to quote Miss Calkins) are to be found. There are degrees of attention; there is clear consciousness, vague consciousness. But within my consciousness I never find either a subconscious or an unconscious process—their very definition relegates them to a realm external to my experience. Likewise, in my experience I have never found my brain, or my nervous system, my eyes nor my ears, heart nor lungs; not even my hands and feet. I have found sensory patterns, plus a firm belief that brain and heart, hands and feet, are there. But my body is not within my experience. Subconscious and body (like society) are on the one hand, objects of knowledge (of warranted belief, as Dewey well puts it); and on the other, they are organically related causes of my experience. I am my experience; the objects and causes of my experience, however, are no part of me.

The gentle reader will now be prepared to charge me with being

that awful thing, a solipsist, forgetting that my argument rests on the admission of objective knowledge of (warranted belief in) both subconscious and body. He will forget it with some justification, for I have said that the person is present consciousness, not its objects, not its causes.

Before answering this charge, I want to support more fully the position that I am my conscious experience, not its objects nor its causes. If everything that is an object or cause of my experience is a part of me, then I am one with the whole universe, for it is my object and it operates in all causation. There may be some sense in saying that I am one with the universe, as being inseparable from it. But there is very little sense in saying that I am the whole universe. If I am, then it would be better to stop all reference to human personality and talk only about the universe. Or if, more humbly, the view is advanced that I am whatever is my constant object and whatever constantly causes my being, I am in trouble again. Surely, very little of my body is always my object, and even more rarely is the subconscious my object—only in highly scientific psychological moments is that the case. We'll have to drop the idea that I am my objects, if we want body and subconscious to be part of me, or if we want any "me" at all. The only logic of the desired view is the logic of cause. Body and subconscious are doubtless always exercising causal influence on my experience, leading me to be conscious in this or that particular way. But if we try to eliminate the entire universe and reduce my personality to experience and the set of causal factors which constantly determine it, we cannot stop with subconscious and body. At least the sun and the air are essential, and always essential, to the being of my conscious experience; and we are once more in the balloon that flies up to the stratosphere. If I am to define personality clearly, I must distinguish it from its environment, its objects and its causes, and I must restrict it to actual experience. My personality is my experience; its *esse* is not to be confused with its *causa*.

Now, back to the question of solipsism. Is this identification of personality with experience pure solipsism? Not at all. The personalist trusts the rational implications of experience, and especially of its objective reference. He has declared his allegiance to the principles of objectivity and of cause, but he has added that experience neither contains nor implies the claim that all objects and all causes (or even constant causes) of my experience are to be identified with me. There are, however, two types of experience which do make that claim of identity—

they are memory and anticipation. It is true that each has a curious double reference. I may remember or anticipate objective situations remote from myself; but in so doing I must always also remember or anticipate that there was (or will be) an actual personal experience that was, or will be, mine.

We are, therefore, now ready to distinguish the datum self (or present situation) from the whole self or personality. The datum self is the present field of attention or time-span, which at any given moment is actually given as my consciousness. But my whole self is all the past and future consciousness that is connected with the present by chains of self-identifying memory or anticipation linkages. At no time, of course, can I remember my whole past or anticipate my whole future. But, chainwise, I can remember the time when I could remember the time when I could remember my first dawning consciousness. So with anticipation. Knowledge, promises, plans can point ahead to my personal existence in an indefinite future.

The primary experience of the datum-self is, doubtless, as the realist, Donald Williams, and I agree, "innocent." It is not knowledge, but is sheer immediacy. Yet, although the knowledge of the self is thus a matter of mediation, and not immediately certain, knowledge reveals that it is the self which all the time is given. All experience, then, is self-experience, but not all experience is self-knowledge.

III

Having defined Nature and personality, we are ready to consider the meaning of human nature. Human nature is the field of the potentialities of human experience, and the limits of that field. What man can experience is within human nature. What man cannot experience is foreign to human nature. I am not thinking of human nature now as an ideal norm of what is properly natural to man. Sin, abnormality, perversion may be condemned as unnatural in some lofty and eulogistic sense; but they are manifestations of human nature. As far as this paper goes, the unnatural is the impossible. [It may be remarked that the unnatural is not to be identified with the supernatural, which is relative to physical nature—the world visible to sense—and therefore connotes all non-sensory aspects of the universe, such as ideals of beauty, truth, goodness and worship.] As thus defined, human nature is no definite substantial entity; it is a process, undergoing evolutionary development in a tem-

poralistic universe. There is no reason to believe that the limits of human nature have always been the same, or always will be as they are now. "Man is a bridge" from subman to superman. It is impossible to define exactly when man emerged; and the type that is to be, whether Nietzschean *Übermensch* or Christian redeemed man, will not stand in a clearly distinct category so as to possess a wholly different "nature" from man.

Man's nature, then, is his potentialities and his limits. Inspection of an acorn, including a perfect and exhaustive analysis of it, would shed almost no light on its nature. *Experientia docet*. The acorn and the man must unfold their potentialities by experiment. There is no way of determining apriori, by methods either logical or theological, the possible limits of growth, of knowledge, of love or of sin. Human nature is a voyage of discovery.

It must not be forgotten, however, that several hundred billions of human beings have made their voyages and have reported what they have found. We may, therefore, glean working hypotheses about human nature from the human experiment to date.

In these days, particularly, we are impressed by the limits of human nature. "Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther." There are impossibilities. We cannot achieve our ends by mere wishing. We must know something of the laws of Nature if we are to use Nature effectively. Human beings can do and endure up to a certain point; beyond that, they break. There is something in man, call it what you will, which makes response to the call of the ideal extremely difficult. Man's body, its organs, and its heredity, limit the range of man's physical action, however much radio and radar may extend it. The environment, physical, social, cosmic, limits man's action. Psychologically, man cannot know, or feel, or suffer, everything. Man's free choice is always limited by his past, his surroundings and his imaginative powers. Beyond these, no choice is available. All choice is within limits. The field of choice is always limited—by limits some of which are within a given personality and some external to it.

Some of the limits of human nature it may perhaps share with all possible being. No being conceivable to us, natural or supernatural, human or superhuman, can by its fiat change or affect the validity of logical laws of mathematics or of the ideal values of truth, beauty, goodness or holiness. No power can make the rational irrational, or make justice or love evil, and injustice or hate good. Furthermore, no power can change a single brute fact in the universe without facing it as it is and reckoning with



it. It appears that the nature of the whole universe is essentially, in certain respects, finite. All potentialities are realizable only within the limits of the truths of reason and the truths of fact. Ideals and brute facts limit every possible nature, human or divine—especially the human.

Nevertheless it is very difficult to assert that the limits of human nature are absolutely fixed and rigid. If the truths of reason are limits, they are also themes of perpetual investigation and therefore areas of growth. Brute facts are limits; but they are subject both to investigation and to use. They are both obstacles and instruments at the same time. Sin is a limit; yet sin may be forgiven, sinful habits may be overcome, and no sin is necessarily final in any life. The very limits of human nature thus drive us to consider its potentialities.

Human nature, then, is limit and it is also potentiality. Despite the limits of human weakness, the cynical Koheleth, according to the American Revisers, saw that God "hath set eternity in their heart, yet so that man cannot find out the work that God hath done from the beginning even to the end." King James had only "the world" there, which is a good deal for one heart; in the International Critical Commentary, Barton insists that it is "ignorance" which God has set in our hearts; Prof. Elmer A. Leslie thinks it is "vastness." What the Scripture may mean we leave to the Hebraists, their emendations and their condemnations; in any event, there is in the depths of human nature an ideal of infinity. Heraclitus knew this. "The soul's limits thou canst not find as thou goest, even if thou travelest every way—so deep a *Logos* has she. A *Logos* ever-growing is the soul's." Kant knew it, even of our physical knowledge, for he called it *eine unendliche Aufgabe*—an infinite task. All who have wrestled with the ontological argument know that there is in human nature an ideal of perfection, more or less dimly apprehended. The conception of reason itself—the ideal of perfect coherence—is an essential aspect of this ideal.

Reason well illustrates the main point about human nature now before us. It is an infinite, an inexhaustible ideal. This ideal is broader than all man's limits, defects and sins; for without it he would not be able to recognize a defect as a defect, a sin as a sin. All defects and sins, whatever else they may be, are offenses against the reason of man's own nature. Hence, reason is the measure of all potentialities, and is itself the seat of inexhaustible further potentialities. Until all experience is interpreted and controlled by the ideal of reason, until all persons have

mastered Nature, have come to understand themselves and each other, have fully adjusted their lives to the conditions of the real as well as the demands of the ideal, and have exhausted the creative possibilities of themselves and of objective reality—until all this is accomplished human nature always confronts new potentialities of good and of evil.

There has been much ridicule of liberal hopes for progress in these dark days; and if anyone ever held to a theory of rectilinear, painless, perpetual progress, he was, of course, talking nonsense. But the personalistic view of human nature is an affirmation of the possibility of infinite progress; it is a denial that any limit can be set, as long as man is conscious, which would render progress impossible. As long as man exists, in this world or in a world to come, he is a complex of potentials, and the realization of any potentiality always opens new areas of potentials—as well as excluding others. Not forgetting what has been said about limits, we must affirm that human nature is finite-infinite, being limited in certain senses and unlimited in others. The affirmation of both aspects of man is the essence of the struggle, the magnificence, and the degradation of man's spirit. Cusanus (who died eighteen years before Columbus discovered America), with his *docta ignorantia*, and his theories of the union of opposites, and of the infinity of man's nature (recently re-emphasized by Arnold Metzger) proposes a divine nature that is a *coincidentia oppositorum*, and a human nature that is a microcosm somehow mirroring the infinite universe, yet never achieving true infinity. This view is close to what I mean, as is the strangely symbolic philosophy of Jakob Boehme, Hegel's dialectic, and Bergson's creative evolution.

In addition to the finite limits and the infinite potentialities of human nature, the fact of freedom should be made explicit—partaking both of the limit and the unlimited potential. Freedom within limits is man's contribution to the creativity of an endlessly creative universe.

Man's freedom has at least three aspects. (1) Man experiences choice. He selects; he says "yes" to this, "no" to that. In this experience of choice is the root of morality and of sin. Here alone—in free obedience to a freely chosen ideal—is moral goodness; here alone is sin. Sin is universal, in that all at some time disobey the heavenly vision. But it is a moral calamity that the same word has been used for the unchosen misfortune of "missing the mark" and for the chosen act of repudiating the mark. That "the whole creation groaneth and travaileth together in pain until now" is true; to call this groaning and travail by

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the name of sin—whether original or unoriginal—is so confusing as to be false. Sin is well defined in the Epistle of James: "To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin." Sin, then, presupposes knowledge of an ideal and choice to reject it. Where these are absent, sin is absent, however much pain, failure and defeat may be present.

From the point of view of value, however, the mere potentiality of choice would be a relatively trivial aspect of human nature if choice could not be followed by (2) achievement. Unless the universe is such that the free person can plan, and to some extent carry out his plans, freedom is purely formal and empty. The fact is that the universe is, within limits, plastic and responsive to man's choices. Human purposes are able to direct history, remake Nature, and create arts, sciences, philosophies and religions, because choices work in a responsive universe. Human persons respond to each other, Nature responds to human effort, and the invisible and transcendent Divine answers our prayers and co-operates with our seeking. Achievement is, to a considerable extent, possible. Free activity yields rich results. With it there is sin and tragedy enough; without it there would be complete fatuity, a life of unintelligent and subhuman vegetable somnolence. Before we condemn human activity as pride, let us consider what human nature would be without any free human activity. It would descend to a state below the level to which a Hitler would depress the Jew—a body without a soul.

Freedom is, however, more than choice and achievement. Every free act creates (3) responsibility. The free man lays an autonomous responsibility on himself; he enters into responsible, contractual relations (as Cabot says) with his fellow human beings; and, by sharing the prerogative of creation in the light of the ideal, he enters into a sacred and responsible relation to the eternal Creator of creators and the eternal realizer of the ideal—God. No free man can choose without involving himself in relations to his human comrades and his God.

IV

Human nature, limited, potential, free: such a nature cannot be adequately described in one word. It is necessary, but not sufficient, to condemn human nature as sinful. How absurd to suppose that sin is man's only potentiality, or even his chief one! Let us speak plainly. It is meaningless to speak of sin in any sense unless man is more fundamentally a potential child of God—a realizer of spiritual values—than he is a

sinner—a repudiator of those values. Basically, then, if we must have a formula, man is a child of God, even when he fain would fill his belly with the husks that the swine eat.

Hence, although man's existence is tragic, it cannot be adequately described as mere tragedy. It is partly tragic, partly comic, partly drab and neutral. There is tragedy, but tragedy is no more the ultimate word for human nature than Calvary is the ultimate word in the Christian drama. Easter comes, and even the often gloomy and semi-Barthian Saint Paul transcends tragedy. "Being justified by faith, we have peace with God." "And the greatest of these is love." It is human nature to sin; but it is also human nature to find peace and love.

For like reasons, the overemphasis on man's creaturehood or creatureliness is, when carried to extremes, both inadequate and morbid. Yes, of course, man is a creature. His nature is dependent on the nature of the whole; but the meaning of creaturehood is determined both by the nature of the creature and by that of the Creator. It is well to remember Schleiermacher's proviso that religion is dependence on the God revealed in Jesus Christ. Much current theology is closer to the fatalism of Islam than to the Christian consciousness of the Fatherhood of God. The personalistic view of human nature reaffirms the conception of man as a child of God in all the Iliad and the Odyssey of his soul's wanderings.

This affirmation is made, however, without any easy, moralistic optimism. Suffering and tragedy, cross and pain, are (on this personalistic view) not merely the lot of human nature, but also of the eternal divine nature. He who thinks that freedom, or heaven, will wipe out this aspect of experience is extending his hopes far beyond the empirical evidence, if not in flagrant contradiction of it. But with all the moral and nonmoral obstacles to the full achievement of life's ideal potentials, the personalist, seeing history in perspective, finds no tragedy that cannot be endured, and no sin beyond possible redemption. Time goes on; no war destroys either humanity or faith; no crime or plague exists but what goodness and wisdom survive it and somehow cope with it. Man is blind, willful, suffering; but in it all, his kinship to God is the most revealing and vital aspects of his nature.

V

Man, then, is "a citizen of two worlds"—the world of obstacles, tragedy and sin, and the world of aspiration toward the divine. A philos-

ophy or theology which denies the full force of each world in human experience is blind in one eye. There is, indeed, always the dire conflict of thesis and antithesis; but there is everywhere creative growth toward the synthesis—if you give God and man time. In such a world of dialectical tensions, man's struggles are somehow always involved in God's struggles, man's plans in God's plan, human nature in divine nature.

This does not mean that man is God or that human nature is divine nature. Such a view leads to a series of incoherencies. But it does mean that the picture of man "apart from God," man as a purely natural being without divine aid, is a theological monstrosity and a fantastic abstraction. In a personalistic universe, man is constantly surrounded by, constantly sustained by, constantly affected by God. Without God's continual activity, both Nature and human nature would vanish.

Man, then, is human, subject to human limits, often restricted in his vision to the world of visible Nature. But while remaining a citizen of his own world, he is also a citizen of the divine world—the world of the ideal potentials not yet achieved, the world of the God who is always beyond him. His task of being a good citizen of both worlds is sweat and agony, but also reason and love and joy and peace.

VI

Man's dual citizenship opens the perspective of his destiny. This world is such that in all its history it will never be perfect; yet it is such that the other world, the world of the perfect ideal, will always be at work in it. As surely as there is a world against which we protest, so surely the ideal in the name of which we protest is more potent than the world's evils. It may well be, in the light of the second law of thermodynamics, that history on this planet will have its terminus. But the vision of the real which we catch here reveals an eternal order in the light of which this planet and all astronomical galaxies are but incidents in the eternal development of personality—and subordinate incidents, too, as compared with the ideal potentials of personality.

The personalistic view of human nature, therefore, suggests a faith in personal-social immortality, with a career of inexhaustible perfectibility in a universe in which the Lamb is slain from the foundation of the world, and yet eternally rises again from every slaying.

Jesus Christ and the Family of the Father

J. LEONARD FARMER

THE KINGDOM OF GOD AND THE FAMILY OF THE FATHER

THE expression "Kingdom of God" is sounded as a diapason throughout the teaching of Jesus. It is the *motif* of his gospel. As popularly understood, it referred to a restoration of the Davidic monarchy. But as put into his mouth, it had reference to no type of political government. Such governments as everywhere administered were regarded by Him as "kingdoms of this world" in contrast with the new administrations of affairs which He envisaged as superseding them all. Their supersession was to be in social functions rather than in structural forms of government, in the ethical ends which it would serve in the life of peoples. For Him "kingdom" meant a sphere of rule, and "Kingdom of God" the rule of God throughout the earth against all forces of evil in physical and human natures for human welfare.

This meaning is implied in his initial announcement concerning the imminence of the Kingdom of God. It was at hand because through Him the power of God would begin to achieve the total welfare of mankind against all forces of evil. This was demonstrated in the miracles reported of Him and in his persistent battle against the unrighteous rulers of his people. Writing more than a generation after his death, and with the national debacle of 70 A. D. imminent or in retrospect, Mark and Matthew believed that He had begun the establishment of the Kingdom during his ministry, and that this political disaster would in some way contribute toward its more rapid development.

Matthew preferred the expression "Kingdom of the heavens"¹ to "Kingdom of God." When he uses the latter a comparison between this Kingdom and those of men (or other supposed superhuman beings) is in mind; but when he uses the former he is thinking of the mutuality of relations in the new universal society. This phrase suggests certain re-

¹ Matthew everywhere uses the phrase *he basileia ton ouranon*, never *he basileia toy ouranou*. When he speaks of "heaven" as, for instance, in the second petition of the Lord's Prayer, he is comparing the celestial realm with the earth; and when he speaks of "the heavens" he is comparing the different orders of the celestial world with the different peoples or races of the kingdoms of the earth.

lations between God and men on the one hand, and between men of difference classes, races or nations on the other. The relations between God and men were to be the same as those between Him and the "heavenly hosts," and the relations between the different races and nations of men the same as those between the different orders of the celestial hierarchies. God's righteous will is ever operating for the welfare of mankind as energy flows from the sun; but it is sometimes thwarted by evil forces of nature and in men. With the consummation of his Kingdom the operation of his will was to be as unobstructed throughout the kingdoms of the earth as in the celestial realm. All obstacles, human and super-human, were to have been overcome.

Luke represents Jesus as declaring that this Kingdom would not come in a visible way, as a change in structural forms of government, but was already within the midst of the people.² It had already begun in the power of God operating through Him against the forces of evil in nature and men for the total welfare of the people. And the two instances in which John puts "Kingdom of God" into Jesus' mouth, and especially his report of Jesus' disavowal of a "kingdom of this world,"³ make it clear that for the fourth evangelist Jesus so spiritualized the popular concept of the Kingdom as to have divested it of all nationalistic implications. For Jesus, as far as the evils of men are concerned, any kingdom of this world may become a part of the Kingdom of God without any necessary change in its structural form. What it needs is a change in attitude, relations, purposes, ideals of service—spirit. Its objective manifestations are in its achievement for the total welfare of all its citizens. But the summation of God's Kingdom is universal in scope.

Jesus employed the popular term which carried political connotations for two purposes: first, to establish a point of ideational contact with his people, that through his teaching He might the more successfully elevate them religiously and socially, so that they might promote the true interests of the higher Kingdom; and, secondly, to contrast the spiritual

² Taken out of its context, the phrase *he basileia toy Theoy entos hymon estin* in Luke 17:21 could mean either "the Kingdom of God is within you" or "the Kingdom of God is within the midst of you." But in its context it has the latter meaning. Jesus would not have told Pharisees that the Kingdom was within them. On every hand he caustically condemned them, saying that publicans and harlots go into the Kingdom before them, that unless one is more righteous than they he can in no case enter the Kingdom, and that they were children of the devil. Besides, he nowhere spoke of the Kingdom as entering one, but everywhere of one as entering it. Only the spirit enters one which causes him to promote the interests of the Kingdom in human society. Though invisible, the Kingdom is as objective as human society.

³ John 3:3, 5; 18:36.

nature and social relationships in the new world society with those of the present political kingdoms of this world. Had it not been for these motives, He could just as appropriately have designated the new order the Family of the Father; for relationships in it were to be those of an ideal family with God as universal Father and all men as brothers.

Though "Kingdom" of God frequently occurs in his teaching, God is referred to as "King" but once, and parabolized as such only twice. These instances occur in the Gospel of Matthew⁴ who had a theocratic bias. Neither refers to God's relation to individual men; but both refer to his relation to Jerusalem as the governmental center of the people, or to the religious rulers in relation to this city. Kingdom of "God" contrasts the new society with the kingdoms of this world. When He is elsewhere referred to as "God," his contrast with all rulers, human or superhuman, is implied. But when his relation to individual men is in mind, He is not referred to as King or God, but as Father. That is, *God is referred to as King as compared with kings of this world*, indicating His authority over men as nations; *He is God as contrasted with all other beings, human and superhuman*, denoting his power over the universe; but *He is Father in relation to men as individuals*, suggesting his personal interest in human welfare, especially in the welfare of each individual.

The Kingdom of God is, therefore, the Family of the Father which stresses *relations* rather than *contrasts* between the Father and his individual children, and between different groups of his children. Ideationally, in its contrast with the state as the critic of it, and in its works of charity for the relief of human suffering and the promotion of human welfare, the institutional Church is an embodiment of the Kingdom of God. But if personal attitudes and face-to-face relations between all individuals and groups within it are not "heavenly" in contrast with those in the state, it contrasts the Kingdom as envisaged by Jesus, and is another kingdom of this world. The inner spirit or attitude which prompts conduct makes all the difference between a Kingdom of God or Family of the Father and a kingdom of this world.

THE PLACE OF JESUS IN THE FAMILY OF THE FATHER

As He is portrayed in the Gospels, one thing of which Jesus was certain is that He was the Son of God to an extent to which the same cannot be affirmed of any other character of history. No outer circum-

⁴ Matthew 5:35; 18:23-35; 22:2-13.

stances could deprive Him of this inner conviction. It would seem that He himself conceived of his Sonship as ethical or spiritual rather than metaphysical. Whoever did the will of the Father the most completely was the Son of the Father in the highest degree;⁵ and whoever served the welfare of mankind the most completely was for the same reason the Son of Man. He and his Father were one in spirit and will, though not in knowledge and power.⁶ For Him "Son" meant "Servant."

Being such a unique Person, He was clearly conscious of a divine purpose of world significance for his life. Toward its achievement He completely disregarded his personal welfare, spent every ounce of his strength, and gave every drop of his blood. This purpose was two-fold: first, to make men filial in attitude toward their heavenly Father and fraternal in relations with one another. This is spiritual sonship and brotherhood. Scientifically speaking, they have a common origin and, therefore, are brothers even though they may devour one another; but they are filial and fraternal only when promoting the welfare of one another. And, secondly, it was to reveal the fatherly nature of God and his solicitude for the welfare of his children. The heavenly Father is always fatherly because He is Father; but men are not always filial and fraternal because they are sons and brothers.

That is to say, Jesus came to reconcile men to their heavenly Father and to one another. Their estrangement did not lessen the Father's love, but, causing sorrow and not wrath, brought it into clearer consciousness by making it more emotional and impelling. It was because of his great love for mankind that He sent his Son into the world to strive for men's salvation into family relations with Him and with one another. He himself did not need to be reconciled any more than did the father of the prodigal when his son was in the far country in utter degradation. What He needed was the great joy that would come into his yearning, sorrowful heart as the result of the change of his unfilial and unbrotherly children into filial and fraternal ones. He feels himself glorified in the glorification of his children.

The death of Jesus was part of the divine revelation—its climax

⁵ See Jesus' conception of kinship as spiritual as reported in Mark 3:33ff; Matthew 12:48ff; Luke 8:21; and John 8:38-44. In these instances the kinship that counts most is not physical but spiritual, manifesting itself in likeness of conduct. Though John himself believed in his metaphysical Sonship, it seems that in the Johannine passage just referred to the Sonship of Jesus to His Father is the same as that of his opponents to their father, the devil. Probably no clear distinction was made between the ethical and metaphysical.

⁶ Mark 13:32; Matthew 24:36; John 10:29; 14:28; Acts 1:7.

and ultimate expedient. It revealed the depth of the Father's love for his children: the extent to which it would impel Him to go in his effort to reconcile them; and it revealed the completeness of Jesus' devotion to his Father's will and of his love for his brothers: the extent to which these would impel Him to go in his effort to achieve the purpose of his Father. More than this even the loving Father and the devoted Son of the Father could not do.

The price which He paid—his tireless labors, suffering and shameful death—was the cost of the kind of reconciliation which He essayed to achieve. The end supremely justified the means. If such had been possible, it would have been worthy of even a greater price; for no more glorious and end is conceivable for the Father in heaven or for his children on earth. Whether or not this price was sufficient depends upon the extent to which it actually achieves its end in reconciling the Father's children in this world here and now. They cannot be reconciled to Him without being reconciled also to one another. The least wrong done even the lowliest of his children causes sorrow to the Father's heart.

Jesus' place in the Family of the Father is, therefore: first, serving his Father's will the most completely through his devotion to the welfare of mankind, He was the God-Man, the only begotten Son of the Father and the elder Brother of the Father's children. Secondly, He was the most authoritative champion and perfect exemplar of the divine-human relations which He endeavored to establish that has come into this world. His life is a beacon light to all who love light rather than darkness. Thirdly, He not only spent it in laboring for the achievement of his end, but freely yielded it through the most excruciating death on behalf of the relations which He would establish between the Father and his children. And, fourthly, He died with the firm conviction that, even should the great and glorious event for which He strove, the consummation of the Family of the Father, be far off, somehow through the abiding influence of his earthly career, including his ignominious death, it would eventually come to pass. The world can ill afford to lose such a victorious faith in such a noble ideal. He was founder of the Family of the Father.

He is, therefore, most worthy of good men's admiration, love, esteem, honor, devotion, emulation—worship. The Father has many children who do not accept his ideal for this world, and are bent upon thwarting his will toward this end. These may disregard Jesus and even regard

Him with contempt and scorn. But men who understand Him and are united with Him in spirit cannot withhold from Him their worship. They worship Him formally because they worship Him in their daily living, in their attitude and conduct in their various relations with various children of the Father, and in their public championing of the spiritual-social ideals for which He lived and died. If in these ways men ignore and flout the ideals which were most sacred to Him, if they differ from other peoples only in forms and objects of worship, while being worse or essentially the same in social attitudes and relations with all the Father's children, their formal worship of Him is of no religious value. As far as they are concerned He came, labored, suffered and died in vain.

RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FAMILY OF THE FATHER

As children of the Father and brothers of one another, men have duties to Him and to one another. Their duty to Him is expressed in the one word *obedience*. This obedience is not inspired by fear as a duty which may "seem a load," but by filial respect, reverence, gratitude, appreciation, loyalty, devotion—a duty performed as a privilege which brings inner satisfaction. The ideal father experiences less joy from the fearful obedience of his children to his commands than from their initiative in doing good because of their loyal devotion to the principles for which he is known to stand. Indeed, deep down in his heart he finds no satisfaction in their fear of him, but much joy in their loyalty to him, even though he must sometimes appeal to the instinct of fear to discipline an obstreperous one.

Worship belongs in the Family of the Father. It is not a duty, however, imposed from without, and which may at times "prove a task," but a privilege prompted from within. Sometimes it is with solicitude for what the Father may do or with entreaties for Him to do, oftener with gratitude for what He has done, but always with joyful appreciation for Him as Father. Whatever is done for Him directly is done freely as a gift of appreciation and gratitude. Any filial child delights in making gifts to his father, even though the father has provided him with the means with which he makes such gifts. And every loving father who has such filial children knows how deeply his own heart is touched by such free-will gifts, though of but little intrinsic value, bestowed out of filial hearts.

Only such worship is communion and fellowship with the Father;

for only it is in spirit and in truth. Because the whole earth is always full of his invisible Presence, such spiritual worship is not confined to any particular time or place. It is engaged in whenever and wherever the divinity within men moves them to worship. For this reason Jesus did not enjoin upon men the worship of the Father, but everywhere assumed it, and exemplified it in his own relation with Him, both privately and in public. It is unhuman for men not to worship; but it is only when they have been performing their duties to their fellow men that they have the privilege of worshipping the Father in such a way that both He and they will receive the greatest satisfaction and joy out of their fellowship and communion. Otherwise, becoming spiritual introverts, they commune only with themselves. Two cannot walk together except they be agreed.

As Jesus was one with his Father in spirit and will, He exhorted obedience to Him only through obedience to Himself. Had He exhorted men to obey *God*, they would have thought of keeping the law of Moses, which did not present the highest will of *the Father* as only Jesus knew it. Besides, the professors and administrators of the law placed greater stress in practice upon the ceremonial than upon the ethical law, while the Father of Jesus required the reverse. With the exception of a few injunctions and prohibitions which have to do with men's filial attitudes as shown in their respect, reverence, humility, trust and dependence, the only acts which Jesus regarded as men's bounden duty to perform, and as expressing the highest will of the Father, had to do with their relations to one another.

Men's duties to one another in the Family of the Father are expressed in one word, *good will*, which means an active interest in the welfare of all others with whom one is in any way related, and summarized in the pithy statement, *All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you even so to them*. This is not merely respect for one another's "rights," but freely conceding to one another the same privileges which one claims for oneself, and the helping of one another to use these privileges for the highest welfare of all. This command cannot be fulfilled unless one is able to imagine oneself in the place of everybody else, and to see in him an essential kinship with oneself.

The filial child of the Father always sees his brothers through the same spiritual eyes through which he beholds the Father Himself. He gets a glimpse of Him even in the lowliest of his children. In view of

their spiritual likeness to Himself, other differences are relatively unimportant in determining his attitude and conduct toward them. For being Spirit, the Father belongs to no race or nation but embraces them all. One may see *God* in nature; but anyone who cannot see *the Father* in his fellow men, even the lowliest of them, is not likely to see Him anywhere else. And anyone who will not serve Him through unselfish and uncondescending service of such fellow men will not truly serve Him at all. For this reason Jesus made no appreciable distinction between men's service of their Father and their service to one another. Being one with Him in spirit and will, He enjoined service to Himself, the visible representation of Him, but only through men's service to their fellow men as He himself had done. Insofar as they serve the least of His brothers on earth, they serve Him. Otherwise they are still children estranged from their Father.

REALIZING THE FAMILY OF THE FATHER

The doing of the things which He commanded them was made by Jesus the basic condition of men's discipleship to Him and, therefore, of their membership in the reconciled Family of the Father. These things have to do especially with men's relation to the father as shown in their attitude toward one another. He regarded the leaders of his people as estranged from his father, though their religiosity was the most fervent. Their estrangement was expressed in their unbrotherly social attitudes and relations among themselves and with other peoples. His purpose was to save them immediately and ultimately all peoples of the world by changing their spirit and social attitudes and relations so that God would be recognized as the Father of all men and all men as brothers in theory and in practice.

If his followers are ever to achieve his purpose, they must revert to his original emphasis, and make the fatherhood of God and brotherhood of man an evangelical gospel, the heart of the Christian religion in preaching and practice, and the controlling motive in the evangelization of the world. If in the postwar world they shall do nothing more than to redouble and intensify their interests and activities at home and abroad in the traditional way, it is more than likely that the world will continue its traditional processes, producing nothing new under the sun. The traditional emphases are not likely to yield anything but the traditional results.

Peace on earth means more than mere temporary cessations in physical warfare between nations, and begrudging compromises in domestic group cleavages. It means the healing and the prevention of social friction through active good will among individuals, classes, races and nations. There is no problem in class, racial or national relations that is not basically an extension of a similar problem in human relations between individuals of the same group. Nations fight with the sword for the same fundamental reasons that class groups fight through courts, lockouts, boycotts and sabotage. Interracial friction arises for the same reason that friction arises between groups and between individuals within the same group. The problem is one in social psychology and social ethics, not polemics and politics. Fundamentally and ultimately its solution is spiritual and not physical or legal—spiritual in the sense of changing the spirit, the inner attitudes of men which determine their voluntary and involuntary conduct toward one another individually and between their various groups.

The exigency of the times demands such a holy crusade at home and abroad in the interest of human brotherliness and the enduring peace within and among the nations of the world. Toward something like this the original World Fellowship of Faiths has been preparing the way. Doubtless all the great religions of the world have something to contribute toward this glorious end. They are religions of human beings who need and desire salvation as well as any others. If Christianity can take the initiative in leading the peoples of the world to the acceptance and practice of these family relations of Jesus, it will thereby have achieved that whereunto it was primarily designed. The world will have been won to Jesus indeed, even if not in formal confession of faith in the personal Christ. For Him, the doing of his will and not the crying unto Him, "Lord! Lord!" is the all-important thing. It matters little in whose *Name* as God men walk; but it matters much if they learn of the *ways* and walk in the *paths* of the universal Father of mankind.

This is men's salvation in this world; and it will be their salvation in the world to come. The world can never be saved with an eternal salvation until its peoples everywhere shall somehow be brought to the acceptance in theory and practice of this salvation of Jesus for their lives as individuals, classes, races and nations. Then will the Family of the Father for which Jesus spent and gave his life have been realized in its completeness; and the will of the Father will be as unobstructed by men in its operation on earth as in heaven.

I Believe

RICHARD MACKENZIE

THERE is no denying the contention that religion is one of the chief concerns of man. Go anywhere in the world among people and there are churches, synagogues, idols, mosques, temples, shrines, totems or sacred objects; there are clergy, medicine men or priests; and there are rituals, ceremonies and meetings. In the name of religion huge sums of money have been spent and millions of lives given and taken. How did man come to be so engrossed in religion? How did religion begin? The question has often been asked.

In order to get oriented for an approach to the problem, a quotation from *Modern Biology* (p. 443, Tudor Publishing Company, 1935), by Eric Nordenskiöld seems appropriate:

"In the history of human thought three successive phases have followed one another: the theological, in which it was believed that personal divine powers were the cause of all that happened; the metaphysical, when for these were substituted impersonal forces; and the positivist, in which men no longer ruminate over causes of all that takes place, but are content to establish facts and determine their cause."

According to these views there are three possible approaches to the problem of finding the origins of religion. Despite the statement quoted that "The theological stage culminated in the Catholicism of the Middle Ages," the theological method in thinking is still very much with us. To be sure, the metaphysical method was not a new development if it is taken in the usual sense of speculative philosophy. As Comte held the metaphysical "the worst of all," so Will Durant in his *Mansions of Philosophy* (Simon & Schuster, 1929, p. 523) deplores the effect of philosophy in these words: "This is one of the drawbacks of philosophy, that it replaces concrete particulars with generalized abstractions, taking from us the intimate and anthropomorphic deity of our youth and giving us instead an Absolute that it would be ridiculous to picture in the human form."

Those who use metaphysical assumptions and generalized abstractions have been the bane of theologians and positivists alike. They were the Gnostics of the early Christian era, the esoteric doctrinaires. The cabala represents the same type among the Jews. Much of the Talmud has

only a philosophic background. The Greek philosophers gave a pattern for thinking that has held popular scholastic thought in a vise. The writer of the book of Job had little regard for their method for he wrote: "Canst thou by searching find out the almighty unto perfection?"

In the contest with the theologian, who starts from the belief there is a God, the philosopher, in his vain attempt to show whether there is or is not a God, says that wherever the belief in a God or in spirits exists that man has invented such ideas. But they have not yet come to an agreement as to just how they "think" man invented the idea of God, but centuries ago, God, through His prophet, Isaiah, said to such people "shall the work say of him that made it, He made me not?" That is an appeal to the idea that if God did make man, is man able to explain his Creator? Can man explain the nature or faculty by which he records and explains his experience? But listen to a resume by Eric Nordenskiöld of what Emanuel Kant wrote on the subject in his *Critique of Pure Reason*:

"Natural science is thus a knowledge of reality such as we observe it, not a knowledge of reality as it actually is. Natural laws are based on our own capacity for knowledge and are binding on us because this capacity has certain fundamental qualities that are the same for all men. Natural science is thus fully justified in drawing its conclusions in the world of experience; on the other hand, it can never give any enlightenment as to the intrinsic meaning of things—that is, what is not phenomenon—nor indeed does it need to do so for the purposes of its physical explanations; but even if, say, some influences from the immaterial world were to arise, it should pass them over and base its explanations upon what the senses are able to reveal and what is reconcilable in accordance with the laws of experience, with our actual observations. On the other hand, all things on which the experience of the senses can give no knowledge, such as what the soul, the world, God actually are in themselves, fall outside any rational knowledge. Of these things, then, we can know nothing—we can maintain neither their existence nor their nonexistence. But for that very reason we are able, if our feelings require it, to take them for granted; we are justified in believing in God, in the immortality of the soul, and in the free will, and reason has no right to reject any such belief as irrational."

On this same matter hear William James in his essay, "The Will to Believe" (Longmans, Green and Company, 1908, p. 10):

"Why do so few 'scientists' even look at the evidence of telepathy, so-called? Because they think, as a leading biologist, now dead, once said to me, that even if such a thing were true, scientists ought to band together to keep it suppressed and concealed. It would undo the uniformity of Nature and all sorts of other things without which scientists cannot carry on their pursuits. But if this very man had been shown something which as a scientist he might do with telepathy, he might not only have examined the evidence, but even found it good enough.

This very law which the logicians would impose on us—if I may give the name of logicians to those who would rule out our willing nature here—is based on nothing but their own natural wish to exclude all elements for which they, in their professional quality as logicians, can find no use.”

But isn't there a chance that rather than excluding these facts because they “can find no use” for them, it is because they could not *control* the thinking of the populace on the facts used for their systems of philosophy if facts that could not be proven by sense experience had to be included in their thinking as well as ours. This insistence by the logicians and philosophers that consideration be given only to facts which may be comprehended by our physical senses is limiting evidence and showing partiality—one of the worst offenses against science.

The efforts of logicians and pseudoscientists to fairly consider the facts of the “willing nature” of man and the persistence of man's belief in deity has led these men to give way to imaginations and unscientific statements. They shout at the waves of belief in deity to recede or dry up. They seem to dread the idea that there can be a great universe of realities that carnal senses cannot apprehend, much less explain. They are like the biologist of whom Mr. James wrote. A few examples follow:

Dr. George A. Dorsey, formerly Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of Chicago, in his book, *Why We Behave Like Human Beings* (Harper and Brothers, 1925) on p. 478 states:

“Death is a common affair in nature; for millions of years man had been dying of old age or disease or killed in combat. But he suddenly becomes conscious of death! And within a few centuries he has raised a natural phenomenon to a vast and complicated rite, and expects the very stars to stand still while he breathes his last. The monuments to the dead, the worship of the dead, the prayers for the dead! Yes, and the communion for the dead! All this had to be, presumably; man had become that kind of an animal. . . . It was inevitable that his love for life and fear of death lead him into magic rites and groveling superstitions.”

In order to consider this statement by Doctor Dorsey a part of the definition of science from the Standard Dictionary seems in order: “Knowledge gained and verified by exact observation and correct thinking.” In the above quotation Doctor Dorsey assumes to tell us what happened “for millions of years.” He states that primitive man “suddenly becomes conscious of death” and “within a few centuries he has raised a natural phenomenon to a vast and complicated rite”; and that “man had become that kind of an animal.”

What facts have ever been “observed” and “verified” to give the

"knowledge" that man was not always concerned about the unseen, "conscious of death" or that man did not always believe in life after death or that what became a "complicated rite" had not always been a "rite" with man, no matter how simple? What evidence has ever been produced to show that man has not always been the same kind of man he is today in fundamental beliefs, faculties and behavior, and that primitive man differed only in the fact that he lacked knowledge and that his beliefs in the unseen were elementary and *not* differentiated?

Another writer of wide repute who has attempted to interpret the reports of observations of beliefs and practices among savages is Mr. H. G. Wells. In his book, *The Outline of History* (Macmillan, Third Edition), he attempts to develop a theory of the origins of religion (p. 94ff); but not how he uses the terms "may" and "probably":

"Certain very fundamental things there may have been in men's minds long before the coming of speech. Chief among them must have been fear of the Old Man of the tribe. The young of the primitive squatting-place grew up under that fear. Objects associated with him were probably forbidden. Everyone was forbidden to touch his spear or to sit in his place. . . . The idea of *something forbidden*, the idea of things being, as it is called, *Tabu*, not to be touched, not to be looked at, may thus have got well into the human mind at a very early stage indeed." (p. 96ff): ". . . Another idea probably arose early out of the mysterious visitation of infectious diseases, and that was the idea of uncleanness and of being accurst. From that, too, there may have come an idea of avoiding particular places and persons, and persons in particular phases of health. Here was the root of another set of tabus. Then man, from the very dawn of his mental life, may have had a feeling of the sinister about places and things. . . .

"Then the idea of the sinister has for its correlative the idea of the propitious, and from that to the idea of making things propitious by ceremonies is an easy step.

"Out of such ideas and a jumble of kindred ones grow the first quasi-religious elements in human life."

Then Mr. Wells, having presented his evidence, concludes: "Out of such ideas and a jumble of kindred ones grew the first quasi-religious elements in human life."

Here is the attempt of another man who has written much to prove that man invented religion. In his *Treatise on the Gods* (Knopf), Mr. H. L. Mencken offers his explanation of the origin of religion. On p. 15 he states: "The earliest religion, I daresay, arose out of some extraordinary series of calamities, unprecedented and intolerable." On p. 10 he wrote: "It is highly probable, indeed, that the first priest appeared in the world simultaneously with the first religion." On pp. 18 and 19, in recounting the story of a flood and the origin of religion among prehistoric men, he

tells that "One Spring" (no date given) "there came great rains in the valley" (no name or location given) "and on their heels a flood of melting snow." He tells how "a mother and her child" (no name given) are drowned. He tells of the terror and famine as the waters rise. He tells us that "It is not hard to imagine the hideous scene."

As long as Mr. Mencken is honest enough to tell us that it was "not hard to imagine" what he reports happened many thousands of years ago and that what he stated regarding the appearance of the first priest is only what he considered "highly probable" there should be included a quotation from his Preface. Writing of theologies, he says:

"It seems to me that some of them, in this detail or that, and logic being what it is, have a considerable plausibility, and so I can imagine more or less rational persons believing in them, though I am unable to do so myself. Moreover, no matter what may be said against them on evidential grounds, it must be manifest that they have conditioned the thinking of mankind since the infancy of the race, and that they remain forces of great potency to this day. Thus they deserve examination in a fair and scientific spirit, and to that business I have devoted much of my leisure for many years. It has not shaken my lifelong (and apparently congenital) conviction that the case of religion is not proved, but it has at least made me see that dismissing the thing itself as a mere aberration is a proceeding far more lofty than sensible. What has been so powerful in its effects upon history deserves sober study, whether it be an aberration or not."

Mr. Mencken might be chided for his presumptuousness in supposing that his imagination of what happened before the dawn of history in an unknown valley on an undated Spring, or what he considered "highly probable," was of serious scientific consequence. But, he says the subject deserves "examination in a fair and scientific spirit." To this we agree!

Perhaps more can be learned about the facts of the origin of religion from consideration of those things which are found from factual evidence in the religious life of man. If all evidence and signs show that man has everywhere and, so far as we know, always had religion or belief in unseen spiritual powers superior to man; if man everywhere has been inclined to give personality to "inanimate" objects, then these manifestations of religion may help us to see clearly the source of religion.

The unsigned article on Ethnology of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (Eleventh Edition) states in part: "The works of early man everywhere present the most startling resemblance. The palaeolithic implements all over the globe are all of one pattern." The author of the article quotes Sir J. Evans as follows: "The implements in distant lands are so identical in form and character with the British specimens that they might have

been manufactured by the same hands." . . . The author continues: "But perhaps the greatest psychical proofs of man's specific unity is his common possession of language." He quotes Theodore Waitz as follows: "Inasmuch as the possession of a language of regular grammatical structure forms a fixed barrier between man and brute, it establishes at the same time a near relationship between all people in psychical respects. . . . In the presence of this common feature of the human mind, all other differences lose their import."

The author gives this quotation from Dr. J. C. Prichard: "The same inward and mental nature is to be recognized in all races of men." And in keeping with the evidence from bones of well-authenticated human remains, the writer states "man, then, may be regarded as specifically one."

In the same *Encyclopedia* E. B. Tylor writes on Anthropology:

"there is usually to be discerned amongst such lower races (lowest modern savage) a belief in unseen powers pervading the universe, this belief shaping itself into an animistic or spiritualistic theology, mostly resulting in some kind of worship. . . . If, again, high savage or low barbaric types be selected, as among the North American Indians, Polynesians and Kaffirs of South Africa, the same elements of culture appear, but at a more advanced stage, namely, . . . more systemic and philosophic schemes of religion and a more elaborate and ceremonial worship. . . . It is now certain that there ever has been an inherent tendency in man, allowing for differences of climate and material surroundings, to develop culture by the same stages and in the same way."

In the same work under the heading "Animism," by N. W. Thomas, it is stated: "No people has yet been discovered which has not already developed to a greater or less extent an animistic philosophy." And further: "All over the world agricultural people practice elaborate ceremonies explicable, as Mannhardt has shown, on animistic principles," and the term "animism" is defined as "the doctrine of spiritual things."

Under "Immortality" in the same work, by A. E. Garvie, it is stated: "The belief in human immortality in some form is almost universal; even in early animistic cults the germ of the idea is present, and in all the higher religions it is an important feature."

The article on "Religion" in the same work by J. E. Carpenter includes the following statements regarding religious belief and practices that are found among all primitive peoples. They are, according to the author of the article or those writers whom he quotes, the universal or almost universal religious practices, attitudes and beliefs.

"Most savage vocabularies have a word corresponding to sacred which denotes something to be avoided."

" . . . it is certain that what is strange, new or portentous is regularly treated by all savages as sacred."

The identification of "the efficacy of sacredness with mystical or magical power" has analogies "on all sides."

"Ghosts and spirits are everywhere believed in, and appear to be endowed with greater predominance as religious synthesis advances among primitive peoples."

"The dead are always sacred."

"Blessings come, evils go, may be said to be the magicoreligious formula implicit in all socially approved dealings with the sacred, however specialized in semblance."

Regarding mystic power it is stated that: "On the whole, however, savage society tends to regard (it) as something acquired, the product of acts and abstinences having a traditional character for imparting magicoreligious virtue. An external symbol in the shape of a ceremony or cult object is of great assistance to the dim eye of primitive man."

The statements made in the foregoing articles give the following facts, gained and verified by exact observations, of the identical characteristics of all races and tribes of man in all known parts of the world:

1. a. "All human races are of one species and family."
- b. "The skeleton bones (of 'well-authenticated human remains') show differences so slight as to admit of pathological or other explanation."
2. Implements are strikingly identical the world over.
3. a. "Perhaps the greatest psychical proof of man's specific unity is his common possession of language."
- b. "The same inward and mental nature is to be recognized in all races of men."
- c. "The possession of a language of regular grammatical structure . . . establishes . . . a near relationship between all people in psychical respects."
- d. "Most savage vocabularies have a word corresponding to sacred."
4. a. "No people has yet been discovered which has not already developed to a greater or less extent" a "doctrine of spiritual things."
- b. "There is usually to be discerned amongst such lower races (lowest modern savages) a belief in unseen powers pervading the universe."
- c. "Ghosts and spirits are everywhere believed in, and appear to be endowed with greater predominance as religious synthesis advances among primitive peoples."
- d. And this word from Ratzel's *History of Mankind* may be added: "ethnography knows no race devoid of religion, but only differences in the degree to which religious ideas have been developed."

These quotations are not given to draw any comparison between man and brute. They are to show that men of science, who have collected facts regarding peoples from all parts of the world, covering many thousands of years, state in effect that all members of the human race have, not only as distinguishing features, but as uniform characteristics: 1. Bones of one

kind. 2. Identical implements. 3. A "language of regular grammatical structure." 4. A universal belief in unseen powers, spiritual things, ghosts and spirits.

Examination of these statements discloses that the four classes are not of the same category, for bones are a part of man's being, while implements, language and belief are things which man's being produces. Bones have been readily discernible to man's senses. However, we have the assurances of men of science that because of the fundamental similarity of the implements and languages of all peoples that all men everywhere have "the same inward and mental nature." Furthermore, we have accepted it as a fact that the making of implements and the devising of language are products of what we call mind. Yes, man not only has bones, but he has a mind as well.

The rub has been regarding the matter of belief. But are we not going contrary to scientific method and correct thinking, yes, even logic, if, when we can rightly deduce from certain facts that man has a mind, that, if when we have a similar set of facts, such as that all men everywhere have belief in what J. G. Frazer calls "conscious or personal agents," we do not proceed by the same method and declare that belief is the product of some part of man's nature? We seem forced to the conclusion that the existence of religious belief in man is evidence of a distinctive and uniform functioning of *homo sapiens*. And whether the philosophers like it or not we have called that part of man's nature from which belief emanates, his soul. From the evidence produced by men of science we can say that a common feature of the soul of man is belief in "unseen powers," "spiritual things," "ghosts and spirits."

The contention seems in order that, as there are variations, though slight, in the workings of the mind of man in different races and tribes as shown in the variations in implements and language, so there should be allowances for the variations in the belief of man regarding the deity. And just because the religious beliefs of mankind vary and the belief practices include such varied forms as the burial practices of Neanderthal men, animism, magic, totemism, fetishism, it is no proof that they are not all products of a common inherent faculty of man's being: his soul.

The fact seems to be that there is a fair resemblance between the variations and uncertainties of the religious beliefs of savage and primitive man and the confusing jumble of religious beliefs of the "civilized" and "educated" man of today. Mention might be made of the variation

of belief regarding deity of Hebrew, Hindu, Confucian, Mohammedan and the various Christian and near Christian sects. Even among ministers of various Christian denominations the beliefs regarding the person, acts, powers, intentions and demands of the Deity vary to such an extent that there could not be one deity that could possess such conflicting powers and qualities. Would it be unscientific to state that there are many different gods believed in today? But through all there is belief that God is!

Jesus of Nazareth knew of the ignorance of people about God for He said to a certain Samaritan woman: "Ye worship ye know not what: we know what we worship" (John 4:22). And He also left us a word which at once explains and justifies the longing and searching of men for God, for He said in prayer to Him who sent the Living Word to teach us: "And this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent" (John 17:3). Perhaps all do not know the "only true God" but men everywhere have sought Him. The soul of man has ever searched for the One who sits in the seat of authority and man has the belief that there is at least one spirit. That is the belief of man. That has been man's secret inheritance. Men everywhere, consciously or unconsciously have been saying "I believe." And searching for God they have believed in many spirits, many deities, various forms of spiritual powers. The superstitious savage, the idol worshiper, the animist, the pantheist, the follower of magic, all have been seeking "the only true God," for all have been sure He is somewhere. Yes, all have said "I believe." And is that not every bit the natural axiom after the inherent conviction of existence—"I am"? It is that belief that stirs the soul of man to cry in the words of Job: "Oh that I knew where I might find him" (Job 23:3). It is the song of the psalmist: "As the hart panteth after the water brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God. My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God: when shall I come and appear before God?" (Psalms 42:1-2).

How did religion begin? It does seem that it is as natural for man to seek for God in the unseen universe of the spirit as for man to desire food for his body and to desire survival of the flesh. Religion seems to be made of the search for the Ruler of the Universe and the efforts of man to please Him. How fortunate are those who are spiritually children of Abraham of whom it may be said: "He believed in the Lord and it was counted unto him for righteousness." It seems quite natural that Jesus said to Peter, "Feed my sheep."

The Centrality of the Resurrection of Jesus to the Christian Faith

J. M. SHAW

I

SOME months ago I came across this statement, quoted as made by "a recent writer," that "Christianity consists of a great fact and a great doctrine, the fact of the Resurrection and the doctrine of Redemption." I cannot give exact chapter and verse for the quotation. But this for our present purpose does not really matter. What does matter is that by making the fact of the resurrection of Jesus central to the Christian doctrine of redemption, this statement properly represents the New Testament emphasis and perspective. This emphasis and perspective have not been maintained in our traditional Protestant religious thinking, and as a result, we miss too much the radiant fullness and glory of the New Testament Christian faith.

Not indeed that our traditional Protestant thinking has altogether omitted or overlooked the significance of the resurrection. But it has not made it essentially and centrally determinative of the gospel of redemption which it proclaims in the way that the New Testament does. What is made central to this gospel in the traditional representation is the cross of Jesus Christ, the death of Jesus on the cross as the supreme manifestation of the love of God to sinful men revealed in his life and teaching, on which as sinful creatures we are encouraged to stake our hope for time and for eternity.

"Upon a life I did not live,
Upon a death I did not die;
Upon another's life, another's death,
I stake my whole eternity."

Where the resurrection comes in, in this traditional way of thinking, is as an appendix or appendage to the life and death of Jesus, in the way of supplying the great pledge and guarantee from God's side that that life and death are divinely efficacious for our redemption as Jesus Himself declared. But this is not to make the resurrection central to our Christian thinking and our Christian gospel; it is to make it rather merely circumferential, a kind of seal or stamp added on to a redemptive work

performed by Jesus on earth to give the needed divine guarantee that Jesus' work on earth was verily efficacious, the proof that that Life and Death have indeed availed for the remission of the sins of the world, thus working faith on our side in the virtue of that Life and that Death. Or, where there is more than this in the traditional interpretation of the resurrection of Jesus—and this further aspect is generally acknowledged and associated with the other—it is this, that the resurrection is pointed to as the great pledge and confirmation of the faith or hope in a life beyond death as involved in the life of fellowship with God on earth, that life of fellowship with God of which Jesus' life was the supreme example in human history and as such the test case, what scientists would call the "crucial instance," of death's reaction on a life lived on earth in such a fellowship.

Neither of these aspects of the resurrection, however, nor both taken together, brings us to the real essential and central element in the New Testament representation of the significance of the resurrection of Jesus. In either case the difference that the resurrection makes is represented as chiefly a difference to *our* thinking or to *our* faith, in the way of supplying a needed establishment and confirmation of our faith first in the efficacy of Jesus' redemptive work on earth, and then in a life of immortality as involved in the life of fellowship with God begun here on earth. But this, while no doubt true so far as it goes, comes far short of the full New Testament representation. Here, in the New Testament, the resurrection of Jesus is represented as making not only a difference to our faith in Jesus and to our faith in a life beyond death, but a difference first of all to Jesus Himself and to his work of redemption, inasmuch as it marks the point at which Jesus' work on earth in his life and death—or, as we may equally truly say if not indeed more truly to the New Testament representation, the point at which God's work in and through Jesus—becomes effective for our redemption, through his exaltation to a new life of risen power and glory. Only through his resurrection and exaltation, with the redeeming virtue of his life and death on earth in Him, did Jesus enter fully on his career as Prince and Saviour, and become the "life-giving" or "life-creating" spirit of a new humanity.

The New Testament gospel of redemption is thus a gospel which we have only in relation to a crucified but now risen living Christ and Saviour. So that Paul, *e. g.*—and Paul in this, on his own acknowledgment, was only carrying on the gospel already proclaimed by Peter and

the earlier apostles, the subject of which was according to the early chapters of Acts "Jesus and the resurrection"—in declaring the Christian gospel of redemption and the ground of our hope in Jesus' redeeming work, when he mentioned the death of Jesus simply or by itself as the basis of this hope immediately corrected himself and said: "It is Christ Jesus that died, *yea rather* that was raised from the dead" (Romans 8:34). "If Christ hath not been raised, our preaching is vain (*κενόν*, there is nothing in it) . . . ye are yet in your sins" (I Corinthians 15:14, 17). Redemption is ours, he is always emphasizing, only as we are "in Christ" (*ἐν Χριστῷ*, the most important phrase in the New Testament), in vital saving union with a risen living Saviour and Lord. So it is that Paul makes the resurrection of Jesus, with the exaltation following, central and essential to his gospel of redemption. And more; so it is also that in the resurrection and exaltation of Jesus supervening on the cross he sees the evidence and stablishing assurance of the fact that God's love in Christ was no weak or defeated love, but a love which was able to triumph over the worst that sinful man could do to it and become "more than conqueror" (super-conqueror). So that he says, "If God be for us," and for us in such a way as is seen in the cross and then in the resurrection and exaltation of Jesus, "who (or what) can be against us? . . . I am persuaded ('certain,' Moffatt) that neither death nor life . . . nor things present nor things to come . . . shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Romans 8:31, 38f).

So it is and thus it is that an Old Country New Testament scholar and teacher, the late Principal James Denney, of Glasgow, many years ago in a work on Christian doctrine than which there are still few more worthy of study,¹ declared that the cross while the sign of Christian devotion and the inspiration of Christian service is "no adequate symbol of Christian faith." "Christ was crucified through weakness; but He lives by the power of God, and we must not forget His life. Sometimes people do. They look at Christ on the cross as if that exhausted the truth about Him, or even the truth about His relation to sin. They forget that He is not on the cross, but on the throne; that He has ascended far above all heavens, separate from sinners, inaccessible to sin. They forget that the keynote of the Christian life as it is related to the ascended Christ is one of victory and triumph" (*Studies*

¹ Delivered first as lectures in Chicago Theological Seminary in 1894.

in *Theology*, 7th ed., p. 170). As we ourselves may put it in terms which are frequently on our lips today as we think of postwar reconstruction: In the resurrection and exaltation of Jesus we see the inauguration of "a new order" of God's creative redemptive working, an order in which power is joined to love, and the love of God revealed in Jesus Christ is seen to be no weak, struggling, defeated love, but a love which is able to triumph over the worst that sinful men or nations can do to it, and to make all things, even the death of Jesus Himself, to work together for the accomplishment of its purposes. The world in which we live is indeed a world in which evil seemed at a supreme crisis in human history to have been victorious, and often still seems to be victorious; and if the death on the cross had been the end of Jesus the cross would be for all time the world's supreme tragedy, man's worst meeting God's best and triumphing over it. "But now is Christ risen from the dead" (I Corinthians 15:20)—this is Paul's overcoming shout of triumph, and the world with all its tragedy and travail is shown to be a world in which victory is on the side of divine redemptive love and working. "This Jesus (whom ye crucified)"—such was the reiterated triumphant proclamation even of the earlier apostles—"Him God raised up" and "made both Lord and Christ" (Acts 2:22ff, 32, 36).

This is the ground, and the only sufficient ground or basis, of the New Testament optimism and of the radiance of the New Testament gospel, that radiance which some years ago the editor of the *Hibbert Journal*, Dr. L. P. Jacks, referred to regretfully as in these modern days too much a "lost radiance." It is a radiance which we are summoned even in these days of world travail and world agony to recover and reassert, the gospel of the omnipotence of sovereign overruling divine love and grace. "There is not in the New Testament from beginning to end," says Denney, "in the record of the original and genuine Christian life, a single word of despondency or gloom. It is the most buoyant, exhilarating, and joyful book in the world. The men who write it have indeed all that is hard and painful in the world to encounter; but they are of good courage, because Christ has overcome the world, and when the hour of conflict comes, they descend crowned into the arena. All this is due to their faith in Christ's exaltation, and in His constant presence with them in the omnipotence of His grace." It is the emphatic *sursum corda* culminating message of the New Testament evangel: "Hallelujah, for the Lord God Omnipotent reigneth" (Revelation 19:6).

II

This is an emphasis and a point of view, which, it must be acknowledged, it is often exceedingly difficult to get scientific thinkers and scientific historians of today to admit and adopt. Under the influence of what they call the modern, scientific historical spirit they either reject the resurrection of Jesus altogether, or if they do not reject it, they so minimize or attenuate it as to present us with a very reduced or faded representation of the fullness and glory of the New Testament Christian faith.

It is a good many years ago since Harnack, the great German theologian and Church historian, under the influence of this scientific historical spirit and by way of the better recommending Christianity to the modern scientific mind, drew a distinction between what he called "the Easter faith" and "the Easter message"; and suggested that it is possible and indeed advisable for us today to hold "the Easter faith" in the survival of Jesus' spirit independently of "the Easter message," the message about an empty grave and subsequent appearances or self-manifestations of Jesus' surviving spirit, with which, he acknowledges, it was originally connected. "The Easter message"—such are his words—"tells us of that wonderful event in Joseph of Arimathea's garden, which however no eye saw; it tells us of the empty grave into which a few women and disciples looked; of the appearance of the Lord in a transfigured form—so glorified that His own could not immediately recognize Him; it soon begins to tell us, too, of what the risen One said and did." But "the Easter faith," he says, "is the conviction that the crucified One gained a victory over death; that God is just and powerful; that He who is the firstborn among many brethren still lives." And this "Easter faith," Harnack claims, is really independent of "the Easter message" and of the historical evidence alleged for that, and is based for us today, he suggests, on an inner experience of the reality of the living, reigning Christ. To base "the Easter faith" on "the Easter message" is, he says, to base it on what he calls an "unstable foundation." For "who of us can maintain that a clear account of (the empty grave and) these appearances can be constructed out of the stories told by Paul and the evangelists?" (See *What Is Christianity?*, 3d ed., pp. 164ff.) And more recently, essentially the same position has been advocated by an outstanding British New Testament scholar, viz., the late Doctor Sanday, of Oxford. He, too, is of the opinion that we ought, in this modern, scientific historical age, to be satisfied with a heartfelt expression of the conviction that the risen Lord as

Spirit still governs and inspires His Church, and that we should sit loose to the question of what became of Jesus' body in death. In regard to what he speaks of as "the resuscitation of the dead body of the Lord from the tomb," Sanday says: "The accounts that have come down to us seem to be too conflicting and confused to prove this. But they do seem to prove that in any case the detail is of less importance than is supposed. Because, whatever it was, the body which the disciples saw was not the natural human body that was laid in the grave." "No coherent and consistent view," he continues, "can be worked out (from the narratives) as to the nature of the Risen Body. . . . The central meaning of the resurrection is just that expressed in the vision of the Apocalypse: 'I am the first and the last, and the Living One; and I was dead, and behold, I am alive for evermore' " (Revelation 1:18). So, especially from the point of view of recommending Christianity to what he calls the "cultivated modern man" and removing "the greatest of all stumbling blocks to the modern mind" in the way of accepting Christianity, he frankly acknowledges his personal willingness to treat the bodily resurrection of our Lord as "an open question," belief in which is a matter of indifference for our Christian faith today (see Sanday's pamphlet entitled *Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism*, pp. 20, 30 and cf. his *Divine Overruling*, pp. 16ff).

On this matter it must be said first that, whatever we may say as to our own faith today, so far as the apostles and the early believers at least were concerned their "Easter faith" was not independent of "the Easter message" and the facts which constituted that message. Rather, their faith in a living Christ sprang directly out of that message and was based essentially upon it. For the fact of the resurrection of Jesus in which they believed was a fact relative to, of the same kind and on the same plane as, the facts of his death and burial. This is so even in the case of Paul who is sometimes represented by scholars of this way of thinking as believing simply in what they call "a spiritual resurrection," or a spiritual survival of Jesus, as if all that really survived death was Jesus' spirit. This is certainly not what the first witnesses to the resurrection of Jesus are represented in the Gospels as believing. They believed in a fact occurring, or at least discovered, "on the third day," as the result of which their day of worship was changed to the first day of the week. And as certainly it is not what Paul represents himself as believing. In his chapter in First Corinthians—where we have the earliest extant state-

ment of Paul's belief on this matter (which is indeed also the earliest account of the resurrection which we have in the New Testament), and where he gives a summary statement of what he taught to the Corinthian Christians—he explicitly mentions the resurrection and represents it as a fact relative to the death and the burial of Jesus. The reference is this: "I delivered unto you (*παρέδωκα*, I handed on to you—the term used for the transmission of tradition) the gospel which also I received (*ὃ καὶ παρέλαβον*), that Christ died for our sins and was buried, and that he was raised again on the third day according to the scriptures" (I Corinthians 15:3-4). Here an event "on the third day" is set over against the burial, and is presented as the reversal of it, thus making clear what the apostle meant by the fact. The clause "that He was buried" not merely emphasizes the full reality of Jesus' death, but points to the grave as the state from which the resurrection took place. "Why mention his burial, indeed," it has been properly asked, "unless it was his bodily resurrection he had in view? Who ever heard of a spirit being buried?" Even Schmiedel, the German radical critic of the resurrection narratives, somewhat inconsistently admits this. "That Jesus 'was buried' and that 'he has been raised' (I Corinthians 15:4) cannot be affirmed by anyone who has not the resurrection of the body in mind" (*Encycl. Bibl.*, IV, 4059). That this is what Paul had in view is further borne out by the whole line of his argument in this chapter in First Corinthians. Paul is here replying to those Greek Christians in Corinth who under Greek philosophical influence denied or called in question not the continued spiritual existence of the Christian after death, but the possibility of a bodily resurrection, and he does so by setting the resurrection of the Christian in the closest and most vital connection with the resurrection of Jesus Himself as "the first-fruits of them that are asleep" (v. 20). Obviously in such a context only a reference to the bodily resurrection of Jesus would have been relevant, though indeed, as we shall presently point out, this did not mean for Paul the resuscitation of the material body of earth.

That there should be difficulties in fitting together in a completely consistent whole the different narratives of the discovery of the empty grave and especially of the various appearances of the risen Jesus to his disciples—that there should be even "discrepancies" or "contradictions" perhaps in the different accounts of so unique and extraordinary or super-ordinary an event or happening—is indeed not surprising. The writers of the Gospels were trying to describe something which was quite new to

them and which was beyond their full understanding or comprehension. But even on ordinary matters of historical fact "discrepancies" of account are acknowledged by historians without their thereby calling in question the actual historicity of the fact to which they refer. Says one of my own old theological teachers, of more than ordinary clarity of judgment in this and other matters: "It is impossible to reconcile the discrepant accounts we have of the signal given by Nelson at Trafalgar, or of the time at which the battle began. Are we therefore to conclude that there was no signal and no battle?" (Marcus Dods, in *The Supernatural in Christianity*, p. 98). But on the matter before us it must always be remembered that the fundamental and primary evidence for the resurrection of Jesus, and the main fact to be accounted for, is not the documentary evidence of the narratives of the empty grave or of the post-resurrection appearances of Jesus, but something prior to this; namely, the transformation, the psychological transformation, effected in the thoughts and lives of the first disciples giving rise to the Christian gospel and the Christian Church. To realize the greatness of this transformation, we have but to take the picture of the disciples after the event as given in the Acts and compare it with that before the event as given in the Gospels. As I have put it elsewhere: "Sadness has given place to joy, weakness to strength, cowardice to courage, despair to confidence. The men who, timorous and lacking understanding, had forsaken their Master in His hour of utmost need, who counted their hopes in Him lost when He was put to death, who, disillusioned and hopeless, had for fear of the Jews shut themselves up within closed doors, now face the rulers of the land proclaiming that He whom they had condemned and crucified was indeed the Christ, the Messiah, in whom alone there was salvation" (J. M. Shaw, *The Resurrection of Christ*, pp. 11ff) and with this gospel they went out to found the Christian Church.

Such a change, such a moral and spiritual transformation, with the results following, demands a sufficient reason or cause. To satisfy this Principle of Sufficient Reason is the fundamental condition of true scientific thinking. What the disciples' own explanation of the change was we have seen—the resurrection "whereof we are witnesses" (Acts 2:32; 3:15; 5:32; 10:39, etc.), a resurrection which was not, as supporters of the view we are criticizing represent, a resurrection merely of the spirit of Jesus into new life, or a mere rising again in the faith of His followers who on reflection could not bear the thought that for Him death was the

end, but a resurrection connected with an event discovered "on the third day" or "after three days," an event or fact which they traced uniformly not to their own reflection but to the mighty working of God, to a mighty declaration in action by God Himself. "This Jesus God hath raised up" (Acts 2:32).

III

The reluctance of scientific or scientific-historical thinkers to accept the New Testament representation is really due, I believe, chiefly to one of two misconceptions of this representation, or to both operating together.

(a) One is a misconception as to *the nature of the resurrection itself*. The resurrection of Jesus, as presented in the New Testament narratives, though a bodily resurrection, as distinguished from a merely spiritual one, is not properly described in Doctor Sanday's words, already quoted, as a "resuscitation of the dead body of the Lord from the tomb." This is indeed the form in which the Christian belief in the resurrection of the body first found doctrinal expression in the creeds of the Church, in particular in the earliest form of the Apostles' Creed, the Roman or "R" form, which according to Harnack himself goes back to the early part of the second century. This creed spoke definitely of a "resurrection of the flesh" (*carnis resurrectio*), suggesting a resuscitation of the fleshly body, a form of the belief in a bodily resurrection which, chiefly through the influence of Augustine, continued for too long to influence Western Christian thought, even down to the Westminster Confessional formulations in which our traditional Protestant doctrine has found its best-known expression. Such a grossly material form of the belief has become for us today scientifically impossible and untenable, and is the ground undoubtedly of much of the opposition of scientific thinkers to what they suppose is the properly Christian view. But the fact is, such a belief, so far from being the properly Christian view, is directly opposed to the New Testament representation and in particular to the representation of Paul on this subject in whose writings we have the earliest historical formulation. In his great chapter on the resurrection to which I have already referred—I Corinthians 15—he explicitly repudiates and rejects such a view, characterizing it indeed as a "foolish" view (*ἄρρωγ*, v. 36)—as we would say today a scientifically impossible and inadmissible view, the kind of view apparently which was at the root of the objection of "certain individuals" (*τῶν*, v. 12) in the Greek Corinthian church to

what they supposed was the Christian teaching as to a bodily resurrection, leading them to take up the position that "there can be no such thing as a resurrection of dead persons" (v. 12). No; there was indeed a bodily resurrection of Jesus, Paul says—his soul or spirit had a "body," or organ of activity and expression, his post-resurrection life as in the days of his flesh on earth, involving or carrying with it the survival not of his spirit only but of the totality of his human personality. But this resurrection body of Jesus was, he indicates, a very different kind of a body from the body of earth, for "a body of flesh and blood," he says expressly, "cannot inherit the kingdom of God" (v. 50). It was what Paul calls—and, in all probability, he had in mind in so calling it such stories about the appearance of the risen body of Jesus as were later recorded in the Gospels—a "spiritual body" (σῶμα πνευματικόν) as opposed to and contrasted with the earthly "natural" or "animate" body (σῶμα ψυχικόν), the fit organ of the spirit under the more spiritual conditions of the life after death.

In Jesus' own case indeed—Paul emphasizes—there was a differentiating circumstance in his post-resurrection "spiritual body" as compared with that of Christians or believers in Him. In this, *viz.*, that in his case apparently his body of earth, the fleshly or natural body, was transfigured and transformed into "a spiritual body," the mortal body "absorbed by life" (Moffatt) to use Paul's own expressive phrase in II Corinthians 5:4, without any fleshly or sensuous element having to be left behind in the grave to undergo corruption. This was so in his case—such would seem to be the Pauline view—not only for what is ordinarily called "evidential" purposes, *i. e.*, for the sake of convincing his followers of the reality of his resurrection, and accordingly of the completeness of his personality's triumph over death and the grave, but further in the very nature of the case, "according to a law of the spirit of holiness" (κατὰ πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης) as he puts it in Romans 1:4—it being altogether natural and reasonable, he suggests, that a body unstained by sin such as that of Jesus' was should not be abandoned to corruption in death. As we would say today, the uniqueness of the bodily resurrection of Jesus was the natural correlative of the moral uniqueness of His life—a position which seems to be increasingly corroborated by present-day investigations of the "new physics" into the nature of matter. The point is—and this is what we wish to emphasize chiefly in this connection—the resurrection of Jesus according to the New Testament representa-

tion was indeed and truly a bodily resurrection, but not a mere resuscitation of the fleshly body of earth, as is generally supposed by those who under the influence of modern scientific thought object to what they think is the New Testament and Christian view.

(b) The *second* misconception referred to as back of the modern repugnance or reluctance to the acceptance of the bodily resurrection of Jesus is a misconception as to *the nature of the supernatural involved in such a resurrection*. It is the aversion to the recognition of the supernatural, especially in the physical sphere, that is the real root of the objection we are considering. Says Walter Lippmann in his *Preface to Morals*, in often-quoted words: "The acids of modernity," the acids of modern thought, "have dissolved" and "eaten away" the belief in the supernatural which is at the basis of traditional religious thinking. But they have done so, only insofar as the conception of the supernatural is supposed to be identical with the contranatural or antinatural. It is this confusion or misconception, leading to thinking of the supernatural as a "break" in the order of nature, an "interference with uniform law," which is the real trouble. This is seen very clearly in Sanday's frank acknowledgment of the difficulty in his mind, in the pamphlet already referred to, where the bodily resurrection of Jesus is represented as a "*contra naturam*" happening, a "breach in the order of nature" or "a definite reversal of the natural physical order," and, as such, contrary to the postulate of modern science, the uniformity of nature, "the beautiful regularity that we see around us . . . the law of the divine action from the beginning to the end of time" (*Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism*, pp. 23ff).

If we regard Jesus of Nazareth as one whose life moved wholly on the plane of our ordinary human experience, then the *contra naturam* argument adduced by Sanday might be urged with some plausibility against the recognition of the resurrection. But in Jesus, as the Gospel narratives present Him, we have a new beginning in human history, in the sense of an historical personality unique in his character and work. He stood in the midst of a sinful world the alone sinless One, in unbroken communion with the living God, a "miracle" in the sense of a new beginning in the moral and spiritual sphere, as wonderful as any alleged miracle in the physical. Nature is "uniform," only in the sense that if the same conditions are fulfilled the same results will follow. If the conditions are changed, however, a difference in results does not contradict ordinary

experience but rather transcends it. In the case of such a new departure in human history—a life lived as no other life in normal relation with the living God and Father of the universe and in harmony with His purposes of father-love, so that men found in Him a unique incarnation of God—in the case of such a new departure in human history, we should antecedently expect that God would be able, would be given the opportunity, to manifest his power through Him in new and unprecedented ways, so that we may see in Him a more perfect and complete subservience of nature and the natural order to the purposes of spirit than that observed in the case of ordinary imperfect personalities. It is when we thus consider the resurrection of Jesus in the context at once of its unique antecedents and also of its unique consequents in human history, in the rise and continuance of the Christian Church, that we see the naturalness and congruousness of the fact.

How the resurrection of Jesus took place, *i. e.*, how the natural body of Jesus was transformed into a spiritual body, we may not understand. It is a cloud-capped region this, in which we move. Here, as it has been finely said, is "the land where the great mists lie, but also where the great rivers spring" (Principal D. S. Cairns, in *Christ and Human Need*, p. 177). It is essentially a supernatural or supranatural event, in the sense that nature and human nature by themselves cannot explain it. As Dr. John S. Whale of England said, speaking to the undergraduate students of the University of Cambridge: "Here is the mightiest of the mighty acts of God, foreign to the common experience of man, inscrutable to all his science, astounding to believer and unbeliever alike" (see his *Christian Doctrine*, p. 73). It is a mighty creative act of the living God, comparable, according to Paul's suggestion, to the act of the first creation itself; a new influx from the world of creative Spirit into this world of sin and death, and opening a new redemptive epoch or era in the divine working in the world.

The Teaching Function of the Church

DONALD T. ROWLINGSON

MUCH is being said these days about the prophetic function of the Christian Church. Assuming that the major cause of world chaos is our generation's neglect of God and his laws, it is alleged that the primary, if not the sole, function of the Church is to recall society to its divine destiny in the spirit of "Thus saith the Lord." A typical and forceful expression of this point of view is set forth in the following words of a recent writer:

On the basis of the moral law a prophetic church may take up its task of subjecting society to analysis and criticism it will have no concern with the expedencies which pass as political realism. Its sole responsibility is to proclaim what should be its present duty, as a prophetic voice, is to see that men have placed before them, so clearly that they cannot remain in ignorance, knowledge of what should be, in the light of the moral law. In relation to such public issues as are involved in making the peace and forming the postwar order, the Christian Church has no other responsibility than the discharge of this prophetic task. (P. Hutchinson, *From Victory to Peace*, Willett, Clark & Co., p. 31.)

Anyone familiar with current thinking will realize that similar sentiments might be quoted from many sources.

There can be no quarrel certainly with the emphasis upon the need of prophecy. In a time of unprecedented crisis, when the future influence of the Church itself is hanging in the balance, only the blind can refuse to face the urgency of our need as the prophet visions it. However, in our emphasis upon prophecy there is danger that we shall lose perspective regarding the total function of the Church, and especially as prophecy is related to the teaching needs of the Church. Historically, in Judaism and Christianity, the prophet and the teacher both have had an honored and significant place. Their functions have often merged to some extent, as they must and should, yet there is a distinction between them which history makes clear and which we must recognize as valid today in our attempt to assess the relationship of the Church to current needs. The thesis of this article is that the teaching function of church leadership is not only involved in the requirements of prophecy, but also that it stands in its own right as a necessary supplement to the prophetic voice. Unless

it assumes a place of importance in the active efforts of the Church to rise to the demands of the day, the Church will be unable to deal effectively with the needs of our generation or of those to come.

In order to avoid ambiguity it is essential that we define what is meant here by the teaching function, especially as it is related to the conception of prophecy as implied in the quotation previously cited. Assuming that teaching may be involved in any number of experiences by means of which a person is taught something, and recognizing that the Church appeals to many means of teaching, what we have in mind is the narrower conception of teaching as concerned with systematic instruction adapted to the level of the pupil's intelligence and capacity to absorb that instruction. As such the function of the teacher overlaps that of the prophet, as previously defined, to the extent that the former is as obligated as the latter to be sensitive to truth and its application to social relations, and to make men aware of the truth by imparting the requisite information and by stimulating insight. In contrast, however, the teacher is obligated to have a greater concern for the expediencies in the case and with what *can* be done in the light of environmental conditioning and other retarding factors. He cannot vision his task as solely that of setting before men what they must do in the light of the moral law, whether they like it or not, and regardless of how radical a transformation of their customary ways of thinking and acting is required. He need not decry the prerogatives of the prophet so to interpret his function, nor need he question the value of the prophetic voice. He is skeptical, however, of the implication that the mere statement of truth will as such awaken those who sleep, or that the only task of the Church is so to sound the prophetic trumpet. The teacher realizes the futility of feeding meat to infants, and as a part of his conception of his place in the Church he directs his energies toward stimulating the growth of intelligence and vision, rather than to developing maturity at a bound. He is less interested in denunciation than in encouraging and cultivating latent possibilities of growth, adapting his presentation of the truth to the capacities of his pupils to apprehend and receive it. He does not sacrifice principle for expediency, and he is as capable of facing the cross of martyrdom as is the prophet, but he does not court disaster.

In civilized society the teacher has a time-honored place, and in the history of the Church his function has been considered to be of the greatest significance. There is no good reason to question but that this function

is still pertinent to the Church's task today. This judgment allows a place for other aspects of the Church's task, including prophecy, but it refuses to permit teaching to be shunted into a subordinate place by an exaggerated emphasis upon any of these other valid roles which the Church must play. That this judgment is sound may be seen by an analysis of the limitations of prophecy—and of teaching, and of the positive values of teaching in the Church.

THE LIMITATIONS OF PROPHECY

The significance of the teaching function is indicated by the limitations of prophecy. These limitations involve the application of the term to an institution, and its relationship to the capacity of individuals to learn. In the first place, there is something very ambiguous about the use of the word "church" in relationship to the prophetic function. By its very nature, as demonstrated in experience, prophecy does not inhere in an institution, but rather in the mind and spirit of an inspired individual who is recognized as a prophet—usually after his death—by the very fact that he rises head and shoulders above the rank and file of those whom he addresses. It is the ill fortune of the true prophet usually to stand quite alone, or relatively so, in his own generation, usually to the extent that he becomes a martyr to his vision and aggressive courage. And more often than not his persecutors are the members of his "church." How then can a "church" be prophetic? How can it have "no other responsibility than the discharge of this prophetic task?"

The pertinency of this question was pointed out rather forcibly in a recent number of *The Christian Century*, under the title "The Church's Great Illusion." Commenting on the failure of governments to be impressed with the proclamations of the churchmen at Delaware and similar gatherings, Caxton Doggett writes:

Governments cannot be blamed for being unimpressed by the invisible hosts led by the people who journey from the Delawares to the Princetons, because those hosts are not only invisible—they simply don't exist. True, their names are on the membership lists of the churches, but as soldiers marching in a church crusade they have no existence. . . . There are scattered, apathetic millions, but no considerable body, certainly not of Protestants, who will empower a church resolution with anything even as potent as a letter to the Congress. (8/2/44, p. 897.)

Not content with a critical denunciation of this "illusion of power," the writer suggests the heart of the remedy. "The situation would not be so tragic," he continues, "if the leaders of the Church regarded their

membership with humility and repentance, as neophytes awaiting instruction in the most elemental essentials of the gospel" (p. 898). In other words, the leaders must become teachers—or teaching prophets.

It is obviously true that many leaders of the Christian Church today have prophetic vision as regards the needs of society, and many of them have expressed their views in such documents as those emanating from Delaware, Malvern and Princeton. As such we all owe them not only a debt of profound gratitude, but also intense loyalty as we are inspired to rise to their insights. But the Church as an institution does not necessarily stand behind these utterances, any more than the social proclamations of individual church bodies represent the real intentions of even a majority of the constituent members. A majority vote at a Methodist Annual Conference, for instance, may well indicate the sentiments of many who are present, but many who vote in the affirmative, as well as the laity back home, have no intention of following out the implications of such committee reports. In many cases the rank and file at home is not even aware that such a report exists. To that extent the report is not representative of their prophetic vision.

In other words, the rank and file are not prepared to stand up and be counted on the side of the prophetic vision any more than were the people of Israel in the time of the great Isaiah of the Exile, or the contemporaries of Jesus when confronted with his message. This is not to discourage the prophet, but only to emphasize the fact that the teacher has his place of unrivaled significance in educating the people in regard to what is needed. If the prophet is also teacher, so much the better, but teaching there must be. It must be systematic, concentrated and constant. It must deal with "the most elemental essentials of the gospel" as well as with current public issues. It must embrace every individual and institution capable of acting in the capacity of teacher, including parents, church-school teachers, ministers and the formal educational agencies of college, university and theological school. Unless such is the case the prophet will be crying in the wilderness and his message will go unheeded by the very institution which he presumes to represent.

The limitations of prophecy alone are also evident when we consider the question of how fast people can learn, or, at least, how ready they are to learn. As the teacher of a large class of young adults, well endowed intellectually and culturally, I have had the opportunity to observe the effects of efforts to confront them with the prophetic pro-

nouncements of the church leaders at Delaware, Malvern, Princeton and similar gatherings. Without conscious effort to tone down the absolute demands in regard to economics, race and other vital issues the proclamations were presented. The reactions could have been predicted on the basis of human experience and are typical of those in many similar groups. Some responded very positively, some with indifference and some with frank hostility. In regard to the subject of race prejudice, of particular interest because the class is in a Southern church, the hostile reaction was more evident than in regard to some other issues. The analysis need not be carried further. The point is that prophetic pronouncements alone are incapable of eliciting a positive response except in the case of those who are prepared for them, or who are at the point where such an utterance lights the path which they have been seeking. To the extent that the mind of the hearer is unreceptive, whatever the cause, the prophet's seeds fall upon barren ground.

Nor is the prophet's method of presenting truth in uncompromising fashion the best means of awakening those who are blind. In this area the teacher's method is unrivaled. Of course, he is limited too by the unresponsive mind, and he cannot make flowers grow on rock. But if he is capable, he can, over a period of time, work on the soil so that, if it is capable of providing fertilization at all, it may be prepared for the prophetic voice. He is better equipped than the uncompromising prophet to achieve this end.

Thus it is the business of the Church not only to produce prophets who can proclaim God's will and predict his judgment upon an unrepentant people, but also to prepare teachers and teaching materials by means of which a laggard people may be stirred to respond to the prophetic message when it comes. To a great extent this is being done, but in the face of an overemphasis upon the significance of prophecy in the Church, the teaching function needs to be emphasized and developed. Without its supplementary, and often more primary, work it is highly questionable how much social advancement can be accomplished by the prophet, however true and urgent his words may be.

LIMITATIONS AND VALUES OF TEACHING

It is not assumed in these pages that the teaching function is without limitations or that it can usurp the place of prophecy or other vital aspects of the Church's life and program. To recognize and analyze its

limitations, however, only enhances our appreciation of its significance, at the same time that it enables us to view it in proper perspective.

Consider, for example, the situation of crisis when it is not the teacher but the mighty leader of men who is needed. The contrast has been drawn between Luther and Erasmus in this respect, the contention being that the gentle, scholarly and perhaps compromising teacher was incapable of providing the dynamic popular leadership which was needed at the moment to inspire the Protestant Reformation. There is truth in the contention as John T. McNeill has argued in an engaging essay entitled, "Was the Reformation Needed?" "Many," he writes, "would have preferred an Erasmian to a Lutheran Reformation. . . . A reform led by him would have been educational, gentle and lighted by a gay humanist wit. . . . But Erasmus had no access to the common people. . . . The Protestant Reformers were men who had the rare combination of gifts that enabled them to lead both scholars and uneducated lay people." Bringing his whole thesis to its climax he affirms the conclusion: "Any number of varieties of reform are imaginable, but most of these varieties were in the circumstances precluded. Indubitably the Reformation was in part made by the psychological personalities of the Reformers, and it would have been different if they had been different. But in any case it would have required leaders who had conviction and unhesitating determination—men who would take risks, even the risk of being rough and abrupt." (*Protestantism*, ed. by W. K. Anderson, p. 174.)

But before we minimize too quickly the significance of teaching as it related to the Reformation, let us consider the words of Prof. Edwin P. Booth as he portrays something of the tremendous influence which one group of teachers, the Brethren of the Common Life, had upon the generation which responded to the leadership of Luther. He writes:

These men aimed above all else to match the pagan Renaissance with a renaissance of Christian antiquity. . . . In all these schools Latin literature was subjected to the most exacting study, and to that study these teachers brought a full Christian influence. . . . (They) set up the first printing presses for the education of the North. . . . Books printed by them were read by Ignatius Loyola . . . and they set him out on his strong career. These were the teachers Luther knew . . . in Magdeburg. These were the men who set the immortal vision of the life of the Christian mind in the young Erasmus, . . . confirmed by the clear and eloquent Colet. These were the men in charge of the student lodging-house when John Calvin went up to Paris . . . the men who trained . . . John Sturm. . . . These were the men who trained the generations that listened

so gladly to the reform preaching when it came . . . who sowed for the generation that was to reap the mighty harvest of freedom. (*Ibid.*, pp. 34ff.)

In addition, when we are estimating the place of the teacher in regard to the Reformation, let us be reminded that Luther was teacher as well as popular leader, differing mainly in temperament, disposition and skills from Erasmus with whom he is contrasted. Let us also recall how significant a place teaching had in the careers of Zwingli, Calvin and the other Reformers. Let us not forget, of course, that much of what was taught was inadequate and that in the ensuing reaction teachers led men and women into the morass of bibliolatry and unfortunate theological and ethical conceptions based upon it. Yet it was a generation and more of Christian teachers which in turn rescued the Christian mind from such abnormalities, and today point us toward a more intelligent and a more fruitful method of treating the Bible, constructing theology, and dealing with social problems.

Today it is being urged upon us that the prophetic voice is alone equipped to meet our needs, the implications being that it is too late for the teacher to be effective. With the collapse of the Axis powers we shall be precipitated into the era of postwar reconstruction where irrevocable decisions must be made at once by the moral conscience of mankind through its representatives. Unless the prophetic voice of the Church can speak with no uncertain sound, reflecting the moral insight of millions of adherents, we can expect nothing but disaster. So we are being told.

This is probably a true contention, but it does not minimize the importance of the teacher. If it be true that the present generation is not morally sensitive enough, and intelligent enough, to respond to the leadership of its prophets it is a tragic misfortune. It may indicate the failure of a generation of Christian teachers in home and church and school. But in the very confession of failure is the acclamation of what should have been as respects the importance of teaching. If teaching had been as vital and as influential as that of the Brethren of the Common Life prior to the Reformation, tragedy might be avoided. If, on the other hand, the Christian teachers of this generation have prepared the ground better than the more pessimistic are inclined to believe it will reveal itself in the days ahead. It is not our business here to predict what shall come to pass, but, only to point out that whatever happens the importance of the teaching function of the Church is demonstrated. The value of the teaching function as such is not on trial.

In other words, the teaching function as such may be less effective than prophetic leadership in meeting the demands imposed by times of crisis, but without the preparation of the people by teachers no prophet can hope to get a response to his utterances. Without the work of the teacher following the crisis there can be no permanent and constructive building. If the teacher has his way long enough before a critical situation develops his work may prevent the kind of social revolution which is destructive. If circumstances beyond his power to control force us into a period of revolution, his work may temper the outcome in a constructive way otherwise impossible of achievement.

Thus today the teacher has his place even in a day of crisis. If he has not risen to his opportunity in the Church so as to prevent disaster in postwar reconstruction, it is, as we have said, cause for the profoundest regret. But the future is still before us and teaching there must be. If the prophet himself becomes teacher he is but following the divine necessity which historical situations place upon teaching. Whether the teaching be done by professionals or by laity, or by both, it is indispensable to the achievement of a society permeated by the values which the Christian believes to be vital.

As the prophet needs the supplementary work of the teacher so the teacher needs the vision which the prophet possesses. Otherwise he is in danger of perpetuating a static tradition better forgotten or of a legalistic mulling over of dead formulas. Many of the scribes of Jesus' day, many of the scholastic theologians of the Middle Ages, and they who bequeathed bibliolatry to the modern Church demonstrate this danger clearly. Likewise, the teacher's imparting of information and the stimulus to think must be supplemented by evangelistic zeal, if ideas are to become alive with the fire of conviction and purpose, and penetrate to the marrow of men's wills. Information and intellectual penetration represent a kind of power not to be deprecated, but radical transformation of character calls for the evangelist's art of awakening men to their needs and leading them to their salvation.

These various ways in which the teaching function itself is limited are not in question. They are obvious, but they do not disqualify it as vital to the Church's program. Rather is the significance of teaching but the more clearly revealed in the perspective of its relationship to other important tasks in which it is the duty of the Church to be engaged.

GUARDING AND ENCOURAGING THE TEACHING FUNCTION

The question being considered here has ramifications beyond that of the relationship between teaching and prophecy. Consider in this connection three areas of church activity in which the teaching function must be guarded and nurtured if it is to fulfill its possibilities.

The first is that of the adult class in the church school. Ideally such a class exists in order to give the teaching function of the church one of its most important outlets, and it fulfills its purpose when it stresses teaching and cultivates the atmosphere of the study group. The danger, as experience demonstrates, is that it may come to be thought of as a substitute for the church service of worship, or that it may take on the atmosphere of a Rotary Club meeting, both of which procedures tend to nullify its value as a teaching unit. It can, however, provide both inspiration and fellowship without succumbing to these temptations, since both will be by-products of an educational effort that is adequate. The adult class, as well as other similar groupings in the church school, serves the church best when it conforms to its appointed task of education.

The second area concerns the minister, particularly in relation to his preaching activity. It may be truly said that his task in preaching is above all else to be a herald of the Good News of salvation in Jesus Christ, and to adapt his sermon to the end of leading his congregation in worship so that they experience the presence of God. For the successful accomplishment of these high ends he must be more than a teacher, and perhaps not primarily a teacher; he must be a combination of prophet, evangelist, priest and teacher. But the teaching genius must permeate his other capacities, if he is to serve his people adequately. He must be able to impart ideas in an intelligible and persuasive way, if he is to meet their need for guidance as well as for emotional stimulation. Is it not enough in this connection to be reminded of the fact, which Christian history and contemporary experience so clearly demonstrate, that some of the greatest prophets, evangelists and priests have at one and the same time been great teachers? Call the roll of Paul, Luther, Calvin, Fosdick and E. Stanley Jones; and of how many besides! Even Jesus was known as "Teacher." He found it necessary to instruct his followers in the meaning of the Kingdom at the same time that He proclaimed its coming with power.

In the area of formal education in the church's schools and colleges the danger relating to the teaching function takes a different form. What

is involved here is the tendency for a valid concern with the subject matter of teaching—science, the humanities and vocational skills—to be considered as the only business of the institution; that is, to define the function of the church-related institution too closely in terms of the state institution. As distinct from the state school the church-related school is under obligation at least to “expose” its students to the Christian interpretation of life. In accomplishing this end educational standards must not be compromised, nor educational ideals relaxed, nor must there be a dictatorial disregard for academic freedom. But in a world where different philosophies of life are battling desperately for the soul of the world, the Church has no business in education as such unless it is prepared to give its students the opportunity, not only to receive first-class instruction in the normal curricular studies, but also to become aware of the Christian meaning of experience. This must involve, along with the impetus to understand it, a positive and sympathetic portrayal of the values inherent in the Christian faith, and encouragement to give oneself to that way of life.

There are obviously many other areas of experience which are relevant to this subject, but it is not necessary to treat them here for the point of view of this article to be seen. It is believed, however, that a thorough study of all relevant areas will serve to corroborate the main thesis, that the teaching function of the Church is of such great significance in these days that any minimizing of its value will be disastrous.

THE ANCIENT AND THE MODERN CHURCH

A glance at the early Church may serve us well in bringing this article to a conclusion. The first Christians discovered in their growing experience as churchmen that the Church had a multitude of functions to fulfill. Among them were prophecy, evangelism, healing, administration and numerous other things, but not least significant was teaching. Not only was it necessary to give birth to a special class of teachers, but those whose function it was to be apostles, prophets, evangelists and local officials, had also to teach. The contents of the teaching concerned not only the central affirmation of the Lordship of Jesus, but also the adaptation of that fact to Jewish prejudices and Gentile curiosity, and above all perhaps the working out for ethical conduct of the implications of the gospel. Paul's Letters, the four Gospels, and the other New Testament documents reveal at one and the same time something of the need and

practice of teaching and of its contents. Teaching as such was thus one among other functions, but it was always of the greatest concern throughout the whole period, and it continued to retain of necessity its high importance as the Church expanded down through the centuries.

There is no reason to believe that the situation is materially different today. The Church is called upon to exercise various functions which call into play corresponding talents, all of which cohere in the body of Christ. Through its human representatives it must evangelize, counsel, administer, prophesy, teach and perform numerous other tasks. In these pages prophecy and teaching have been singled out for particular attention. Without any desire to discredit the prophetic emphasis, we have been concerned lest such an emphasis be so exaggerated as to imply a nullification of the values of teaching. When we view the work of the prophet within the total framework of the Church's task and in the perspective of its limitations as well as of its virtues, and in relation to the positive values of the teaching function, we are better able to evaluate the respective merits of both prophecy and teaching. We are thus led to see that, if the insights and power inherent in the Christian gospel are to become explicit today in thought and action, prophecy and teaching together, each in its own way, must plow the ground of our moral and spiritual attitudes.

As an institution the Church can hardly be prophetic, although it is profoundly to be hoped that its prophetic voices may have a serious hearing. This is more likely to be the case, however, if the Church as an institution concerns itself to rear a generation of teachers comparable to the Brethren of the Common Life in pre-Reformation days. In many respects the Church is attempting to rise to this opportunity and responsibility. But in the face of an implied attack upon the teaching function by a zealous and crusading prophetic wing of the Church, it is not amiss for us to be reminded once again of its permanent significance.

The Christian Conception of Freedom

PAUL W. JOHNSTON

THE conception that Christianity sanctions and supports the democratic way of life, as known in America, is fast becoming a platitude. Therein lies danger for a platitude, as the word suggests, is a flat truth: truth flattened out, deprived of its essential dimension of depth. Meaning seldom lies stretched out on a verbal surface. To find it one must go beneath the words, dig and tunnel through a whole mass of relevant facts and ideas.

Listing the basic assumptions of democracy in a recent essay, "The New Democracy and the New Despotism," Professor Merriam of the University of Chicago, puts first the belief "in the essential dignity of all men." Whence do we derive this idea? We do not get it from those gifted people who discovered the political institutions of democracy, won popular government and coined the word for it. It was one of the symptoms of the instability of Greek democracy, and one of the causes of its failure, that it was never supported by a deep and widespread conviction of the dignity of the common man.

Consider their drama. The theater of Periclean Athens is perhaps the most genuinely democratic theater in history, more democratic in some ways than were even the Federal Theater Projects of the New Deal. A public subsidy guaranteed the price of admission to every citizen who was in need of it. Sailors and artisans and peasants rubbed shoulders with Athenian aristocrats. And what did they see and hear? The protagonists of that popular spectacle were the vanished rulers of a vanished kingdom: kings and queens, princes and princesses of the royal blood. The common people had no part in the action of the tragedy. They appeared only in the chorus. They stood by as passive onlookers, commenting in helpless resignation on the events that befell their kings.

The greatest Greek philosophers echo the same undemocratic estimate of human life. Even in his ideal *Republic*, Plato takes it for granted that the masses of the people must live in docile industry, with no voice in the decision of the common life. Aristotle, suspicious of utopias and champion of common sense, criticizes his master. And the point of his criticism is not that Plato was too aristocratic, but that he

was not aristocratic enough. Plato at least admitted the farmer, the artisan, the trader and the sailor to the status of citizenship, though it was inferior citizenship. Aristotle would deny them that status altogether.

As we leave Athens for the Orient the picture grows incomparably worse. In the great states that bordered Palestine, men were accustomed to the most disgusting servility toward their social superiors. The Egyptian Pharaoh is literally worshiped as a god. An Assyrian saying goes:

The man is the shadow of God,
The slave is the shadow of man,
The king is like God.

When we turn from this to little Palestine the contrast is so striking as to be almost incredible. Let us recall a famous incident from the Old Testament as reported in First Kings, chapter 21.

Ahab, the King of Israel, covets the vineyard of Naboth, his subject. He offers to buy it. But Naboth refuses the offer, knowing perhaps how unequal would be the bargain when the seller is a commoner and the buyer a king. He clings to a man's ancient right to refuse the alienation of the family land: "The Lord forbid it me, that I should give the inheritance of my father unto thee." And the king is balked. There is nothing he can do about it. He goes home and sulks: "And he laid him down upon his bed, and turned away his face, and would eat no bread."

Thus the commoner has rights, so clear-cut and so well established that not even the king can override them. Remember who the king was: supreme authority, military, civil, political and religious. No law should be able to stop him, for he was the law. He was legislature, judiciary and executive; and the Lord's anointed as well, who could make and unmake high priests. But in the little kingdom of Palestine this absolute monarch's power is limited by the commoner's inalienable rights.

Jezebel, the foreign queen, is not accustomed to such inconvenient restrictions. "Doest thou now govern the kingdom of Israel?" she taunts her husband. She finds a way by which the king can really govern, that is, get the field. On Jezebel's instructions and with the connivance of the nobles of the capital, Naboth is accused of blasphemy and sedition, and stoned to death. So, "Jezebel said to Ahab, Arise, take possession of the vineyard of Naboth, the Jezreelite, which he refused to give thee for money: for Naboth is not alive, but dead."

There must have been terrible indignation about this judicial murder. Years after, men speak of Ahab's successor as "the son of a murderer"

(II Kings 6:32). But who could do anything about it? The aristocracy, the "elders and the nobles," had been a party to the murder. And there was no conceivable action which could be taken against the king.

"But the word of the Lord came to Elijah the Tishbite." At the very moment when the king was taking possession of the murdered man's vineyard, Elijah had to meet him and deliver the following message:

"Thus saith the Lord, Hast thou killed, and taken possession? In the place where dogs, licked the blood of Naboth shall dogs lick thy blood, even thine."

One will search in vain the literature of the ancient world to find anything like this. Elijah is not a priest. He has no official position of any sort. The terrible judgment he has just delivered is sedition and lese-majesty. In any other Oriental court the king's guards would have struck him down immediately without even the formality of a trial; and if his death had been delayed, it would have been only to prolong it with torture. But here, the chronicle has it, the king of Israel accepted this divine verdict of the public conscience, delivered by a man whom he knew to be his enemy: "And it came to pass, when Ahab heard those words, that he rent his clothes, and put sackcloth upon his flesh, and fasted, and lay in sackcloth, and went softly."

The prophets identify themselves and the God for whom they speak, with the cause of the common people: "my people," they say.

What makes the difference? Why this concern for the common man, this merciless condemnation of those who oppress him? One may say: Because the prophets are religious people, and look upon the life of their community with religious eyes. That is no answer. The Egyptians, too, were religious people. It was Egyptian religion that made Pharaoh a God. Other-worldly religion does not give dignity to the common man—either in Egypt or elsewhere. At best it offers him a substitute for dignity, a consolation for the indignities he suffers in this life. Other-worldly religion is authoritarian and autocratic.

Thank God for another kind of religion, a religion that was discovered not in the despotic empires of the Nile and the Euphrates, but in the close-knit community of the nomad. The very insecurity of the life of the desert forces people together in firm solidarity. Class distinctions have hardly the chance to solidify, because there is so little private property. Men can own there little more than horses on which they ride, the weapons they use, the clothes they wear, and personal articles.

The essential thing in this religion is not a mysterious act performed by one man; it is an intelligible, reasonable service performed by every member of the community on his own behalf and on behalf of the whole community. It is an affirmation of a covenant, an understanding that the whole community makes with God, an agreement to obey God's law.

How does this confer dignity on the common man? Every man, be he king or peasant, is a covenanter with God. The observance of God's law is an act of free choice, which every man must make. Thus man is made in the image of God. God is a Creator. And man is also a creator: creator of his own life, co-creator of the common life. He has the dignity of a free spirit, freely choosing his destiny; and therefore, the responsibility of a moral being, who must choose aright in order to safeguard the rightness of the common life. Dignity and responsibility are inseparable; neither can exist apart from the other. If we expect responsibility from the common man, we must first accord him the conditions of dignity. Hence, the prophet's persistent demand for justice, righteousness, rightness in human relations. For any man who is unjust to his neighbor violates the conditions of the common covenant with God: he sins against God and the common life; and any other man has the right to protect God's broken law on God's behalf. That protest is a demand that duties be fulfilled and rights respected.

How does Jesus Christ fit into this tradition?

It is fairly obvious that the idea of freedom and its cognates has always been central to our religious culture. The long process of Israel in her achievement of freedom, from the evil of Ur and the slave quarters of Egypt to the lofty moral and spiritual emancipation of Jeremiah and Micah, culminated in the freedom-giving redemption of Jesus Christ and in its elucidation by Saint Paul. It was no accident that the first sermon reported of Jesus was concerned with manumission: "The spirit of the Lord is upon me to set at liberty."

Whatever else Jesus did or failed to do for the common people who came under His influence, He brought them a sense of dignity. Here are the words of an early disciple. They echo the prophetic tradition in its most truculent mood:

"My soul doth magnify the Lord,
And my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour' . . .

"He hath showed strength with His arm;
He hath scattered the proud in the imagination of their hearts.

"He hath put down the mighty from their seats,
And exalted them of low degree.

"He hath filled the hungry with good things;
And the rich he hath sent empty away."

The poor man who wrote these words was not sorry for himself.

Jesus goes deeper than any of the prophets; He completes their work and surpasses it when He raises the question that no prophet had put explicitly: What constitutes the measure of human greatness? He considers two possible answers:

"You know that those who are supposed to rule the heathen lord it over them, and their great men tyrannize over them. But so shall it not be among you. But whosoever wants to be great among you must be your servant, and whosoever wants to hold the first place among you must be everybody's slave."

Goodspeed's translation brings out the full meaning of that harsh Greek word *doulos*, which the King James Version softens into "servant." The contrast that Jesus draws here could not be more striking. Here is the top of the social pyramid: Caesar, the man of absolute power, the man of unlimited wealth, the man who lords it over millions and tyrannizes an empire. And there is the bottom: the despised, ignorant, degraded slave. He is the pattern of human greatness.

Why so? What is it that makes the slave great, and Caesar small? The slave is a worker. He gives away the most precious thing he can give: his labor, his life. And that is human greatness: to weave the single thread of your own life into the pattern of the community, and discover its own meaning in the common destiny; to find life in spending it; to realize life in giving it away. That is the uniquely human thing we have: our community, our unity with one another. The worker illustrates that principle, for his life is a constant pouring out of his own strength in order to make possible the common necessities, the common values of our everyday life. He is the prototype of human greatness. There is no human greatness about the ability to overpower others. A brute can overpower a man; and a man who seeks that kind of pre-eminence finds only brutal supremacy, but never human dignity. If Caesar wants to be great, he must descend, or rather ascend, to the level of the worker, and give his life in service. He must recognize the equal greatness of the other workers. He must hold himself, and be held by others, as servant of all.

I do not know any idea in history that is more revolutionary than

this idea that Christ taught and lived, that the measure of human greatness is not one's ability to dominate, but one's ability to serve. Insofar as this idea is accepted by men, the structure of society is altered, the conditions of human life are transformed. The feeble and faltering extent to which we have accepted it is the measure of our democracy. In the political field, though not yet in economic life, we have recognized power as a public utility, government as a public service, and our governors as public servants. That is political democracy. It is one of the few genuinely Christian things about our society. We can repudiate it only by returning to the pagan idea that political authority belongs to him who is strong enough to seize and hold it by brute force; that the greatest man is he who can dominate the greatest number of people.

Our Christian tradition, and perhaps no other, asserts the essential dignity of every man. Every man has dignity as a free moral agent if he affirms in his own personal choice the covenant that makes the common life possible. Every man has dignity as a worker if he gives his life in service that makes the common life actual. The first is the backbone of the prophetic demand for justice. The second is the substance of Christ's gospel of love. Justice affirms every man's right to be respected as a man, as an end in himself, never a mere means to others' ends. Love affirms every man's destiny to find life for himself only as he gives his life in service to the whole community. Democracy has meaning only insofar as that kind of love forms its motive and that justice is its goal.

The spirit of human freedom was latent in Christianity for many centuries but it emerged in full flower during the eighteenth-century spiritual awakening, and blossomed into glory when America was born. "America was born," said President Coolidge, "in a Revival of Religion. Back of that Revival were John Wesley, George Whitefield and Francis Asbury." This fact, however much ignored or obscured by secular historians, will stand the test of patient, accurate research.

Some historians and observers will say that this spirit of freedom is the unbroken heritage of the Anglo-Saxon people ever since the winning of the Magna Charta in 1215. Some will trace it to the virile independence of Wycliffe and his Lollard preachers in the fourteenth century. Some again will contend that it is the joint product of the Renaissance in the fifteenth century and the Reformation in the sixteenth. Others will connect it with the passion for liberty that characterized the Puritan upheaval in the seventeenth century; and certainly the contribution to

freedom made by the Westminster Assembly of Divines in 1643 must not be overlooked. Others will argue that our heritage sprang from the French Revolutionary Doctrine of the "rights of man," as elaborated by Voltaire and Rousseau in the eighteenth century.

Now that all these movements, directly and indirectly, left their impress upon the British and American heritage of freedom and self-government, cannot be doubted. So also is it beyond doubt that the peoples of Anglo-Saxon origin and tradition have, throughout the centuries, developed a unique instinct for liberty. Nevertheless, for eight decades following the Restoration in 1660, Britain's moral, spiritual and social life plunged from bad to worse. This period, indeed, marks the nadir of Britain's social history. Though calling itself the "Age of Reason," it really was the age of the skeptic, the slave-trader and the financial and political charlatan. As those eight decades wore toward their close, the "Slough of Despond" yawned just ahead; moral and spiritual collapse seemed complete; the *Cambridge Modern History* sums up this period as a time of "expiring hopes"; it appeared that Britain's doom was sealed.

Then came the transfigured Wesley, who, for fifty-three years, despite all persecution and contempt, "contested three kingdoms for God." And he won!

The resulting Evangelical Revival is the watershed of Anglo-Saxon history. This movement became the spiritual Magna Charta of the common people of England. It recaptured the spirit of Wycliffe and the Lollards; it bore the fairest flower and the richest fruits of Reformation principles; it revived and made Christo-centric the tortured soul of Puritanism; it established "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity," not on the sand of humanism but on the rock of a soul-purging and soul-nurturing faith.

This peerless Revival caused the then prodigal Anglo-Saxon people to find their soul; and having found their soul, they created an epic era of freedom and social reform. The remarkable century of the Pax Britannica is but one of the fruits of the Revival's sowing. The glorious heritage of liberty and social reform bequeathed to the modern Anglo-Saxon and American peoples has been fed at many springs, but the mighty river which carried those blessings far and wide is none other than the Evangelical Revival of "vital, practical Christianity"—a revival which mediated the gospel's inspiration and ethic not only to the individual but to the home, the factory, the market place and the seats of learning and

government. This is the truth which former Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes emphasized when he warned: "The question today is whether we have enough of the old spirit which gave us our institutions, to save them from being overwhelmed."

Can freedom live in our time? The answer is, Yes, it *can* live, but only on certain conditions.

There are no rights without duties—a truth which would seem so axiomatic and inescapable but which in our time has been widely neglected. We Americans have claimed the right to private initiative, to free enterprise, to the opportunity of doing business without government interference. We have failed, however, to recognize that this right entails duties. We must ever remember that freedom of initiative must be exercised with a most lively sense of obligation to the community, that free enterprise must be carried on for the benefit of all the people and not only for the benefit of the relatively few of the people who have money to invest. The right to do business without government interference is not unconditional but is dependent on the will to do business in such a way as to promote the general welfare.

Freedom cannot live with mass unemployment, with bitter want, with fear of an insecure old age. It appears to be a fact that most human beings, if driven to despair, will prefer a dictatorship that offers them a chance to make a living to a democracy that leaves them jobless, hungry and hopeless. When people are left with no economic security but the constant fear of hunger, the stage is well set for dictatorship.

It must also be recognized that human freedom is rooted in a Christian conception of the world and life. Freedom can live in a world where human beings are regarded as children of God. If we Americans have enjoyed such freedom as few peoples in history have known, it is because the founding fathers of this nation held that "all men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights." The authors of the Declaration of Independence and the framers of the Constitution held that human beings are children of God and that, as such, they have certain rights which governments are instituted to secure and which governments most certainly are bound to respect. Hence, there was brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are entitled to a fair and equal chance to become the best of which they are capable.

True, this high doctrine was flouted in the toleration of Negro slavery.

But it may at least be said that the tragic inconsistency of slavery was recognized and deplored. Jefferson held that slavery was "a national sore and a disgraceful condition to be remedied as soon as conditions would permit." This position was taken also by John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, James Duane and George Clinton.

Freedom can live in a world where human beings are regarded as children of God, endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights—all human beings, without distinction of race, nation, color, class. Science today recognizes a common ancestry of all peoples.

It is, therefore, a question of all or none. Either we human creatures are all children of God, or none of us is a child of God. We cannot believe that white men only have a divine origin and destiny. If it is held that the dark-skinned peoples are not children of God, it cannot then be held that any man is a child of God. It must then be denied that human beings are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights—a denial which is the death of freedom. In the world of today all men must be regarded as children of God if freedom is to be assured to any man.

"Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (II Corinthians 3:17) is a bold dogmatic claim. If it seems so to us, how must it have sounded when read to the small Corinthian fellowship? They knew political slavery and cultural pressure. The explanation of their liberty lay in the spirit they possessed. For liberty and freedom in the last analysis is a divine heritage as well. As the late G. K. Chesterton said, "There is no basis for democracy except in a dogma about the divine origin of man."

The terrible danger of our time consists in the fact that ours is a "cut-flower civilization." Such flowers die because they are severed from their sustaining roots. We are trying to maintain the dignity of the individual apart from the deep faith that every man is made in God's image and is therefore precious in God's eyes.

In the words of John D. Rockefeller, Jr.: "The crying need of a broken and suffering world is a return to the simple, courageous faith of the Pilgrim Fathers; . . . and a rekindling of the deep, impelling trust in God which they had."

A Poet Speaks to Our Need

W. RUSSELL BOWIE

I HAVE recently been rereading a book written forty-one years ago and another one written a decade before that; and both of them deal with a man who died in 1889. Yet the thoughts which they suggest are not old or outdated, but fresh and relevant today, for they deal with the poetry of Robert Browning; and this poetry of Browning, both in its spirit and its expression, is indeed a tonic for our distracted time.

One of the books I refer to is Gilbert Keith Chesterton's brilliant little appreciation entitled *Robert Browning*; the other is Henry Jones's *Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher*. The title of the latter is somewhat unfortunate. It sounds too abstract and academic. Browning did not aim primarily at being a teacher. He cannot rightly be pictured as though he were a professor putting his glasses on his nose, settling himself behind a lecture desk and spreading out his papers to deliver a lecture to a class. He was essentially the poet, with the poet's gift of seeing truth most characteristically not in syllogisms but in sudden suggestions that dawn in the sky like stars, with the poet's swift imagination and the poet's inspired word that lifts the thought as though on wings. Browning was one of the last men who would ever have wanted to be made to appear as a theorist or pedant. He had vivid interests and deep emotions. He lived intensely and he loved life. Deeper and more primal than his thought about life was his feeling for it—his vital identification with all the wide and various wonder of existence in this world. If he tried in his poetry—as he did—to wrestle with many of the great problems of man and God and destiny, it was because human beings in all their relationships in and out and up and down had meant so immensely much to him. A "philosophical and religious teacher" he has in actual fact become, but one's feeling toward him must not be warped by the notion that this was what he set out to be. If he taught, he taught because he could not help it. He was saying out loud what experience and imagination were teaching him; and that is why in a day when hard systems of thought are being built up like theological prisons, it is good to listen to this man who believed that the actual experience of living leads to an inexhaustibly expectant and courageous interpretation of life.

The interpretation of life which is being communicated in many philosophical and religious circles today is in danger of not being courageous because it is not expectant. With a kind of grim monotony it emphasizes not what is hopeful but what is helpless in human nature. It wants very much to persuade man that he is inherently a worm, and that if he ever gets wings or any semblance of them, it will only be in some supernatural change "beyond history." According to the neo-orthodox, we cannot look within the facts of our everyday life to find any brightening revelation of the reality of God. Emil Brunner in his *Theology of Crisis* repudiates what he calls "the idea of continuity," namely "that the consciousness of the best and highest in human nature constitutes also the consciousness of the eternally Divine." Against this he sets the thought of discontinuity which (he says) is basic to every primary doctrine of Christianity:

"Reality, as it now exists, is not only not divine; on the contrary, its center, that part of it which we really know, our will, is anti-divine. God, therefore, can reveal himself only as One who is in contradiction to the present world and breaks through its immanent order or law. God's will is antagonistic to the course of the world, but through revelation he declares his purpose to overcome the antagonism. The religion of immanence must either optimistically deny or minimize it; otherwise it is forced to acknowledge it as necessary to God's world; and so religion becomes wholly pessimistic and would better give up the name of God."¹

Whatever else Robert Browning may or may not have been, he was certainly not skeptical of the revelation of God through the present world and its immanent order. On the contrary, he had a most robust optimism as to those elements in all ordinary life which he believed will give us immediate glimpses of the real meaning of God. Here is the critical hinge upon the turning of which depends the way we face and interpret life. Much of the theology now being propagated involves an actual near-despair veiled in metaphysical projections that give a supposed assurance, but which in the end may turn out to be hollow and unsatisfying. It is no wonder that in the light of recent history many thinkers should be disillusioned about human nature and should pass to the extreme of believing that God and the purpose of God can be revealed only in supernatural events which are completely different from anything that earth's common life suggests. But it is a perilous matter to accept this conclusion. A gulf may be made between God and man which the ordinary human being never can get across; for cloudy phrases about a grace to be given "at the edge of history" or "beyond history" are not a substantial enough

¹ Emil Brunner, *The Theology of Crisis*, p. 33.

bridge for ordinary feet to walk on. If average people are to keep on looking forward and going forward, they may need to believe exactly what Robert Browning believed—that life which is full of poignancy and pathos and is scarred by much evil nevertheless possesses also the romance of incipient moral heroism, and intuitions which are authentic reflections of the immanent fact of God.

Let us consider, then, some of the particular aspects of what Robert Browning thought and what he said—or rather, since he was a poet, what he sang.

In the first place, he had an overwhelming sense of the sheer interest of this human scene and the human drama that is played upon it.

"He does not find the great part of his joy in those matters in which most poets find felicity. He finds much of it in those matters in which most poets find ugliness and vulgarity. He is to a considerable extent the poet of towns. 'Do you care for nature much?' a friend of his asked him. 'Yes, a great deal,' he said, 'but for human beings a great deal more.' Nature, with its splendid and soothing sanity, has the power of convincing most poets of the essential worthiness of things. There are few poets who, if they escaped from the rowdiest waggonette of trippers, could not be quieted again and exalted by dropping into a small wayside field. The specialty of Browning is rather that he would have been quieted and exalted by the waggonette.

"To Browning, probably the beginning and end of all optimism, was to be found in the faces in the street."²

And as Henry Jones has put it:

"Shelley and Wordsworth were the poets of nature, as all men truly say; Browning was the poet of the human soul. For Shelley, the beauty in which all things work and move was well-nigh 'quenched by the eclipsing curse of the birth of man'; and Wordsworth lived beneath the habitual sway of fountains, meadows, hills, and groves, while he kept grave watch o'er man's mortality, and saw the shades of the prison-house gather round him. From the life of man they garnered little but mad indignation or mellowed sadness. It was a foolish and furious strife, with unknown powers fought in the dark, from which the poet kept aloof, for he could not see that God dwelt amidst the chaos. But Browning found 'harmony in immortal souls, spite of the muddy vesture of decay.' He saw that nature was crowned in man, though man was mean and miserable. At the heart of the most wretched abortion of wickedness there was the mark of the loving touch of God. . . . God is present for him, not only in the order and beauty of nature, but in the world of will and thought. Beneath the caprice and wilful lawlessness of individual action, he saw a beneficent purpose which cannot fail, but 'has its way with man, not he with it.'"³

² *Robert Browning*, G. K. Chesterton, p. 186.

³ Henry Jones, *Browning as a Philosopher and Religious Teacher*, pp. 55-56.

This interest in all existence and this belief in a spark which always and everywhere may disturb the clod, produced in Browning, as Chesterton has vividly pointed out, his hearty enjoyment even of things crude and common and—to ordinary estimates—ugly.

"If *Browning*," he says, "instead of Tennyson had written the passage which opens '*The Princess*,' descriptive of the 'larking' of the villagers in the magnate's park, he would have spared us nothing; he would not have spared us the shrill uneducated voices and the unburied bottles of ginger beer. He would have crammed the poem with uncouth similes; he would have changed the metre a hundred times; he would have broken into doggerel and into rhapsody; but he would have left, when all is said and done, the impression of a certain eternal human energy. Energy and joy, the father and the mother of the grotesque, would have ruled the poem. We should have felt of that rowdy gathering little but the sensation of which Mr. Henley writes:

" 'Praise the generous gods for giving,
In this world of sin and strife,
With some little time for living,
Unto each the joy of life.' " ⁴

Along with his interest in all existence, and because of it, Browning had the faculty of appraising life and people not from the outside only, but with the intuitive understanding which got inside the other person and looked out again as through his eyes. He had an invincible curiosity not so much as to what a poet might say about all sorts of persons, but as to what those persons might say of themselves. If they were the kinds of individuals whom society would ordinarily despise and put to silence, he wanted to be their interpreter all the more. So he writes his *Bishop Blougram's Apology* and *Mr. Sludge the Medium* and *Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau*; and what we listen to is the uninhibited and unabashed self-expression of the shrewd and compromising ecclesiastic and of the cheap, spiritualistic charlatan and of the dishevelled politician. Nevertheless—and here is the genius of Browning, not only as a poet but as a reader of the strange wonder of human souls—out of these self-revelations, in the main so cynical and mean, there come flashes of pure poetry, flashes of sudden revelation, as though the tawdriest soul had some point of awareness at which the inescapable truth of God will be reflected. It is in the midst of Bishop Blougram's confession of the invasion of another and a higher world into his earthy consciousness that one comes upon the haunting lines:

⁴ Chesterton, p. 148.

"Just when we are safest, there's a sunset-touch,
A fancy from a flower-bell, some one's death,
A chorus ending from Euripides,—
And that's enough for fifty hopes and fears
As old and new at once as Nature's self,
To rap and knock and enter in our soul."

If Browning were alive today it would be a fascinating matter to wonder what figures in our contemporary world he would seek to penetrate with his uncanny understanding. Instead of writing—as he did under other names—of Cardinal Wiseman and the Emperor Napoleon III, would he write of some Cardinal ally of Franco in Spain or of Hitler or of Goebbels; and write of them not as we see them but as each man sees himself? Certainly it would be a matter of vast value if some true poetic insight did illuminate the actual truth of that terrific thing which is the soul of Hitler, with its frenzied mysticism, its grandeur of dark passion like the grandeur of Milton's Satan and Milton's hell, its demonic loyalties, its stupendous dedication to his idols of an energy and devotion which turned in another way might have helped to bring in the Kingdom of God. One thing is sure, and the fact of it may well face us with a sobering responsibility. Unless we do understand from the inside those satanic figures which throw their shadow on our world, understand them as Lucifers whose evil owes its power in part to the twisted pride of a heavenly destiny which they think is theirs, we shall not have the wisdom to sift out the inescapable moral judgments upon ourselves in what they represent, and so isolate the essential evil that must be justly seen before it can be destroyed.

We have been speaking of evil. It is the terrible recognition of evil and sin and moral chaos that came to our civilization in the first World War and struck our bland confidence in human progress a blow full in the face that has made many theologians turn sharp about, with their backs to any human confidence and their eyes groping for a revelation of God who, as Brunner puts it, is "the unheard-of, unrecognized, mysterious person who cannot be discovered anywhere in the world." That is to say, man himself is so utterly depraved that he is alien from God, and no awareness of God can come from looking at man.

Certainly there is purifying value in this drastic repudiation of human pride. It is a good thing to be bowed down sometimes in such self-abasement that in the light of the glory of God we see our utmost righteousness as no more than filthy rags. There are moments when our false complacency may need to be cauterized by the iron of the terrible truth-

fulness of God. But it is possible for theologians to develop a fanaticism like the fanaticism of the anchorites, who thought that the more they mortified themselves the more pleasing they would be to God. These theologians of today put blisters of condemnation all over the body of humanity and call it a garment of praise. They would have the human soul sit down like Job on the ash heap and find assurance only in its boils. But there is bound to grow a doubt as to whether the neo-orthodox who speaks so confidently of a God "who cannot be discovered anywhere in the world" have themselves managed to discover and express his purpose as completely as they seem to think. Does God really want man to be always confessing his degradation? Or does God also say to him as was said to the Prophet Ezekiel: "Son of man, stand upon thy feet and I will speak to thee"?

At any rate, that was what Robert Browning, in his robust yet reverent way, assumed. As Henry Jones has said of him:

"In his optimism of love, in his supreme confidence in man's destiny, in his sense of the infinite height of the moral horizon of humanity, in his courageous faith in the good, and his profound conviction of the evanescence of evil, there lies a vital energy whose inspiring power we are yet destined to feel. Until a spirit kindred to his own arises, able to push the battle further into the same region, much of the practical task of the age that is coming will consist in living out in detail the ideas to which Browning has given expression."⁵

But was Browning's optimism a shallow wishful thinking, a rose-colored reflection of a sentimental and unrealistic desire to have all life look pleasant and bland? Was he unaware of evil and indifferent to the terrible facts of deliberate human sin? On the contrary, it might be nearer to the truth to say with Chesterton that he realized "the one grand and logical basis of all optimism, the doctrine of original sin," which "large and beautiful and benignant explanation that the heart of man is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked" makes one confident that God must be in and with men if there is any goodness within them at all. Instead of blinking the fact of evil, Browning went out to confront it.

"... His interest in vice—in malice, cruelty, ignorance, brutishness, meanness, the irrational perversity of a corrupt disposition, and the subtleties of philosophic and aesthetic falsehood—was no morbid curiosity. . . . He crowds his pages with criminals because he sees deeper than their crimes. He describes evil without 'palliation or reserve,' and allows it to put forth all its might, in order that he may, in the end, show it to be subjected to God's purposes."⁶

⁵ Jones, p. 32.

⁶ Jones, p. 88.

Life as Browning saw it did have and does have plenty of trouble and temptation and moral tragedy too, but it is never in itself petty or cheap or morally meaningless. It is as Thomas Arnold taught his boys at Rugby, "a struggle ordained from of old in which there are no spectators, but the youngest must take his side and the stakes are life and death." "Life's business," as the Pope says in the *Ring and the Book*, "is just the terrible choice" and the one unpardonable failure "is the refusal to take a definite and resolute stand for either virtue or vice; the hesitancy and compromise of a life that is loyal to nothing. . . . The cool self-love of the old English moralists, which reduced the game of life to principles, and weighed good and evil in the scales of prudence, is to Browning the deepest damnation." (Jones, p. 107.)

In Henry Jones's book there is an exceptionally interesting comparison of Robert Browning and Thomas Carlyle. They were alike in their thoroughgoing moral earnestness. They both saw life as a battle in which men must listen to the imperatives of conscience and follow their duty wherever it may lead. But to Carlyle:

"the power which imposed the duty was an alien power, awful in majesty, infinite in might, a 'great taskmaster'; and the duty itself was an outer law, written in letters of flame across the high heavens, in comparison with which man's action at its best sank into failure. His only virtue is obedience, and his last rendering even of himself is 'unprofitable servant.' In this he has much of the combined strength and weakness of the old Scottish Calvinism. 'He stands,' said Mazzini, 'between the individual and the Infinite without hope or guide. He has a constant disposition to crush the human being by comparing him with God.'"⁷

It is this mood and message of Carlyle, rather than what we shall see to have been the different one of Browning, which is essentially repeated in the characteristic emphasis of most of the neo-orthodox theologians of our day. To them, as to Carlyle, the moral struggle often seems a grim and somber prospect. Man is so inherently evil and so denied the companionship of anything immanently divine that he faces what looks like a hopeless fight. "Reality as it now exists," writes Emil Brunner, "is not only not divine; on the contrary its center, that part of it which we really know, our will, is antidivine. God therefore can reveal Himself only as One who is in contradiction to the present world and breaks through its immanent order or law."

Against this defeatist interpretation of our present life Browning stands in wholehearted contrast. He believes, of course, and says in a thousand ways that evil is antagonistic to God and that human nature is

⁷ Jones, p. 66.

constantly harboring sin. But he believes also that God is there in the moral struggle in man, and not only in some unapproachable ideal outside and apart from man. As Henry Jones expresses Browning's faith:

"The legitimate deduction from the height of man's moral ideal is thus found to be, not, as Carlyle thought, the weakness and worthlessness of human nature, but its promise and native dignity: and in a healthy moral consciousness it produces, not despair, but faith and joy. For the authority of the moral law over man is rooted in man's endowment. Its imperative is the voice of the future self bidding the present self aspire. Contrition is not a bad moral state which should bring despair, but a good state, full of promise of one that is still better. It is, in fact, just the first step which the ideal takes in its process of self-realization: 'the sting that bids nor sit, nor stand, but go!'"^a

In his own way as a poet Browning proclaimed the same truth which T. R. Greene summed up in his *Prologomena of Ethics*. "God is a being in whom we exist; with whom we are in principle one; with whom the human spirit is identical in the sense that He is all which the human spirit is becoming." And as Jones in his chapter on Optimism and Ethics says:

"It may seem presumptuous thus to identify the divine and the human; but to separate them makes both morality and religion impossible. It robs morality of its ideal, and makes God a mere name for 'the unknown.' Those who think that this identification degrades the divine, misapprehend the nature of the spirit; and forget that it is of its essence to communicate itself. And goodness and truth do not become less when shared; they grow greater. Spiritual possessions imply community wherein there is no exclusion; and to the Christian the glory of God is His communication of Himself. Hence the so-called religious humility, which makes God different in nature from His work, really degrades the object of its worship. It puts mere power above the gifts of spirit, and it indicates that the worshipper has not been emancipated from the slavishness which makes a fetish of its God. Such a religion is not free, and the development of man destroys it."

"In Browning's great words through the lips of Pompilia:

" 'I never realized God's birth before—
How He grew likest God in being born.'"^b

Surely there is immense and urgent need that this sense of God as coming close to human life and authentically known wherever that life is at its highest should be understood and received today. Much of the current neo-orthodoxy, especially through its Continental spokesmen, represents a kind of moral shellshock. Many of the facts of human history in our time have been so terrible that a whole school of Christian thinkers has been driven to believe that the only way of reverencing God is to say that He must be utterly other than anything which here we see.

^a *Ibid.*, p. 128.

^b *Ibid.*, p. 135.

But sooner or later that will be bound to produce a paralysis of moral hope, and in the end a possible paralysis even of moral effort. The world has shadows enough without trying to make it all dark. Rather, we crucially need to give to people now, and especially to the young, new glimpses of light by which the actual facts of their everyday life may be illumined. It would be a devastating thing to accept the dictum from *The Theology of Crisis* that "experience comes of faith, but faith never comes of experience. The principle of the Christian life is not experience but the Word of God, which can only be believed and cannot be experienced" (Brunner, p. 64). On the contrary, if the beautiful meaning of the Incarnation is not to be turned into a hollow myth, and faith in the Holy Spirit destroyed by a heresy of hopelessness, then the Word of God does speak to us in those aspirations and awarenesses of our own souls which feel themselves to be reaching up to where they touch God and are touched by Him. If this were not so, then our human emotions, even at their loveliest, would be robbed of sacredness. But if it is so, then the life here and now can have some halo of heaven round it. This was what Browning exultantly believed and sang; and listening to him, we ourselves have the more glad confidence to believe that in our own relationships with other human hearts we find:

"The good, the eternal—and these, not alone
In the main current of the general life,
But small experiences of every day,
Concerns of the particular hearth and home:
To learn not only by a comet's rush
But a rose's birth—not by the grandeur, God,
But the comfort, Christ."

Dean Inge, who wrote many things that seemed sardonic, wrote also in his *Personal Religion and the Life of Devotion* the exquisite description of his little daughter Paula, who died in her early girlhood, and of what she brought into her parents' life of God; and at the end he says:

"I hope my readers will not think that I have said too much about our little girl. . . . At a time when so much of our literature is strangely blind to the glory and excellence of human nature at its best, I do not think we can be blamed for making known what we have ourselves seen of the beauty of holiness in a short life. . . . Some may perhaps have the same feeling that we have, that there may be a wonderful completeness in a life which only lasted a few years. 'She, being made perfect in a short time, fulfilled a long time, for her soul was dear to the Lord.'"¹⁰

¹⁰ Inge, pp. 95-96.

And in the same spirit Browning wrote of Pompilia:

"Everywhere
I see in the world the intellect of man,
That sword, the energy his subtle spear,
The knowledge which defends him like a shield—
Everywhere; but they make not up, I think,
The marvel of a soul like thine, earth's flower
She holds up to the softened gaze of God."

And again:

"I can believe this dread machinery
Of sin and sorrow, would confound me else,
Devised—all pain, at most expenditure
Of pain by Who devised pain—to evolve,
By new machinery in counterpart,
The moral qualities of man—how else?—
To make him love in turn and he beloved,
Creative and self-sacrificing too,
And thus eventually Godlike."

It is a fashion among some contemporary theologians to separate the working of God from history and to identify his salvation only with some supernatural crisis of grace at the end of time. But Browning strikes a bolder note:

"His poetry contains suggestions that the moral will without is also a force within man; that the power which makes for righteousness in the world has penetrated into, or rather manifests itself *as*, man. Intelligence and will, the reason which apprehends the nature of things, and the original impulse of self-conscious life which issues in action, are God's power in man; so that God is realizing Himself in the deeds of man, and human history is just His return to Himself."¹¹

He does not fall into the error of pantheism—although sometimes he seems to hover near its dangerous brink—of claiming that all things are good; but he dares to trust that, in spite of contradictions and postponements, all things work together for good and toward good. What God has chosen and purposed, man may waste and desecrate but never quite lose. It may well be that no complete moral victory will be won by men here on this stage of history; but the distinction of Browning's faith is that partial victories which are real and substantial may be won, and that these may become the ascending levels from which God's infinite heights are approached. So it was in lines like these that he drew his ultimate picture of the man who has grasped the meaning of life:

¹¹ Jones, p. 70.

"One who never turned his back but marched breast forward,
 Never doubted clouds would break,
 Never dreamed, though right were worsted, wrong would triumph,
 Held we fall to rise, are baffled to fight better,
 Sleep to wake."

Finally, it is significant to ask what relation there is between Browning's thought and the insistent claim of some of the neo-orthodox that faith in Revelation must be completely separated from the intuitions of ordinary life. There is an explanation, of course, for this insistence. Liberal Christianity in many instances had so faded out into a complacent humanism that recognition of the awful heights in the reality of God had disappeared. Consequently, as a reaction there has come the demand that men should abjure all knowledge of God as immanent and submit themselves in silence only to the Word, which speaks to them supernaturally from regions wholly unintelligible in terms of anything they naturally know.

"Jesus," wrote Karl Barth, "is the herald of the divine will, the champion of the divine honor. Jesus simply had nothing to do with religion. The significance of his life lies in its possessing an actuality which no religion possesses—the actuality of the unapproachable, incomprehensible, inconceivable—the realization of that possibility which passes human consideration."¹²

Is this true? Certainly not according to the poetic insight of Robert Browning. He perceived and understood the fact of evil; but he believed that all life when it blossoms into its best, which is love, carries within itself some element of that same redemption which is made perfect in Christ. His theology, as *Death in the Desert* shows, is in tune with that great and reverent wonder which is expressed in the prologue of the Gospel of John. The Word which at length was made flesh and spoke its perfect truth in Jesus is the same Word which has always sought and is everywhere seeking to communicate itself to the hearts of men. There is no essential gulf between the inner revelation and the outward revelation that objectified the truth once for all in Christ. Within us now, and not only supernaturally above or dimly beyond us at the end of time, Christ's salvation may be revealed. So in Saul, David, desiring to help the stricken king and finding his own power insufficient, cries:

"—What, my soul? see thus far and no farther? when doors great and small,
 'Nine-and-ninety flew ope at our touch, should the hundredth appal?
 'In the least things have faith, yet distrust in the greatest of all?"

¹² *The Word of God and the Word of Man*, by Barth, p. 88.

'Do I find love so full in my nature, God's ultimate Gift,
 'That I doubt His own love can compete with it? Here, the parts shift?
 'Here, the creature surpass the Creator,—the end, what Began?
 'Would I fain in my impotent yearning do all this for man,
 'And dare doubt he alone shall not help him, who yet alone can?' " ¹⁸

And the Beloved Disciple, dying, says:

" 'For life, with all its yields of joy and woe,
 'And hope and fear,—believe the aged friend,—
 'Is just our chance o' the prize of learning love,
 'How love might be, hath been indeed, and is;
 'And that we hold thenceforth to the uttermost
 'Such prize despite the envy of the world;
 'And, having gained truth, keep truth: that is all.' "

So the supreme conviction of Robert Browning sums up in this: that wherever human souls have greatly loved, even here in the midst of our own earthly imperfection, there we have found and been found by God's eternal self. It is Browning's own faith, refined like gold out of the crucible of life, that Pompilia voices when she says of Caponsacchi, the "soldier-saint":

"Love will be helpful to me more and more
 I' the coming course, the new path I must tread—
 My weak hand in Thy strong hand, strong for that!

.

So, let him wait God's instant men call years;
 Meantime hold hard by truth and His great soul,
 Do out the duty! Through such souls alone
 God stooping shows sufficient of His light
 For us i' the dark to rise by. And I rise."

¹⁸ Browning, Vol. I, p. 279.

Fiction That Reflects Life

L. WENDELL FIFIELD

ONE of the tests of great fiction is the degree to which it successfully reflects life. I would insist further that the degree of excellence of fiction is determined, not alone on the basis of its literary merit, but also by the degree in which it reflects life that is good, beautiful and true. A great artist's picture of a garbage pail might be classified by some as great art. It would have artistic merit but it would not be great art. The use of fine literary talents to portray life that is unlovely, ugly and vulgar is not an evidence of high artistic ability, nor is the result great literature. A number of very popular books of fiction have no mention in this article because the kind of life which they reflect is neither good, beautiful, nor in the largest sense true.

The books here discussed have this common factor. They all represent an upward drive on the part of the principal characters. They all seek to make attractive and worthy those ethical and spiritual concepts which must ever be enhanced by literature if they are to be increasingly the controlling virtues of life.

The Green Years is a typical Cronin novel. The author has by now established a pattern for his literary works and very definitely follows that pattern. In *The Citadel*, Doctor Manson faced one disappointment after another, yet he revealed qualities which enabled him to surmount these constant obstacles, to use the very frustrations of life as the basis for a rich accomplishment. In *The Keys of the Kingdom*, Father Chisholm found those inner qualities of spirit which are the keys to the kingdom. These qualities enabled him to rise from one defeat after another, to build out of life's difficulties a rich and moving character. In *The Green Years* the central character is Robert Shannon. As a youth he is called upon to face one disappointment after another. Yet he, too, is molded by these difficulties into a finer man. As the book closes, he is facing his manhood well equipped by the rigors of his youth.

The reading of this book does not produce a feeling of exultation. Doctor Cronin is too realistic. Time after time the reader says to himself: "Now things must go better for young Robert. Just about every-

thing that could happen to him has happened. He has finally fought his way through and life will be easier and happier for him." But such an assumption does not take into account Doctor Cronin. In the next chapter some new difficulty has developed to try Robert's soul. Again he is driven to old Cadger Gow. Cadger Gow, the great-grandfather of Robert, shares central interest. He is possessed of many frailties. At times he is a thoroughly unlikable old rascal. Yet he does possess a considerable amount of natural common sense. He has a tremendous affection for his great-grandson. Uncertain as he was in the application of his code of living to himself, he was able to project that code of living into Robert's life and so serves as a steadying factor for the boy.

The full measure of the devotion of old Cadger Gow toward his great-grandson is not revealed until the closing pages of the book, where it serves to give a final radiant lift to the entire story.

The Green Years will not be as eagerly read nor prove as full of meaning as *The Keys of the Kingdom*. It is not that the book is any less excellent but that the main character does not come as close to universal experience. The story of Father Chisholm was the story of all men and women, struggling for poise and peace in the face of life's distressing experiences. Robert Shannon is struggling in like manner, but his struggles are those of youth, experiences which have grown dim in the lives of most of us.

To say that the book carries less of an appeal than *The Keys of the Kingdom* is not for a moment to indicate that it lacks in importance. It is one of the most important novels of 1944. The theme of the book, the struggle of life to realize itself and its destiny is a worthy one. The picture of courage, of faith, of hope under stress, of life striving against staggering odds to salvage its own soul is one of helpfulness and inspiration.

Green Dolphin Street would be my selection for the fiction book of 1944. It is a beautifully written, fascinating and moving story. It is a tale of high adventure and of moving human experiences. It is a story of unusual courage, of deep devotion, of clean humor and of moving pathos.

In a sense it is a wordy book. The author does not hurry in the telling of her story. She pauses to paint with words, phrases, sentences

the material surroundings in which the action takes place, the appearance, the conduct, the inner thought of her characters. The result is a wealth of imagery and descriptive writing.

The book is replete with interesting and unusual characters splendidly drawn. There are Sophie and Octavius Le Patourel, the parents of the heroine. There is Dr. Edward Ozanne, the father of the hero. There are Captain O'Hara, skipper of the "Green Dolphin," and Nat, the one-eyed sailor. There are Timothy Haslam, the lumberman, Samuel Kelly and his wife Suzanna, typical of the missionaries who in their zeal and enthusiasm, as well as concentration and loyalty, brought much of spiritual wealth to the islands of the South Pacific. There is Veronique, William's little daughter, whose story is almost a book in itself. Nor should Old Nick, the parrot, be overlooked, for upon more than one occasion when the emotional tension of the story seems almost unbearable, Old Nick by some expostulation or remark, injects a comic relief.

While all these characters are interesting, the story revolves around William and the two Patourel girls, Marianne and Marguerite. Both are in love with William. Their characters are totally different, the one is moody, passionate, brilliant. The other is lovely, sunny-tempered and joyful. Due to carelessness in a letter, William asks for the hand of the wrong girl. He was in love with Marguerite, but when he wrote the letter from New Zealand back to the little city of St. Pierre on the Channel Islands, he unfortunately used the name of Marianne. Marianne at once went forth on the great adventure, little realizing the struggles, the trials, the difficulties which lay ahead of her in New Zealand. When she arrived, William did not have the heart to disappoint her. He instinctively knew that to tell her the truth would doom her and so he set himself to carry out a program of life necessitated by his unfortunate mistake.

Marguerite, meantime, sought beneath a cloak of gaiety to hide the tragic disaster that had come to her for she had believed that William was her love. Yet it was not to be. In New Zealand, William and Marianne share life and seek their fortunes. Many intensely trying and often exciting adventures befall them; earthquakes, shipwrecks, the Maori wars, all the vicissitudes of pioneer life.

Marguerite meantime remains in St. Pierre, seeking to work out a life whose every hope had been so tragically shattered. It is not my purpose to spoil the reading of the story by telling its conclusion, except

to say that the story ends as it began, in St. Pierre, where the last word is spoken by Old Nick, the parrot.

Papa Was a Preacher in Texas. His family consisted of mother, six boys and two girls. They were a normal, rollicking, active lot. He remained in his conference for forty years and served eighteen different pastorates. That meant eighteen different churches in which the entire family worked, for all of them helped Papa. It also meant eighteen different parsonages into which this family of ten had to be fitted. Sometimes there was plenty of room, sometimes it required a tremendous amount of ingenuity on the part of Mother, abetted by the wisdom of the growing children, to work it all out. This was especially true because Papa was a hospitable sort of man and was constantly inviting guests either for meals or for overnight lodgings.

The youngest of the two daughters writes this story. It is replete with humorous tales. There is a chuckle on almost every page. There is a laugh in almost every reminiscent anecdote. Papa was conservative in his religious thinking. He was extremely strict in his attitude toward social activities. Sundays in the parsonage were observed with the utmost care and loyalty to the strict letter of Old Testament law. Card games were taboo; Papa even felt that playing dominos was in some way yielding to the wiles of the devil. Roller skating, because in the minds of one of the members of the church such activity constituted a semblance of evil, presented a serious problem to the family. But in spite of all the restrictions, here was a family that had a thoroughly good time. The spirit of enthusiasm, the rollicking desire for fun which was the heritage of all eight of these normal, healthy children, always managed to find ways of expression, which at least in the main fitted in with the rules and regulations for life laid down by Papa.

But there is more than humor in this book. There is a touch of pathos. There is much sound common sense. There is a family which very definitely proves that being good is not necessarily a dull, drab, dismal affair.

Here is a picture of family life where there is sufficient radiance at the center of the home to draw the children more closely within the family circle, rather than that emptiness, so frequently characteristic of homes, which drives the children out and away. It is a picture also of

the fine, consecrated loyalty which is exemplified by many of the ministers of the Church of Christ who with great zeal and very limited material resources make their mark in usefulness and service.

In these days where there is so much that depresses, so much that is ugly, when so much of literature deals with the rougher, more brutal experiences of life, where the reading of many books leaves the reader gloomy, discouraged and at times in despair, I heartily recommend this book as a welcome relief. We can face life's sterner realities more adequately if now and again there is a break in the tension, if we learn to offset our tears with our laughter as Lin Yutang suggests. My only regret in reading *Papa Was a Preacher* was that there is not more of it.

In his newest novel, *Pastoral*, Nevil Shute tells the story of the romance of Peter Marshall, a bomber pilot, and Gervase Robertson, a WAAF, on his station. Each falls in love with the other early in the story. The suspense of the book is furnished not by the question of the attitude of each to the other, but rather by what should be done about their deep and abiding love. After all, they have fallen in love in wartime. War places many restrictions upon them. It brings many complications into their romance. It poses many questions of uncertainty about the future. In a beautiful story, marked by its simplicity and also insight, Nevil Shute tells of the way in which they faced this problem of their mutual love and the way in which the problem was finally resolved. The background of the story is the lovely English countryside where the station was located. The author is very adept in the translation of the beauty of the surroundings against which the story is set into the qualities of character revealed by those whose experiences he recounts.

In this book the author is essentially the storyteller. Unlike many present-day novels, Nevil Shute has no deep philosophical problem with which to deal. He has no particular panacea to exploit. He has no wholesome or unwholesome trend to expose. He has a story to tell, the story of the reaching out of life for life, of the sharing of hope, of the blending of abilities. It is the story of a companionship deepening into love which brings added strength and capacity ultimately to those who share it. Many of the paragraphs in the story might well be called poetry in prose, so skillfully does the language lend itself to the loveliness of the story.

The story is not all as calm as the English countryside which furnishes its setting. Misunderstandings develop, difficulties arise, there are times of risk and high excitement to be expected in any story dealing with a bomber pilot. Some of the scenes are terrific in their tension. This frequent change of pace from fishing to flying, from romance to aerial struggle has produced a book which always holds the reader's attention.

One who reads the book is convinced that the author is an authority in two fields, the field of fishing and the field of aviation. For both of these he obviously has a deep affection, and concerning them both he possesses a wide knowledge. He also reveals again the same ability to understand, to express the emotions of the human heart, which was so characteristic of Pied Piper.

This is a war book. It contains graphic and dramatic portrayals of war in the skies. But it is more than a description of war and life in wartime. It is a mellow, sympathetic, understanding affirmation of the fact that there is a quality of life greater than the destructive power of war, a quality that endures and survives always. In its survey of all the various motives and emotions of life, we have here again the great affirmation, "The greatest of these is love."

Some of My Best Friends Are Soldiers is a humorous book with a serious purpose. It is a series of letters written by Gretchen to her brother Jeff. Jeff has been drafted. He is undergoing military training. While his letters do not appear, it is obvious from Gretchen's replies to them that Jeff is running into many new situations which call for adjustment. To cheer him up and also to help him in these new problems, Gretchen writes him the letters which make up this book.

It is a method particularly adapted to the purposes that the author has in mind. The humor of the book is supplied by the accounts which Gretchen sends her brother of the various problems of adjustment after his departure. There is the problem of keeping father satisfied. Father is an irascible old codger who might very well have stepped out of Clarence Day's *Life With Father*.

There is the problem of the hot-water faucet that will not run, and the difficulties created by the leak in the bedroom. The landlord insisted that the best one could hope for in wartime was that water should enter the house in some way. While it was true that it didn't

enter the house through the hot-water faucet, at the same time it did enter the house through the leak in the roof. Therefore, the tenant should be satisfied. Throughout the entire book there is the recurrent efforts of Gretchen to secure a plumber.

Other problems and difficulties due to wartime receive humorous treatment. Margaret Halsey, who displayed the capacity to write with a subtle humor in her former book, *With Malice Toward Some*, here continues to display that same ability.

Beneath the surface of frivolity and lightness there is a serious purpose. The author has become very much concerned about two problems. One is the problem of race in America as it relates to the Negroes and the whites. The other is the problem of the relationship between the Christians and the Jews.

In this concern, Margaret Halsey is right. The problems growing out of intolerance in race and religion are two of the vital matters that will face America and demand solution.

The form of this book makes it possible for the author to discuss these two problems in such a way as to make the discussion palatable and intriguing. Her brother Jeff is coming in contact with both of these problems during his training period in the South. Gretchen encounters both in her work as a hostess in a canteen. Gretchen, out of her experience seeks to analyze and then to discover a solution.

The book is not a complete nor a thoroughgoing discussion, either of anti-Semitism or of racial inequality. At the same time Margaret Halsey says a considerable number of pertinent and important things.

The main value of the book lies in the fact that many will be intrigued by the humor and the interest of this book and so will become familiar with the extent and the nature of these problems. They may come to have a deeper interest and seek more serious literature dealing with their nature and with their solution.

These five books differ from each other in many ways. Their subject matter, style, characters in no way resemble each other.

They are all, however, typical of the trend toward wholesomeness in fiction. While none of them is distinctly religious in character, they all are in the literary tradition established by *The Robe*, *The Keys of the Kingdom* and *The Song of Bernadette*.

This tradition embodies the idea that the mission of modern fiction is to motivate life in an upward direction, to fulfill the admonition of the Apostle Paul, "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honorable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report: if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things."

Green Dolphin Street. By ELIZABETH GOUDGE. New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1944. pp. 502. \$3.00.

The Green Years. By A. J. CRONIN. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1944. pp. 347. \$2.50.

Papa Was a Preacher. By ALYENE PORTER. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1944. pp. 167. \$1.75.

Pastoral. By NEVIL SHUTE. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1944. pp. 256. \$2.50.

Some of My Best Friends Are Soldiers. By MARGARET HALSEY. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944. pp. 207. \$2.50.

Book Reviews

Advance Through Storm, A. D. 1914 and After, with Concluding Generalizations. By KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945. pp. xvi-560. \$4.00.

With this volume, Professor Latourette brings to its climax (for the present, at least) his monumental "History of the Expansion of Christianity." This book must be viewed as not only the successor of its six predecessors (already reviewed in this journal), but also as the keystone of the entire massive edifice. The first three-fourths recount developments in the World Church during the period of the World Wars, since 1914. Then, in the closing hundred pages, the author gathers up in comprehensive summary the major lessons which emerge from the chronicle of Christianity's movement through the whole nineteen centuries. Each part holds for every serious student of the Church, commanding, indispensable importance.

The record of the war years has special interest on two scores. In the first place, the entire globe is under review. The first three volumes, bringing the chronicle down to 1800, likewise survey the full outreach of the Christian movement in the periods with which each is concerned; but in those earlier centuries, that movement was still largely confined to the Mediterranean and Atlantic basins, with only tiny, and often fragile, tentacles reaching out toward the Orient, Continental Africa, and Oceania. For the "Great Century" from 1800 to the First World War, the writer found three volumes necessary, each dealing with a limited, though vast, geographical area. But by 1914 the Church had circled the earth and the comparatively brief space of thirty years with which the present volume deals enables the historian to hold the whole world under scrutiny.

In the second place, Doctor Latourette here writes contemporary history. Earlier volumes chronicled events known to us only at second hand; the average reader had no basis of appraising the competence of both narrative and generalizations save by reference to the judgement of other historians. But the present book tells a story which each of us has seen unfolding under our own eyes; its events have been the matrix of our own existence; it is possible to test the record by first-hand knowledge. Under that test, the achievement of the author stands forth in even more impressive stature. His success in amassing the multitudinous and intricate details of, for example, the impact of the First World War upon Protestant missions or the changes wrought by Japanese occupation, and his capacity to hold them all in judicious balance and to discern among them the main strands of meaning will confound and humble every contemporary who has tried to master even a minor sector of this vast and confusing panorama. He will be confirmed in his impression, that he moves under the guidance of a uniquely trustworthy narrator and interpreter.

It will surprise many to discover that Professor Latourette does not find our own times a disheartening epoch in Christian history. He is emphatically reserved in the hypothesis, seemingly suggested in some of his shorter books and developed by other writers, that 1914 may have ushered in one of the episodes of "recession" which have thrown the Church into retreat periodically since the beginning. It is a possibility not to be denied, but only a possibility. The final significance of our period in the tides of flow and ebb which have swept the Christian movement for-

ward and then backward across all the nineteen centuries must await the longer perspective of later generations. True, the past forty years have witnessed losses, notably in the regions of Eastern Orthodox allegiance. But there have also been gains, mighty gains, especially where Christian faith is most virile and fecund in the lands of the Younger Churches. This volume bears the title "Advance Through Storm," but it is *advance*. And Doctor Latourette reminds us that the title might as appropriately be written across the whole of Christian history.

Many readers, however, will hardly resist the temptation to turn at once to the last hundred pages in which the author brings to focus the main conclusions formed in his own mind by a lifetime's brooding upon this strange and mighty phenomenon, the most dynamic, prolific, and enduring which humanity has yet witnessed—the Christian missionary outreach. There is no strikingly novel material here. For Doctor Latourette had permitted us anticipatory hints in a series of briefer occasional writings, cast off like sparks from the anvil while his magnum opus was under construction, such as *Anno Domini*, *The Unquenchable Light*, and numerous articles. But the hints there disclosed are now resurveyed in their entirety, woven into coherent unity, and set forth with far greater depth and power. It is not too much to say that these three closing chapters together constitute the most comprehensive, authoritative, and commanding conspectus of the Christian movement's world-girdling advance through two millenia which is available to us.

Other and more competent reviewers have paid their tribute of praise to this seven-volume work. The current academic vogue cultivates understatement (which, by the way, is no less a perversion of truth than overstatement), and eschews superlatives. The plain fact is that, in appraising Doctor Latourette's work, only superlatives are appropriate because only they tell the truth. By any test, this is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, achievements of historic scholarship in the life of the Christian Church, indeed one of the most notable in all historiography. Of competent church histories we have an abundance. Harnack had told the story of the early centuries with something of the same mastery of detail. No other has essayed to hold the entire drama of Christianity-in-the-world under review and set forth its annals and their meaning with comparable scope and power. Probably no other was adequately equipped. That essential equipment is of two kinds. On the one hand, thorough scholarly competence. The extent of Doctor Latourette's mastery of his materials, in each period and over the whole world, is suggested in the bare fact that the seven volumes contain no fewer than 15,844 footnotes, and annotated bibliographical references to no fewer than 3,400 works (though these include only *major* sources which have been used more than once in the text). The other necessary equipment is of a more subtle and inward kind. It is the habit of scrupulous accuracy and fidelity to truth at whatever cost linked to discerning judgment. These are fundamentally spiritual qualities. Only a great Christian can write great Christian history, for only such a one is gifted by the very Reality he portrays with the indispensable inner character which, no less than command of facts, renders comprehension possible.

There is a peculiar, if paradoxical, appropriateness that this hour of universal darkness should have brought forth so epochal a fulfillment. (One is irresistibly reminded of that earlier greatest effort of a profound Christian mind to wrestle with the meaning of human destiny, the *De Civitate Dei*, so different in form from this fact-grounded historical chronicle), and that its main import should be so effulgent with hope and assurance. The Christian world stands under immeasurable

debt to this modest and retiring scholar of God, and will continue to do so through many coming decades of "advance through storm."

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The Cross and the Eternal Order. By HENRY W. CLARK. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. pp. xiii-319. \$2.50.

The increased interest in the interpretation of Christian redemption is shown in the flood of new books, particularly in England. This volume is the mature product of a Congregational minister and educator. Though it is written in much too verbose a style, it supports a point of view with several unique features.

The book begins with the true, but often forgotten, fact that every theory of atonement assumes some particular world view. The author subscribes to what may roughly be termed a theistic evolutionism. The operation of the atonement, however, is *upon* human evolution, not *within* it. His sympathies are with Greek theology rather than with Latin. The problem is viewed not from the standpoint of a judicial relationship, but the work of the creator and re-creator. This involves an able criticism of traditional sacrificial and substitutionary theories. Clark insists that the problem is not primarily one of forgiveness, as in the relation of man to man, for God's relation to man is entirely unique.

The life movement, in and through which humanity should have been borne back into God, has been checked, and this by humanity's own choice and fault. A force to reverse this movement must be applied, and that did appear in Christ. "In Christ, therefore, the very creative life of God steps forth on the human platform to create a new manhood, which by man's appropriation of it, is to be substituted for the old." Christ is substitute in his capacity as *agent*, not in shielding man *from* God, but in making him one *with* God.

How does the author know this? Primarily from a very curious exegesis of Colossians 1:15-20, where we read about Christ, the creative Wisdom, that "all things held together in him." But in his death Christ withdrew his former immanence in humanity. "Christus Redemptor" means the restored immanence of Christ to those who completely submit themselves in faith to the new life force. Hence, now, man is either Christian or Christless. It is not a matter of judicial decision, but the presence or absence of this force, restored by the Resurrection.

It should be apparent that the discussion deals with the heart of the problem, the actual redemption of human personality. But the procedure is that of quite subjective speculation. Great areas of biblical material are totally ignored. The author does not come to grips at all with contemporary biblical scholarship in his interpretation of the gospels. He elaborates a theory from one passage in Colossians and pays no attention to the equally important statement in 2:11-15. This sets forth a deliverance from flesh, the law, and the principalities and powers in a way which contradicts the author's assumptions. We thank him for his emphasis on the Resurrection (so largely ignored by traditional expositions of Atonement), and also for his devastating demonstration of the utter inadequacy of these traditional statements. But his own view is much too speculative and unbiblical to be accepted as true. I only wonder that C. H. Dodd should have written a foreword for it.

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Preaching in a Revolutionary Age. By G. BROMLEY OXNAM. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1944. pp. 207. \$2.00.

At the close of one of Bishop Oxnam's Beecher Lectures on Preaching at Yale, the lectures which are contained in this book, a professor in Yale University said to one sitting near him, "It is a great treat to listen to a preacher who gives evidence of knowing that the word 'revolution' is more than just a figure of speech."

That was an acute criticism, which underlined one element in the value of the lectures and book. There are many elements of power in the book, but one of the most outstanding is the swift, direct march into the major issues of our time: social economic, and religious, the sure command of fact, and the forthright boldness of the argument and conclusions. The timeliness as well as the insight of the author are indicated by the fact that sharply strikes the reader today, that in the eight months that have elapsed since the lectures were delivered in April, 1944, many of the issues discussed have not only acquired a new urgency, but have also moved in the direction that Bishop Oxnam predicted.

A clear panoramic picture of a world of overturn is passed before the eye of the reader, revolution in Russia, China, Germany, Italy; revolution in politics and government, economic and social relationships. Then all through the book, he faces with no evasion, the outstanding fact, full of terrific challenge to the Church, that "the major revolutions of our day have been accompanied by the repudiation either of Christianity itself, or of Christianity in its organized form, the Church." In colloquial language, he asks, about this arresting fact, "How come?" and answers the question, "What can we do about it?" Insofar as the theme of a wide-ranging book can be put into two or three quoted sentences, it may be put with, I hope, not too great injustice, in these sentences: "The preacher must know the fundamental causes of the revolutionary era into which he has been thrust, must know the ideals proclaimed by revolutionary movements, the programs proposed and the methods advocated to realize these ideals. He must come to decision relative to the great objectives for man and society—thus being in a position to continue as a teacher of conduct for the individual and society, a voice of judgment on those practices that contradict the principles, and a herald of a new day."

A large order, surely, but Bishop Oxnam meets it with specific detail and intellectual vigor. He is not afraid of facing the logical conclusions of a faith in a God of love, or of bringing that God and faith into the closest relationship to the assembly lines of industrial production. The gist of the argument lies in giving concrete implementation to these general principles, as he states them: "The common faith must come to live in the practices that make for brotherhood; the co-operative spirit must supplant competitive struggle; the objective of social endeavor must shift from profit-making to personality-making—not that private enterprise needs to go, but the spirit that infuses it shall be altered and the objective it pursues shall be changed."

One of the impressive and stimulating qualities of the book is Bishop Oxnam's "courage of the concrete." In dealing with large and controversial questions, he is not like the Maine farmer, who was shingling his house on a foggy day and shingled right off into the fog! There is no fog in the author's brain or in his pages. Take two specific instances: He pictures with force one of the greatest liabilities of our time in America, that the owning classes may so fear any change in the practices which have brought them profit and power that they will reject

democracy and choose ownership as the great value. He pleads also against the trend now being pushed forward by sinister forces, that of developing among our soldiers and sailors an anti-labor attitude. He writes: "The seeds of class war lie in misinforming our armed forces, and those responsible for sowing them do the nation a terrible disservice. That comes under the head of 'plain speaking.'"

Through it all he stresses the truth that the Christian gospel is not centered on either revolution or reform but on regeneration.

Any review would be grossly inadequate which did not stress with a long row of exclamation points, climaxed by the Long Metre Doxology, the sheer exhilaration of the vivid, graphic, and epigrammatic style. That is not a minor matter, as anyone who has ever read the words of Jesus knows. Indeed, one of the great handicaps under which religion today labors, is that so much written in support of it is done in a specialized alien jargon. Truth is carried in cases so hard that the dynamite within never detonates. Oxnam can, and does, explode. It is a joy to watch his sentences march by. They deploy like well-trained troops, they move briskly, wheel, and, at the word of command, stop. His sharp pictures and narratives are arresting, the Nazi girls interviewed in Berlin, the Red Square at Moscow, 10 Downing Street; his experience in listening to a sermon by Bishop Lawrence of Massachusetts, while looking out the church window at a washwoman working on a slum fire escape, with the startling emanation of the Bishop's text which flashed into the author's mind: "When ye see these things come to pass, know ye that the Kingdom of God is *not* nigh at hand." He writes epigrammatic sentences which snap like a whip, as "The church is on a march, not in a minuet," or his rollicking comparison of the work of the episcopacy to the ringmaster in a circus, "a bishop must have the ability to manage the occasional clown, check up on the jugglers and sleight-of-hand performers, and be certain that the sideshows do not outshine the performance in the main tent."

But deepest etched of all is the passion for the revitalization of faith.

HALFORD E. LUCCOCK

Yale University Divinity School, New Haven, Connecticut.

A Treasury of Great Sermons. By DANIEL A. POLING. New York: Greenberg Publishers, 1944. pp. ix-198. \$1.50.

A Treasury of Great Sermons is a collection that has just been published by Dr. Daniel A. Poling, well-known preacher and leader of youth. In this volume, an attempt has been made to gather together what might be called the greatest sermons in the course of Christian preaching. The book consists of twenty-eight selections in all—five taken from the Bible, and the other twenty-three from published sermons of some of the world's most famous preachers.

The five selections from the Bible begin with the Sermon on the Mount, which it may be presumed would have first rank in any book such as this. And the other Bible preachers whose works are chosen are Isaiah, Peter, and Paul. It may be noted that the difficulty of editing such a volume as this, is well illustrated by the fact that there is no selection from Deuteronomy, nor Jeremiah to mention two who certainly have a high place among the preachers of the world.

The remaining twenty-three selections cover a large portion of the history of the Church for the last 2,000 years. Doctor Poling begins with a discourse by The Venerable Bede on "The Meeting of Mercy and Justice." Among the other

preachers are found St. Francis, John Calvin among the reformers, and Jonathan Edwards from early New England times. We find here also some of those more recent pulpit utterances that have become famous the world around: "The Greatest Thing in the World," by Henry Drummond, "The Three Crosses on Calvary," by Frederick Robertson, "The Expulsive Power of a New Affection," by Thomas Chalmers, and "The Candle of the Lord," by Phillips Brooks. Christian opinion has assigned these famous discourses a permanent place in the literature of the Church. It is one of the merits of this book that it offers these to us in one place where they may be read and studied. We also find among the great men of the nineteenth century Bushnell and Beecher and Moody. It is interesting to note that Moody's sermon on "Good News" is found here between sermons by Beecher and Brooks, for the contrast in the styles of preaching could hardly be more marked than that to be found in the utterances of these three outstanding men.

Naturally, we turn with some interest to see just which of our contemporaries Doctor Poling has seen fit to include in his roll of the great preachers. Of these there are in all ten, representing a wide variety of choice. One is the late Cardinal O'Connell of the Roman Catholic Church, another Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, and a third, Martin Niemöller, leader of the German Confessional Church. It is indeed an interesting question that is suggested here. What things that men are saying today are going to live for the next one hundred or the next five hundred years? It is only natural that a man should make so large a choice from preachers of his own time in compiling such a collection. They reflect one thing at least, and that is the author's convictions as to messages for our times. Doctor Poling's own test of a great sermon is stated in the foreword: "Human Weakness, Suffering and Inadequacy, Pointed toward Divine Strength, Comfort, and Power." Certainly in this day and age, the establishment of this connection between God and man is as important as at any time in the history of the Christian Church. We are glad to read these and many other words by acknowledged leaders of the present day that will help us to reach the heart of man in a time of overwhelming crisis.

PAUL F. BARACKMAN

The Bedford-Central Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, New York.

Caesar and Christ. By WILL DURANT. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944. pp. xv-751. \$5.00.

While *Caesar and Christ* is the third volume of a monumental "Story of Civilization," of which at least two more volumes are projected, it is, nonetheless, a complete and well-defined unit in itself. It is a happy illustration of Doctor Durant's genius for a summary narrative that is often as sparkling as that of a first-rate historical novel, but always grounded on thorough and accurate scholarship. The drama of the rise and fall of the greatest empire of antiquity is a well-worked theme, but *Caesar and Christ* is evidence that the mine has not been exhausted. Doctor Durant's reading in original and secondary sources has ranged very far afield, and we share in its fruits in chapters on social, economic, literary, and religious history, as well as on the history of art, of philosophy, and of political event and theory. One might use a sentence about Doctor Durant's book that he himself has quoted from the preface to Strabo's *Geography*: "It is a colossal work . . . worthy of a philosopher."

The Christian minister will be interested chiefly in the two concluding books

on "The Empire" and "The Youth of Christianity." Occasional errors in detail are perhaps unavoidable, but are remarkably infrequent. This reviewer notes the erroneous use of the word "followers" on the top of page 559, "Yahveh" instead of "Yahweh" in several places, "priest" instead of "leader of the synagogue" on page 500, "Heb." instead of "Aram." on page 617, and "Justin" instead of "Ignatius" on page 611 (and in the index *ad loc.*). For the "Life of Jesus and the History of Primitive Christianity," Durant takes his cue, in the main, from Guignebert, but corrects the latter's viewpoint from Goguel, E. F. Scott, Klausner, and others. He rejects Gibbon's famous charge that Christianity was the chief cause of Rome's fall. The growth of the new religion was more an effect than a cause of the Empire's decay. Occasional illuminating parallels between the past and the present are cautiously drawn to our attention in many chapters, and an excellent documentation, index, and bibliography enhance the book for later reference.

S. MACLEAN GILMOUR

Queen's Theological College, Kingston, Ontario, Canada.

A Great Time To Be Alive. By HARRY EMERSON FOSDICK. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944. pp. vi-235. \$2.00.

The public always expects a great book whenever it is announced that the publishers are bringing out a book by Doctor Fosdick. His latest—*A Great Time To Be Alive* is more than just a great book—it is a book this war-weary world very much needs to give it courage, faith, and determination to live victoriously.

In these sermons Doctor Fosdick is not trying to minimize the tragedy of these dark days—in fact, with vivid language, he is showing us not only the problems that are with us during these days when we are in the war, but he is reminding us of the problems we will be facing when the war is over. However, and herein lies the tremendous power of these sermons, he reminds us over and over again that Christianity has always been at its best in the time of greatest stress and strain.

He says, "One who knows history knows that in just such times as these, turbulent and revolutionary, whole generations have been brought to their senses; strong souls called on for adequacy have proved adequate; creative gains have come as from travail, and long afterwards flags have been flown by rejoicing nations because of what was done in them."

I have a feeling that many people are going to be saying as they read words like these, "There is a path one can travel even when the lights are dim, and the road is rough, and by the grace of God we will travel that way."

It is good to have a man like Doctor Fosdick who, through his preaching, teaching, writing, and living, has won the confidence of the American people, telling us that it is *A Great Time To Be Alive*, challenging us to make our religion vital, showing us that "No dry-as-dust religion will do now," giving us the conviction that it can be to us "A light that no darkness can ever put out."

After reading the book we feel like saying to the author, "Doctor Fosdick, you have expressed a hope in your sermons, *A Great Time To Be Alive*, that for some souls here we might bring in a northwest wind that would blow the fog away and give us a day of clearer seeing. You have done just that for us and we are eternally grateful."

JOHN W. RUSTIN

Mount Vernon Place Methodist Church, Washington, D. C.

The Relevance of the Prophets. By R. B. Y. SCOTT. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. pp. ix-237. \$2.50.

Dr. R. B. Y. Scott has written a book on prophesy I wish I could have had at the beginning of my ministry. His very first chapter is devastating proof that prophesy is not telling what is going to happen 1260 A. D. or 1934 A. D. Page three is a good page to read to those who know when the world is coming to an end. He does not class Daniel and Revelation with the prophetic books.

The prophets, he contends, express moral certainty and spiritual understanding of what will be because of what is. And because of that the prophets are relevant for our day. The truth they declare is permanently valid.

The second chapter is a very fine and usable short history of prophetic times. The third chapter gives the antecedents to the literary prophets. He claims there is an apostolic succession of prophetic voices in the Bible for which there is no parallel in the ancient world.

Doctor Scott handles admirably the authenticity of the prophets' word. He asks how the prophets were so sure they were right. Besides direct revelation from God they tested prophecy by its moral and worth and rationality. It was not by signs but by the inherent worth of the truth revealed.

Contrary to some writers he maintains that the prophets were theologians or that theology was implicit in their teachings. One of their major contributions to theology is their redefinition of sin.

He takes sharp exception to the idea the Old Testament has no word for history. On the contrary, the religious interpretation of history is laid in the Old Testament and its deepest insights are to be found in the words of the prophets. It is for this reason that the religion of Israel did not perish when the Temple was destroyed.

Perhaps Doctor Scott expresses a somewhat new note when he says, "The prophets were deeply concerned about the nature of the social order because of their theology, particularly the doctrine of man." The prophets were not thinking so much about a heavenly existence as about a new social order.

In the tenth chapter he sums up his whole idea of the relevance of the prophets to our day. And this chapter is worth the price of the book, it seems to me. He says the prophets speak not *of* our age, but *to* it. Their amazing power to penetrate past the maze of appearances to the underlying human and religious facts gives them validity to us today. They were able to define essential justice and essential religion amid all the confusion of traditionalism and heathenism of their day. He speaks well when he says, "We have the prophets to thank for the great insight that religion is not a specialized activity of man's life, but a quality and attitude in all his activities."

GEORGE MECKLENBURG

Wesley Methodist Church, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Highroads of the Universe. By J. GLOVER JOHNSON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944. pp. xii-316. \$2.50.

Doctor Johnson, who is head of the Department of Religion and Chaplain at Mount Hermon School for Boys, has attempted in this study to relate the teachings, life, and death of Jesus to dominant trends and discoveries in the physical, biological, psychological, and social sciences. Doctor Johnson's gift for skillful

and interesting exposition, which brings difficult material easily within range of the intelligent layman and youth, is everywhere apparent, whether he is describing the origin of the world, the theory of organic evolution, the problem of evil, immortality, or the causes of war.

The problem in this book centers around the structure of the argument. On Doctor Johnson's account, man is not only aware of his dependence on, and higher status within, the order, unity, and creativity of Nature, but he responds to it with awe and trust. He must realize, nevertheless, that the scientist, who works with observable and measurable data, cannot justify his religious "hunch" that there is a God. "He is reassured, however, in learning that science does not rule out the possibility of there being a God" (p. 35), and that he may "believe in God without doing any violence whatsoever to his acceptance of the findings of science." (p. 47.) But we note that it is Doctor Johnson, and not the scientist, who sees in natural, biological, and psychical developments "apparent unity and purpose in the process as a whole." (p. 47.) The function of religion, accordingly, is to affirm and expound the concrete meaning of this unity and purpose.

At this point the author does not pause to attempt even a sketchy refutation of those materialists, mechanists, and other thinkers, to whom the unity and purpose of the universe are not so apparent. This omission is logically and empirically significant if one is to do more than show that the Christian interpretation of the world is plausible and *not inconsistent* with a *certain view* of the universe. For once unity and purpose is "apparent," the stronghold of the argument for God has been conquered. It certainly is true "that science without religion would leave vital areas of human experience completely untouched" (p. 54), but before the religious interpretation of the whole can be accepted (especially if there are to be "no assumptions"), other interpretations must be shown to be less reasonable. Religion lives a precarious life indeed as a supplement, fulfilling the promise in a "scientific" account of the universe!

While this book may be recommended as a clear non-technical survey of basic scientific and middle-of-the-way Christian convictions, and their *possible* interconnection, it will not be as helpful as it might be to the more critical student who wants a clear-cut analysis of issues rather than a fitting together of interpreted data.

PETER A. BERTOCCHI

Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts.

The Significance of the Cross. By F. W. DILLISTONE. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1944. pp. 247. \$2.50.

The cross must hold a prominent place in a vigorous presentation of the Christian message. But how are we to think of it? Obviously there must be both serious study of the death of Jesus and a fresh statement of what the cross means to our generation. Dillistone, after showing that events in our day have shown anew the significance of Christ's death, takes up both these lines of study.

He first deals with the cross in the New Testament. Rightly recognizing that the New Testament offers no finished doctrine of the Atonement, but rather "dramatic accounts" and "vivid metaphors which serve to describe the significance which these events possessed" (p. 35), he examines these metaphors and the names used of Jesus, under: "Redemption and Salvation," "Judgment and Justification," "Consecration and Communion," "Forgiveness and Reconciliation."

The second main section, devoted to the reinterpretation of the doctrine "in terms of present-day thoughts and ideas," opens with a study of how theologians have interpreted the cross. The author here presents his conviction that the best way to present the cross is the method of imaginative comparison. "There are four great areas of the imagination," and each suggests a way of viewing the cross. "The struggle of life" calls for a discussion of "The Cross as Redemptive Conflict." "The ordering of the life of the community" leads to thought concerning "The Cross as Righteous Judgment." "The creative activity of man" gives occasion for an instructive analysis of "The Cross as Creative Suffering." "The life of the family" suggests discussion of "The Cross as Forgiving Love." A concluding chapter relates the cross to the eternal purpose of God.

One may doubt that the cleansing of the Temple was meant by Jesus to indicate that the end of animal sacrifices was at hand (p. 85), or that Jesus clearly saw the necessity of the cross at the time of his temptation (p. 191).

Such questions, however, deal with minor points. The book has great strength and positive worth. It combines historical study and contemporary interest, scholarship and faith. Well written, enriched by well-chosen but not too frequent quotations and illustrations, it will prove intellectually and spiritually profitable to the thoughtful reader.

FLOYD V. FILSON

McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago, Illinois.

We Preach Not Ourselves. By GORDON POTEAT. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944. pp. 185. \$2.00.

Another book for ministers that laymen ought to read: a tool forged in the preacher's fires, beaten out on the teacher's anvil, and fit now for anybody's use. Here is first-class, scholarly, but by no means pedantic expository writing—just to show that it can be done in America, and done well. Original in method, it proves to be far more than a running commentary on Paul's first letter to the Corinthians: it holds together as it runs, with a wealth of homiletical material under its arms. The questions it raises are vital questions: Why a Book? Why the Church? Why the Gospel? Religion and Ethics. Liberty or License? Rights and Responsibilities. Form and Substance. And the answers it gives are vital answers: penetrating, stimulating, "insightful." One cannot read it without being impressed all over again by the sheer timelessness of the New Testament.

No doubt there will be many—among them this reviewer—who will not be thoroughly in accord with some of the theological implications. The approach on the whole is that of the so-called "liberal": not a cause of offense, but an occasion for stumbling. "That . . . Jesus could represent God to man . . ." (p. 32). "Christ died . . . to make God's enemies realize His goodness and His uncalculating love" (p. 62). The Eucharist is "Christ's supreme parable" (p. 151), "the symbolic bread and wine" whereby "we renew our pledge of faithful Christian living" (pp. 153, 154). Such paraphrases of the Pauline witness, and they are not infrequent, may perhaps justly be regarded as measurably short of its full content.

For the rest, however, from beginning to end, it is a sane and balanced book: dominated throughout by the towering figure of the apostle, who keeps

moving up from the dim past like a man coming toward you out of a fog. Against such handling of Scripture and of life no charge can ever lie either of dullness or of irrelevance.

PAUL E. SCHERER

Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Holy Trinity, New York, New York.

The University and the Modern World. By ARNOLD S. NASH. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943. pp. xxiv-312. \$2.50.

The mind behind this book is one of the most brilliant and versatile minds now working at the intellectual problems of religion. Professor Nash has had graduate training in both chemistry and sociology and his major professional work has been theological. He brings this varied equipment to an analysis of the problems of higher education and does so with great vigor. His subject is broader than university education, for he gives a diagnosis of modern culture.

The chief instrument in the diagnosis is Karl Mannheim's conception of the "sociology of knowledge" which leads to the conclusion that there is no such thing as a neutral approach to knowledge. Every man who thinks about the general problems of our life does so from a particular perspective. He develops his ideas about man and society as a Christian or as a Marxist or as Freudian or as a Buddhist. He does not do this as a completely objective observer. It is Nash's criticism of the modern university that it has pretended to be neutral and has, in fact, become naturalistic or secular. It has taken over uncritically philosophies that have been developed under the aegis of science but all the while it has honestly, but mistakenly, believed that its "liberalism" was free from bias.

The totalitarian nations, both Russia and Germany, have had a better understanding of the importance of the philosophy that pervades education than have the democracies. Their mistake has been to develop a false absolute out of Communism or National Socialism.

The constructive chapter calls for universities that are based frankly on the Christian presuppositions about life. It is not enough to have departments of religion which isolate religion from the curriculum as a whole. The author would substitute a conscious acceptance of the Christian presuppositions for the almost unconscious absolute of naturalistic secularism but he would do this against the background of a sophisticated understanding of the bias of faith that underlies every world view. He would not inaugurate an inquisition and he would encourage full freedom of thought within the university community. At present it is his claim that the academic pressures do not permit freedom to present philosophy and the social sciences from a Christian point of view.

As a criticism of the existing situation this book is of very great importance. It does not pretend to offer a developed solution. The author should take more account of the neutral or objective segments in the various sciences and make distinctions between the degrees of relevance of Christian presuppositions to them—to sociology as compared with chemistry, for example. Also he should put more emphasis upon the protection of academic freedom in the university. The last thing that he wants to do is to encourage ecclesiastical control of learning, but his thesis might seem to some readers to involve that danger.

JOHN C. BENNETT

Union Theological Seminary, New York, New York.

Sumerian Mythology. By S. N. KRAMER. Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1944. pp. xiv-125. \$2.00.

Most scholars have dissipated their energies over a wide and varied field, but Doctor Kramer has chosen the wiser course of confining himself to the one field of Sumerology. The result is that he has made himself our leading authority in that field, and all his work there can be accepted as authoritative. It is exceedingly fortunate that we have a scholar devoting all his time and energy to the field because Sumerian, as our oldest known language and unrelated as yet to any other, is an exceedingly difficult language and requires all the ingenuity, labor, and patience that a man can muster.

The present volume is designed as an introduction to a series of seven volumes, bearing the general title, *Studies in Sumerian Culture*. Five of the volumes to follow will consist primarily of source material, while the final volume, *Sumerian Religion: A Comparative Study*, will sketch the religious and spiritual concepts of the Sumerians as revealed in their literature. Of these the first and last will be of greatest interest to the layman. The first volume is surely a happy omen for the others to follow. It makes entrancing reading and for the general reader it opens up a whole new vista undreamed of before. No people have contributed more to the culture of mankind than the Sumerians and yet it has only been in recent years that our knowledge of them has become at all accurate or extensive. In the present volume years of labor find expression in our first authoritative sketch of the great myths of the Sumerians, their myths of origins, of creation, the nether world, and the deluge. The book is profusely illustrated with particularly fine photographs. On page seventeen is a chart showing the Sumerian script in various stages of its development, but Columns III and IV should be interchanged, since the linear script of Column IV is earlier than the cuneiform script of Column III and the script in Column IV should be like that of the archaic tablet pictured on Plate III. The volume has interest for specialist and layman alike and is exactly the kind of book that more of our scholars should be producing in their respective fields. Our thanks are due, not only to the author, but to the American Philosophical Society, that has made possible its publication. We look eagerly forward to the publication of the rest of the series.

THEOPHILE J. MEEK

University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness. By REINHOLD NIEBUHR. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944. pp. xiii-190. \$2.00.

The argument of the five lectures at Stanford University, which make up this book, may be stated with rather more simplicity and ease than has been the case with many of the author's works.

His aim is to vindicate democracy and to criticize its traditional defense. What is valuable beyond measure in the democratic way of life must be saved from the destruction of what is false in bourgeois civilization which cradled it. Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; man's inclination to injustice makes it necessary. Of crucial importance, therefore, is the distinction between what is false in democratic theory and what is true. Only so can democracy serve its proper purpose in the solution of major cultural problems of our time.

With characteristic perspicacity Doctor Niebuhr selects four problems for analysis.

The first is that of the relation of the individual to the community; how set limits against idolatrous self-worship on the part of both individuals and communities? Neither *laissez faire* nor Marxist collectivism is the answer. The second problem is that of property. Until property is recognized and dealt with as a form of power it remains a source of injustice. But neither Marxism nor bourgeois liberalism nor any other social philosophy can manage this problem of property except within a framework of democratic procedure. And even here solutions are only partial though none the less valuable. "Democracy is a method of finding proximate [not final or dogmatic] solutions for insoluble problems."

Why and how democracy can help in the solution of such problems becomes clearer when the third problem is dealt with that, namely, of the diversity of religious, ethnic, and economic groups within the community. For the democratic procedure is one of self-criticism, humility, and charity, as well as of devotion to ideals. At this point religion makes its real point of contact with democracy, for the humility, self-criticism, and charity required by democracy are the fruit of a religion which knows that none is good, save God.

In the organization of the world community (the fourth problem) the realistic school of international thought proposes only the bankrupt solution of the balance of power principle. That principle offers as little hope of escape from international anarchy as do the purely idealistic and constitutional approaches to peace. Here again the classic Christian faith provides indispensable resources for this supreme task of history. That faith puts into our hands the democratic tool for the building of a world order. At the same time it prepares us to face failure and corruption on each higher level of social integration, without being driven to the despair that overtakes simpler idealists in the face of such recurrent failure.

The title of the book hints at the author's position. Like a mediating theologian he deliberately places himself between the cross fires of contrasting beliefs. Unlike the mediating theologian he does not try to reconcile the opposites. From his perilously strategic position in no man's land he criticizes the defenders of democracy as well as its opponents. His analysis is a magic to change the uniform of the combatants on either side so that, to their embarrassment, supporters of democracy may find themselves actually fighting against it and opponents reenforcing it in spite of themselves. But in no case can either friend or enemy of democracy do a good job of aid or harm without quite a change of spiritual garment. This is a kind of allegory. But so is the title of the book.

ARTHUR CUSHMAN MCGIFFERT, Jr.

Pacific School of Religion, Berkeley, California.

The Social Gospel of Walter Rauschenbusch. By VERNON P. BODEIN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944. pp. ix-168. \$3.00.

It is time that a careful study of Rauschenbusch's thought should be published, to set over against the careless generalizations made about the liberal social gospel by Reinhold Niebuhr and others. This volume offers us that careful study.

From this book Walter Rauschenbusch emerges as a pioneer in Christian social thought at the beginning of this century, a man of keen sensitivity to human need, of great courage in social criticism, and of profound depth of personal religious faith. There was in him no facile optimism embracing a doctrine of certain progress: he explicitly attacked that. He was no "activist" opposed to theological reflection: he wrote a full-length book called *A Theology for the Social Gospel*.

He did not reform society from a study; he was for years pastor of a church in a depressed area, and all his life he moved among workingmen as their understanding friend. He was also what his freest critics are not: a careful student and teacher of church history.

Because he had such an alert awareness of the concrete social problems of his day (he died in 1918), his books are dated—but they are not outdated. They will not be till economic justice is established in society, and this now seems a long way off. He fought for the right of labor to organize, when unions were still weak. He talked fearlessly, though discriminately, in favor of socialism, before the days when communism took its place as the bogey of conservatives.

His conception of the Kingdom of God was not utopian even though it was evolutionary. He believed that men must help to bring it in—he was no theological defeatist—but he had no illusions about the perfection of any humanly-achieved social order: "It would . . . always be in danger of slipping back into new forms of tyranny and exploitation." And he laid great stress on the inevitable conflict with evil: the Kingdom of God will have to fight against the consolidated evil power in the world.

Doctor Bodein brings out all these points with careful analysis and copious documentation. We are heavily in his debt. The weakest part of the book is the last chapter, and the volume would have been better without it; for the "relation to religious education" is very superficially treated, and detracts from the impression of careful, scholarly work which the rest of the work conveys.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

Crozer Theological Seminary, Chester, Pennsylvania.

The Predicament of Modern Man. By D. ELTON TRUEBLOOD. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944. pp. ix-105. \$1.00.

Seldom does so small a book contain so much of solid substance. Seldom is it presented in so arresting a way. What Berdyaev and Niebuhr and other original thinkers have been saying about the sickness of our civilization, in terms that sometimes prove too subtle or too academic for others than scholars, is here set forth so vividly as to hold the rapt attention of the average reader.

Doctor Trueblood's diagnosis may be summarized briefly in the following points:

1. The primary cause of the near-collapse of our culture is the poison of secularism. The war is more a symptom than a cause of the condition.
2. Scientific education is no adequate physician. It puts vast power in our hands but is morally neutral as to the ends for which the power is to be used.
3. Ethics affords no adequate remedy. We have magnificent ethical ideals like democracy and brotherhood but they have a curious impotence.
4. The impotence of our ethical ideals is due to our trying to maintain them apart from the Christian faith that produced them. Ours is a "cut-flower civilization." Cut-flowers may be very beautiful but they do not last long when they are severed from their sustaining roots.

5. Religion as an "individual experience" will not suffice. There must be a community of faith and love—a stronger sense of the meaning of the Church as the Christian fellowship that keeps alive, from generation to generation, the great insights of Christianity and bears corporate witness to them before the world.

The key strategy of the Church today, according to Doctor Trueblood, is not to get more half-committed and half-hearted members but to develop "cells" of deeply

convinced Christians who have a vision of a "redemptive society" and are prepared to work together to achieve it.

All this is a colorless outline of a singularly colorful book. The reviewer can only hope that it may stir his readers to buy the volume. He has no fear that anyone will regret having followed the advice!

SAMUEL MCCREA CAVERT

Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, New York, New York.

Getting Acquainted With Jewish Neighbors. By MILDRED EAKIN. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. pp. vi-100, plus 4 music. \$1.00.

One God. By FLORENCE MARY FITCH. New York: Lothrop, Lee & Shepard Company, 1944. pp. xi-144. \$2.00.

Americans All. By OSCAR LEONARD. Illustrated by Ellen Simon. New York: Behrman's Jewish Book House, 1944. pp. 232. \$2.50.

Some months ago Dr. Henry Sloane Coffin pointed out in a stirring sermon that the problem of race prejudice is one of the matters America and Americans must settle in justice and brotherhood in our day. In Mildred Eakin's book, *Getting Acquainted With Jewish Neighbors*, she shows that prejudice causes people to allege "that the Jews are undesirable neighbors, being noisy, ill-mannered; that they are dishonest in business," and "that they have more than their share of money and influence in this country." She suggests that these allegations be scanned critically for their truth and insists that "too many times we judge other groups by their worst representatives, our own by its best."

She then suggests getting acquainted with Jewish people in our community, and recommends that we learn something of their background first, from their Bible, which is basically the first part of the Christian Bible, the Old Testament, through visits to synagogues and temples, and through biography. She says the lives of Jewish men and women like Brandeis, Baruch, Frankfurter, Rosenwald, Morgenthau, Lehman, Lillian Wald, Henriette Szold, Irving Berlin, and Lewis Browne afford a good starting point.

As a further point of getting acquainted with Jewish people, she says Christian children should learn about the great Jewish institutions, the Magen David, the Mezuzah, the Mizrach, the Ark, the Torah, the Talmud, Welcoming the Sabbath Queen, the Passover, the Purim, the Feast of Tabernacles (Booths), and other traditions of the Jewish people.

The book was written principally as a textbook and study guide to inspire teachers and leaders in day schools of religion to teach the children in their classes to have larger horizons of race and religion tomorrow. The study units were planned to be most effective with children from nine to twelve. But it is, after all, the adults who need such information today if we are to defeat the forces of race pride and prejudice in our own days, and one cannot help wishing that Miss Eakin had applied her study to older and larger groups and had carried her work and planning to reach parents and adults of all races so that prejudice between Chinese, Negroes, Italians, Jews, Mexicans, Indians, Japanese, Russians, and Germans might be lessened. These adult groups are the tinder box where the flames of further racial discrimination and our next war may be ignited. It would be of great value if one of the great social foundations would endow Miss

Eakin for the study of these same problems in Chicago, New Orleans, Jacksonville, Los Angeles, El Paso, New York, and Detroit. What she says and recommends is good. But she has only grazed the surface and does not really tackle, analyze, or solve the problem. She does suggest the Christian way to solve the problem for our children; it is to be hoped her plan will be followed and expanded; religious freedom is part of the Atlantic Charter, part of what we are fighting this present war to maintain. Let us win this war—and the peace after it.

Another book which tackles the problem of race prejudice and religious intolerance by working for positive understanding is Dr. Florence Mary Fitch's *One God: The Ways We Worship Him*. Doctor Fitch, on the faculty of Oberlin College, has spent years teaching philosophy, Bible literature, and comparative religion; traveled in Egypt, Palestine, India, China, and Japan for the purpose of studying the religious customs and practices of peoples.

Her study is divided into three main sections, each corresponding to one of the main religious divisions, the Jewish Way, the Catholic Way, and the Protestant Way. It attempts to show in picture and story the answer to many of the questions parents must try to answer for their children about God, prayer, dogmas, the sacraments, festivals, and ceremonies of our churches.

First of all, Doctor Fitch asks, "Why do people worship God? Why do people go to Church? Why do they read the Bible? Why do they pray?" She tries to answer these questions quite simply and on the basis of an interfaith study illustrated with splendid photographs, liberally spread through the book. "Even though . . . all worship one God, all people do not worship in just the same way. In America each person may make his own choice. Freedom of religion is one of the rights of free men. But most people follow the religion of their parents," and we in America "live in a country which was founded on faith in God." Her book from this point "describes the ways of worship which are usual among the majority of Jews, Catholics, and Protestants—the traditional ways in which they worship the one God."

Under "The Jewish Way," she explains how certain customs originated, and discusses certain of the topics Miss Eakin also wants people to understand, the Jewish Sabbath, the education of the Jewish child, Bar Mitzvah, the Synagogue, the great Holy Days and what they mean to Jewish people. On pages fifty-six and fifty-seven she very briefly notes the birth of Jesus and points out His keeping of the Jewish faith. She is strong when she writes, "God is King of kings, Ruler of the universe, but He is also the Father of each individual; He asks that each man treat every other as a brother." But Christians—Protestants and Catholics alike—will feel that she is weak when she refers to the Resurrection as "The old tradition . . . that early Sunday morning, two of His disciples and several women came to the tomb and found it empty . . ." Christians will not be satisfied that she does not refer to Christ's Resurrection directly. Had she done so, she would have won more support from Catholic and Protestant people, and the Jewish people would have understood that she wrote as a Christian on the central point of the Christian faith. In trying to be fair to the Jewish faith, she has weakened her transition to the Catholic religion, which immediately follows.

In "The Catholic Way," she discusses the steps in ordination to the priesthood, baptism, home training, and the meaning of the stations of the cross. Her section on the Mass and Holy Communion, confession, confirmation, and the other sacra-

ments, Easter, and the world-wide Church are the best of the Catholic discussion. One feels the weakness is not giving captions to all of the excellent pictures in the book, but it is especially apparent in the Catholic part. To those who know or who read with care, several errors will be apparent, such as the listing of page seventy-seven in her identification of photographs, where she confuses a picture of nuns as that of Father Costello, while on page eighty-five Father McDermott is called, in error, Father Costello. A few errors are bound to creep into most books, but the captions with each picture rather than a list in the back would have made certain pictures more valuable and would have prevented these several minor errors.

"The Protestant Way" is simply covered, with a discussion of the Pilgrim Fathers, baptism, Protestant home training, the church and Sunday school. She says, "Protestant churches are many and varied. . . . Protestants do not want uniformity." She should have qualified this somewhat in view of the great emphasis upon church union now receiving such attention and emphasis in several leading Protestant denominations. For the average reader Doctor Fitch's book will render a great interfaith service. It is a valuable contribution and the pictures are so splendid that for them alone the book can become an important part of the general literature of worship.

Another book which carries out part of Miss Eakins' plea to understand Jewish people, is Oscar Leonard's *Americans All*, in which he shows by the brief biography of thirty Jewish people the contribution each made to America. Mr. Leonard himself is a prominent Jewish worker and the friend of many leading Jews, so that he gives perspective and feeling to his account of the Jewish participation in the discovery and building of America. He says that we are "Americans all. . . . from many lands. . . . They spoke many tongues. They came here to live and to help make America great. . . . They brought with them love of liberty. They brought with them power to work. They brought with them dreams of a better world." So much that he says rings true that we wish he had omitted just one phrase from the above, that "they came . . . to help make America great." This is one thing most Americans did not come for. They came as political refugees, for religious freedom, for economic opportunity, for a new chance in a new land. True, many of our forefathers, Irish, Jewish, English, German, and Italian *did* make our country great, and the Jewish men and women in Mr. Leonard's study were great people and did big things. But most of our forefathers were not great; they were the "great common people" that Lincoln wrote about.

Mr. Leonard writes well of Jewish participation in the discovery of America, the relations of Columbus and Jewish people, especially with de Sábangel; he shows the worth of the great Lopez, Judah Torro, David de Leon, Judah P. Benjamin, Emma Lazarus, Samuel Gompers, Nathan Straus, Lillian Wald—and ends with a fine picture of the American Dream, a dream so great that millions are dying for it all over the world today. "Once again . . . Gentile and Jew—white and black and brown, native-born and foreign-born . . . are fighting . . . that freedom shall live all over the world." The three books make a good trilogy; one cannot help wishing the three authors might have collaborated in one great interfaith book, for they have the same motivation and interest, to make religion real to all and to foster brotherhood among all and for all.

G. PAUL BUTLER

The New York *Mirror*, New York, New York.

Jesus the Christ. By CHARLES CULLEN. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1944. 30 illustrations and 88 pages. \$2.50.

Lenten pilgrims who desire to journey from Bethlehem to Calvary and far beyond to Joseph's garden will find the sacred way made plain for them by Charles Cullen's illuminating series of drawings called *Jesus the Christ*. This is not just another picture book about the Bible. It is a living re-creation of redeeming moments in the Master's still redeeming life. They are so vividly and so reverently portrayed that one is tempted to give the artist-author the accolade which Jesus gave to the Magdalene when she also had broken a box of ointment of spikenard, precious, very costly: He hath done a beautiful thing; therefore let this thing which he hath done be spoken of as a memorial of him wherever this gospel is preached.

In drawing, the pictures have the historic expressiveness of William Blake or Auguste Rodin, but in chiaroscuro their stippled light and shade give them the mystical otherworldliness of Aubrey Beardsley. The combination of rugged realism and refined mysticism make them essentially Charles Cullen and, more than any of these, Jesus the Christ, Son of Man, Son of God, Saviour. In the opinion of this reviewer this generation has produced no more moving portrait of Jesus than Cullen's baptism in the Jordan with "the Spirit of God descending like a dove" and the dark waters curling away infinitely toward the horizon beyond which his eyes are fixed. Equally unforgettable is the agony in the Garden and the betrayal afterwards by the light of torches and the flash of upraised spears. These lights and shades are miraculously "the light shining in darkness and the darkness overcometh it not." It shines also into the hearts of those who have eyes that see and ears that hear spirit-voices saying—it is the last picture—"He is risen."

Accompanying each picture is the reference as given in the King James Version.

This book should be required reading for every church school. Its drawings should be thrown by a reflectoscope on a silver screen so that all sorts and conditions of men may see the Master as He appeared to His disciples and to Mary Magdalene and to Lazarus. Then with a new insight and a new appreciation will they know Him to be what the artist-author calls Him: "Jesus the Christ."

EARL BOWMAN MARLATT

Boston University School of Theology, Boston, Massachusetts

A Realistic Philosophy. By K. F. REINHARDT. New York: The Bruce Publishing Company of Milwaukee, 1944. pp. xii-268. \$2.75.

This is a fairly loyal version of the neo-thomistic philosophy. The author deals in four chapters with the problems of metaphysical, ethical, political, and economic philosophy. To the generally well-known doctrines of his school he adds very little. He is convinced that his principles remain "perennial" even "in a changing world." He mentions, however, frequently the principles and thoughts of modern philosophers, but only to reject them with the traditional arguments of the Thomists. Thus he cannot do justice to any of them. Of course, the half-popular, easy style of his thinking and writing would not have permitted him to discuss seriously the philosophy of Kant and his successors.

Even so, his discussion of Kant's argument against the transcendent reality of space (p. 51) could have been a little less superficial; he should not have repeated the "perennial" error that Kant has denied "the knowability of objective (transsubjective) reality" (p. 74), since it is the very end of Kant's profound

analysis of experience to show that, and how this knowability is possible; and he should not have mistaken the "order of nature" as conceived by Kant, for the "order of being" as conceived by Aristotle (p. 128). He also should not have accused Hegel of not having attributed freedom to the individual will (p. 129), since the slightest knowledge of Hegel's philosophy refutes this statement.

It is strange that the Thomists never put radically the question whether Greek, and especially Aristotelian, thought can really offer the right philosophic basis for the Biblical view of God, man and world. The antagonism of pagan and Christian views should arouse some doubts in them. The Greek fathers themselves like Clement and Origen felt deeply the chasm between Aristotle's "realism" and their Christian faith (cf. Clement, *Exhortations to the Heathen*, ch. V; Origen, *Contra Celsum*, II, ch. XII). Are perhaps the principles of the Thomist philosophy after all not as "perennial" as Doctor Reinhardt and his fellow Thomists would like to make us believe?

RICHARD J. KRONER

Union Theological Seminary, New York, New York.

The Genius of Public Worship. By CHARLES H. HEIMSATH. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944. pp. xiv-204. \$2.50.

The author says: "If this book has a single thesis it is that the genius of the church resides in its public ceremonial." He believes that the focus of Christian education must be fixed upon the worship of the Church, and that while the Bible should remain central in the curriculum of the church school it should be taught not alone as the record of the individual's quest for God, but as the history of the long and moving achievement of corporate devotion. The book is written for the general reader, and its thesis is unfolded in plain nontechnical language. Historical sections of the book deal with the Hebrew origins of Christian worship, the elaboration of the Greek Orthodox mass, an illuminating interpretation of the Roman Catholic mass, the changes in worship introduced by Luther, the Calvinistic, Presbyterian, and Episcopalian patterns of worship and the characteristics of free church worship. It is the author's belief that the estimated disproportion of the population into ninety per cent conservatives and ten per cent progressives is perhaps wise and needful to hold society together. Worship he conceives to be conservative in that it holds the people to its well-established moral landmark. But he sees that worship is also an adventuring moral force in society. Worship validates divine revelation. The highest service which religion can give to the causes of justice and peace is to lift them to the level of worship. The teaching of the Church becomes dynamic in the lives of people only when they are elevated in worship. "The worship of the church is the flaming instrument of the Christian gospel, the inspired emissary of the Great Redemption." The author is a former college teacher of English. He is now a minister and a leader among Northern Baptists.

HAMPTON ADAMS

Union Avenue Christian Church, St. Louis, Missouri.

God and the World. By J. SCOTT LIDGETT. London: The Epworth Press, 1944. pp. 156. 6s.

This book, by the Nestor of British Methodism in his ninety-first year, is one of collected essays, most of which appeared originally in the London Contemporary

Review. If it is suggested that they are out of date, the author replies that "they preserve the memory and illustrate the issues of recent history." Like the Epistles of St. Paul, it may be said that they are an attempt to answer specific questions as they arose, and that they deal with permanent problems in the realm of the philosophy of religion. Some of the questions raised were verbal in form: others as they are dealt with in recent theological and philosophical literature.

Some will appeal to the purely philosophic mind: others, to those who have no particular philosophic bent. Among the latter the most interesting are: "The Christian Religion and the Exercise of Force," "Spiritual Optimism"—a review of Doctor Temple's *Nature, Man, and God*, "The Reformation and the English Bible," "Catholicity, Constructive and Corrective," "The Spiritual Basis of Natural Law," and "The Coming Challenge—an Appeal."

These essays partake of the vitality of life—and are never simply "academic." Doctor Lidgett, on whose "Spiritual Principle of the Atonement" some of us were brought up, has been warden of the Bermondsey Settlement for half a century—and the Settlement is in one of the worst-bombed sections of East London. With this in mind, the last chapter is particularly pregnant with meaning.

The book is timely, and well worth perusal.

GEOFFREY W. STAFFORD

Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, New Jersey.

Enough and to Spare. By KIRTLLEY F. MATHER. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944. pp. 186. \$2.00.

Professor Mather, an eminent geologist who comes of a long line of devout ancestors and who knows whereof he speaks when discussing the long history of mankind, believes in the future of the human race. He has this faith in man's future because he is convinced that the testimony of science supports the Golden Rule. Men have, he writes, survived in their age-long struggle for existence because they have developed "the habit of co-operation, the capacity for sharing." He predicts that the next steps in the progressive evolution of mankind will be marked by "improvement in the human spirit rather than by changes in human anatomy, by increase in social consciousness of individuals rather than by greater emphasis upon personal or group selfishness, by application of intelligence to the problem of wiser utilization of the resources of the earth rather than by its application to the science of war." He maintains that "the scientific study of man makes it absolutely clear that the virtues extolled by the prophetic voices of religion are in complete harmony with the best interests of individuals and nations."

Professor Mather does not agree with those pessimistic prophets who since Malthus' time have been predicting that the earth's human population will outgrow the natural resources on which it must depend for its existence. He has faith that man, with his growing knowledge of the laws of nature and his increasing willingness to co-operate, will be able so to utilize and share the earth's bounty that there will be "enough and to spare" for all. In support of this belief he presents a statement of "nature's stored capital and man's annual income," which indicates that there is no prospect of the imminent exhaustion of any of the truly essential raw materials, as far as the world as a whole is concerned. All that is required is that all men shall work together in a spirit of brotherhood to insure that these materials will be wisely used and equitably distributed.

Whether or not he is correct in his estimates of the earth's natural resources and of their adequacy for a greatly increased human population, Professor Mather is unquestionably right when he urges the nations of the world to abandon their efforts to gain control of natural resources for their own private uses and to co-operate instead in the utilization of those resources for the benefit of all mankind. For we are today, more than ever in the past, "one world," and we shall inevitably be increasingly so in the days to come. The more widely men recognize this fact, the happier their children and grandchildren will be. Such books as Professor Mather's and such screen productions as the one which has been made from it will help to convert Americans to this point of view.

B. F. HOWELL

Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.

The Church Looks Forward. By WILLIAM TEMPLE. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. pp. viii-193. \$2.00.

This is the final work of the late Archbishop of Canterbury. It consists of twenty-five addresses delivered since he assumed the seat of Augustine. His passing is widely mourned throughout the Christian world. His wise word will be deeply needed in the political and economic confusion after the war. He embodied, perhaps more than any other single individual, the hope of the ecumenical church.

These addresses and sermons cover a wide range from theology to economics, from church union to education, to the Christian treatment of postwar Germany. They reflect his profound philosophical insights, his evangelical zeal, his economic and political liberalism, and his passionate devotion to his Lord.

The volume properly begins with the sermon which he delivered at his enthronement in Canterbury in 1942, in which the ecumenical concern is uppermost. Follows an address in which he urges "that we try to recover in some measure the horror of divisions among Christians which is evident in St. Paul" (p. 13).

Of special interest to educators is his sermon preached at Oxford in June, 1942. He laments that whereas once the universities were centers where there was a real unity, supplied by theology, now a university "is a place where a multitude of studies are conducted with no relationship between them except those of simultaneity and juxtaposition" (p. 38).

He argues that an immediate unity could be found in education for peace, conceived not merely as the cessation of armed hostility, but as "good will effectively maintained against every form of greed (p. 40). Moral training should call for the enduring of hardness as a discipline for this kind of peace. Literature, history, and the sciences should be taught around this central purpose.

This reviewer found intriguing the lecture given before a bankers' convocation on the theme "The Christian View of the Right Relationships Between Finance, Production, and Consumption." Temple makes much of the fact that the Christian Church has always had much to say to economic practices except during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. St. Ambrose regarded alms-giving, for example, not as mercy but as justice.

Here is a work that should be widely read. It calls for dedication of thought and action.

JAMES HARRY COTTON

McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago, Illinois.

The Relevance of Apocalyptic. By H. H. ROWLEY. London: Lutterworth Press, 1944. pp. 192. 8s6d.

Professor Rowley, who is Professor of Semitic Languages in the University College of North Wales, has recently published a remarkably fine book on *The Relevance of the Bible*. This is now supplemented by the book before us which contains "a study of Jewish and Christian apocalypses from Daniel to the Revelation." The chapters were originally lectures given at the Vacation Term for Biblical Study at Oxford. They deal with the rise of Apocalyptic, the apocalyptic literature of the last two centuries B. C., the apocalyptic literature of the first century A. D., and the enduring message of the Apocalyptic. There are six important extended notes on such subjects as the date of Jubilees and the sources and unity of the Little Apocalypse in the Gospels. There is a fine sixteen-page bibliography—long as it is, it is still not complete!

There is little that is new or exciting about the book. It is a good survey of recent English and German work, i.e., since about 1900. The author tends to be conservative; for example, on the question of the Little Apocalypse in the Gospels, he does not hesitate to attribute everything in Mark 13 to Jesus (except the sentence, "Let him that readeth understand"). He accepts the theory that Jesus identified himself with the "Son of Man," which symbolized the Kingdom of God and is to be interpreted in terms of "corporate personality." Thus "in the passage . . . which speaks of the coming of the Son of Man in clouds with great power and glory, it is probable that the Son of Man is primarily a symbol for the coming kingdom in its consummation" (p. 116). The trouble with this sort of interpretation is that it simply runs everything together and then smooths over the surface. It gives the careless reader a feeling of security, but it does not advance our historical understanding of Jesus or the Gospels in the least.

Although a few American titles are listed in the bibliography, it is evident that no American work on the subject is taken seriously—for example, Bacon's theory that the Apocalypse of John *really was* pseudepigraphic, is not so much as mentioned. The author follows right along with the ordinary view that the *Christian* apocalypse was, unlike all its predecessors, not pseudonymous, but gives its author's name. (One wonders if this would be true of other Christian apocalypses, such as the Apocalypse of Peter!)

The best chapter is the last, where the permanent value of apocalyptic is ably brought out. The apocalypticists were not pessimists, nor were they mechanists. They were, in truth, the successors of the prophets. They believed in God and they believed that history has a meaning and a goal. Only, unlike the prophets, they believed that God will do more at the end of history than during its course. In this chapter the author finds it necessary to explain that Hitler does not fit the description of the antichrist (p. 147). He also seems to think that social reconstruction and postwar planning usually assumes "that an economic paradise would be the millenium" (p. 156). That may be true in England—though we doubt it—but it is certainly not true here; nobody thinks that economic and social reconstruction is meant to bring in the millenium, and therefore must not be substituted for religion. Such an attitude would be a most unfair one for religious teachers to take.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

Union Theological Seminary, New York, New York.

Down Peacock's Feathers. By D. R. Davies. Macmillan. \$1.75. A commentary on the General Confession of the Prayer Book.

In This Our Day. By Edith Lovejoy Pierce. Harper. \$1.50. A poet speaks for the mass of humanity.

It All Happened Once Before. By Roy L. Smith. Abingdon-Cokesbury. \$1.00. In the style of a news analyst, the author has paralleled for us the happenings of the Old Testament and today.

The Free Church Tradition in the Life of England. By Ernest A. Payne. Student Christian Movement. 6s. The contribution the Free Church is making to the world via a modern England.

Quit You Like Men. By Carl Hopkins Elmore. Scribner's. \$2.00. A helpful guide for young people and their counselors.

Unfolding Drama in Southeast Asia. By Basil Mathews. Friendship. 60 cents. The scene as it opens before us, and the strategy the universal Church must use for the future.

Approaches to World Peace. Edited by Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and Robert M. MacIver. Harper. \$5.00. The fourth symposium of the (1944) Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion.

The Larger Evangelism. By John R. Mott. Abingdon-Cokesbury. \$1.00. The rising spiritual tide as a challenge to weigh anchor and launch out into the deep.

Soldiers Also Asked. Edited by Ronald Selby Wright. Oxford. \$1.75. Questions which arise in the ranks are answered by the upper file of Britain's churchmen.

The Obedience of a Christian Man. By Edgar P. Dickie. Student Christian Movement. 6s. A Christian view of man in modern times.

The Akan Doctrine of God. By J. B. Danquah. Lutterworth. 14s. A fragment of Gold Coast religion.

Conserving Marriage and the Family. By Ernest R. Groves. Macmillan. \$1.75. A counselor and sociologist speaks.

"By Cornelius." By John Evans. Reprinted from *The Chicago Daily Tribune*. 25 cents. Stories of the Christ as retold in the modern language of a newspaperman.

Son of Man and Suffering Servant. By Edward A. McDowell. Broadman. \$2.00. A historical and exegetical study of the Synoptic Gospels.

The Snowden-Douglass Sunday School Lessons for 1945. By Earl L. Douglass. Macmillan. \$1.50. Helps for teacher and pupil.

Traveler from Tokyo. By John Morris. Sheridan House. \$2.75. To an understanding of our enemy.

More Than Conquerors. By W. Hendriksen. Baker's. \$2.25. An interpretation of the Book of Revelation.

Must Canada Split? By C. E. Silcox. Ryerson. 25 cents. This pamphlet is dedicated "to the cause of moral freedom, to freedom of conscience—in Canada and everywhere."

Let's Think About Our Religion. By Frank Eakin and Mildred Moody Eakin. Macmillan. \$2.00. Not as ye say, but as ye think so are ye.

Thoughts of an Ordinary Woman. By Stella Kilgore Moore. Christopher. \$1.50. Homey bits of verse on everyday themes.